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Abstract
This thesis contains six self-contained chapters on the microeconomics of house-
hold consumption and labour supply behaviour, an introduction and a conclusion.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 address issues of mea-
surement. The first of these considers the quality of household budget surveys rel-
ative to the national accounts. The second considers how we measure the inflation
(with a focus on how price changes should be calculated across goods for which
there is no corresponding spending data).
The following two chapters discuss consumption patterns at older ages. Chap-
ter 4 discusses spending declines in two countries - the US and the UK - and the
role of medical expenses in accounting for these differences. Chapter 5 attempts to
shed light on long-standing puzzles surrounding consumption around retirement us-
ing non-parametric, ‘revealed preference’ tests of different models of consumption
behaviour over the life-cycle.
The Chapters 6 and 7 examine how consumers’ spending and labour supply
choices are affected by changes in their economic environment. Chapter 6 looks
how households responses to house price changes are affected by their initial lever-
age. Chapter 7 looks at how women’s labour supply responds to changes in wages
along both intensive and extensive margins.
Chapter 8 concludes.
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Impact statement
There are a number of ways that the contents of this thesis either has, or could be,
put to beneficial use.
By documenting changes in the coverage of household surveys relative to the
national accounts, and exploring possibly causes, Chapter 2 should be of interest to
those designing household consumption surveys and to the users of those surveys.
This includes national statistical agencies such as the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Chapter 3 has direct relevance for current debates about the use of the Carli
index in the UK Retail Prices Index. A draft version of this chapter fed into the
ONS consultation on the use of the Carli index.
Chapter 4 documents reasons for differences in the decline in spending at older
ages in the US and the UK, while Chapter 5 conducts revealed preference tests on
consumption behaviour at retirement. Both have relevance for debates around the
adequacy of households’ retirement savings.
Chapter 6 discusses how leverage affects households’ spending decisions. The
contents of this chapter could usefully contribute to debates around the use of
macro-prudential policies. These policies aim to promote macroeconomic stabil-
ity by limiting the growth of leverage among households during credit booms.
Chapter 7 estimates labour supply elasticities and questions the idea that ag-
gregate labour supply responses can be summarised by a single parameter. Labour
supply elasticties should of interest to those interested in understanding employment
and hours changes over the business-cycle or labour supply changes to changes in
tax rates.
Contents
1 Introductory Material 18
1.0.1 Measurement of prices and expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.0.2 Consumption spending at retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.0.3 Household responses to economic shocks . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 A Comparison of Micro and Macro Expenditure Measures Across
Countries Using Differing Survey Methods 27
2.1 Expenditure survey methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Australia: Household Expenditure Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Canada: The Survey of Household Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 United Kingdom: Living Costs and Food Survey . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 United States: Consumer Expenditure Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Aggregate coverage rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.8 Candidate explanations for declining coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.8.1 Response rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.8.2 Trends in high income concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.8.3 Regression analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.9 Coverage rates within expenditure categories . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Is the Carli Index flawed?: assessing the case for the new retail price
index RPIJ 53
Contents 8
3.1 The RPI and the CPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1.1 The formula effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 The test approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.1 Basic properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.2 Scalar transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.3 Bound on indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2.4 Invariance properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The statistical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 Empirical exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4 The economic approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4.1 Principle of maximum entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.2 Application of maximum entropy to elementary aggregates . 92
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4 Life-cycle Consumption Patterns at Older Ages in the US and the UK:
Can Medical Expenditures Explain the Difference? 97
4.1 The life-cycle pattern of consumption and income . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.2 Differences in employment and retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.3 Housing ownership and downsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4 Health and the divergence of medical expenditures . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.1 Health status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4.2 Life expectancies and age paths of mortality . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.3 Medical expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.4 Long term care costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5 Inter-temporal allocations of consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.5.1 Growth rates in consumer expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.5.2 Precautionary motives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5 Revealed Preference and Consumption Behaviour at Retirement 132
5.1 The life-cycle model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Contents 9
5.1.1 The life-cycle model and retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.1.2 Parametric approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.1.3 Limitations of parametric approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2 Revealed preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3 Data and sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.4.1 GARP/Life-cycle model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.4.2 Perfect foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.4.3 Single change in λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.4.4 Allowing for non-separable preferences . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.5 Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.5.1 Adverse shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.5.2 Changing household composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.5.3 Credit/saving constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.5.4 Measurement error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.5.5 Time inconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6 Consumption Spending, Housing Investments and the Role of Leverage161
6.1 Life-cycle portfolio choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.3 Household re-leveraging behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.3.1 Panel regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.4 Spending on home improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.4.1 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.4.2 Instrument and identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.4.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.5 Other property investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Contents 10
7 Aggregating Elasticities: Intensive and Extensive Margins of Women’s
Labour Supply 202
7.1 A life-cycle model of women’s labour supply . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7.1.1 Marginal Rate of Substitution, Marshallian and Hicksian
Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.1.2 Frisch Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
7.2 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.2.1 Intratemporal margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
7.2.2 Euler equation estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
7.2.3 Extensive margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
7.3 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
7.3.1 Cohort averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
7.3.2 Individual Variation in hours and wages . . . . . . . . . . . 224
7.4 Results: Parameter Estimates and Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
7.4.1 MRS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
7.4.2 Euler equation estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
7.4.3 Calibration of the remaining parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 230
7.4.4 Goodness of fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
7.5 Labour supply elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
7.5.1 Marshallian and Hicksian hours elasticities . . . . . . . . . 236
7.5.2 Frisch hours elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
7.5.3 The extensive margin, aggregate elasticities and life-cycle
responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
7.5.4 Elasticities with returns to experience . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
7.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
8 General Conclusions 251
A Appendix for Chapter 3 253
A.1 Proofs of chapter results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Contents 11
B Appendix for Chapter 4 260
B.1 Long term care costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
B.2 Within period demand system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
B.3 Coverage of household surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
B.4 Additional consumption growth regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
C Appendix for Chapter 5 272
C.1 Proofs of chapter results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
D Appendix for Chapter 6 274
D.1 Mortgage imputation in Understanding Society . . . . . . . . . . . 274
D.2 LTI constraints and re-leveraging behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
D.3 Two-sample IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
D.4 Alternative estimation approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
D.4.1 Alternative definitions of residential investment . . . . . . . 278
D.4.2 Alternative instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
D.4.3 Alternative sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
E Appendix for Chapter 7 284
E.1 Appendix to Section 7.2: estimation strategy and solution method . 288
E.2 Appendix to Section 7.3: data sources and descriptive statistics . . . 296
E.3 Appendix to Section 7.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
E.4 Appendix to Section 7.5: Results for CES and additive separability . 306
E.5 Returns to experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
E.5.1 Response to temporary wage changes . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
E.6 Appendix to Section 7.4: selection correction . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
List of Figures
2.1 Coverage rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Response rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 Response rates vs. coverage rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Response rates vs. coverage rates, all countries . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5 Top 1 percent income shares, all countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 Coverage rates vs. top income shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.7 Coverage rates, food in the home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.8 Coverage rates, alcohol purchased in stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.9 Coverage rates, new and used vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.10 Coverage rates, furniture, household equipment, and appliances . . . 50
3.1 The size of the formula effect, 2005-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Variation in population modal alcohol prices by month, 2010 . . . . 79
3.3 Variance of Carli and Jevons for bread prices . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Variance of Carli and Jevons for alcohol prices . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5 Bias of the Jevons index for alcohol prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.6 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by sample size . . . . . . 82
3.7 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by sample size . . . . . 82
3.8 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by month . . . . . . . . . 83
3.9 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by month . . . . . . . . 83
3.10 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by base month (sample
size =200) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.11 Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by base month (sample
size =200) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
List of Figures 13
4.1 Non-durable spending and incomes in the US and UK by age, 1984-
2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.2 Non-durable spending by cohort and age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3 Log household income by cohort and age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4 Employment rates: men by cohort and age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.5 Proportion of responders in worst health by cohort and age . . . . . 110
4.6 Proportions covered by government programs, US . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.7 Insurance paid for by others, US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.8 Share of cohort spending on medical care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.9 Composition of out-of-pocket medical spending (1928-32 birth co-
hort) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.10 Proportion of households with 3 or more adults . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.11 Dispersion in OOP medical expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.1 Total income over retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.2 Total non-durable expenditure over retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.3 Results from different revealed preference tests . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.4 Proportion λt higher than λretire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.5 Proportion λt higher than λretire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.6 Proportion λt higher than λretire, no change in HH size . . . . . . . 158
6.1 LTV ratios by age and cohort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.2 LTV ratios and house price growth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.3 New mortgage loans and housing extensions by homeowners in the
UK, 1993-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.4 Purpose of new mortgage loans, 1993-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.5 New mortgage loans and housing extensions by homeowners since
previous PSID wave, 1999-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.6 Housing equity and debt (normalised by income) . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.7 Credit conditions, 1969-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.8 Loan-to-value ratios by age and year moved in (1960s cohort) . . . 189
List of Figures 14
7.1 Wages and hours by education group and cohort . . . . . . . . . . . 224
7.2 Life-cycle profiles: baseline model (solid line) versus data (dashed
line) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.3 Intensive elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
B.1 Real price of medical spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
B.2 Coverage rates, 1985-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
D.1 Imputed and actual LTV values, BHPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
D.2 Re-leveraging behaviour by LTI ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
D.3 Credit Conditions Index vs price-income ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
E.1 Life-cycle profiles: baseline model (solid line) versus data (dashed
line) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
List of Tables
2.1 Features of the data sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2 Coverage and response rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1 Examples of goods at different levels of aggregation in the UK . . . 57
3.2 Importance of different formulae used in the RPI and CPI . . . . . . 59
3.3 Price bouncing example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 Test performance of the elementary aggregate formulae . . . . . . . 71
4.1 Spending categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 Life expectancies at different ages, 1984 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3 Yearly out-of-pocket medical expenditures by country- 2000-2006
Age 60+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4 Average percent consumption growth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.5 Changes in log non-durable expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.2 Regressions: income and expenditure at retirement . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3 Pass rates with single change to λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.4 Pass rates in periods before and after retirement . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.1 Descriptive statistics, BHPS and LCFS and PSID . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.2 Changes in mortgage debt and changes in house prices over two-
year periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.3 First stage results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.4 Exogeneity of instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
List of Tables 16
6.5 Log spending responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.6 Log spending responses: Ages 25-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.7 Effects of leverage on second home ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.8 Effects of leverage on home size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7.1 Variances of labour supply measures, 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
7.2 Changes in weekly hours among the employed . . . . . . . . . . . 226
7.3 Estimation of MRS equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
7.4 Estimation of Euler equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
7.5 Calibrated parameters and targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
7.6 Statistics on hetereogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
7.7 Elasticities at percentiles of Marshallian distribution . . . . . . . . . 237
7.8 Frisch responses by age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
7.9 Frisch responses by household wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
7.10 Frisch responses across the business cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
7.11 Life-cycle responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
B.1 Distribution of out-of-pocket long term care costs, non-institutional
population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
B.2 Estimated demand system coefficients αmk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
B.3 Estimated conditional demand system coefficients αmk (no medical) 268
B.4 Changes in log non-durable expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
D.1 Results with alternative definitions of residential investment . . . . 279
D.2 Results with alternative instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
D.3 Log spending responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
E.1 Descriptive statistics for married women, 1980, 1995 and 2012 . . . 297
E.2 Selection probit results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
E.3 Baseline MRS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
E.4 MRS estimates using GMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
E.5 MRS estimates with different dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . 302
List of Tables 17
E.6 MRS estimates using alternative instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
E.7 MRS estimates using alternative samples/hours measures . . . . . . 305
E.8 External parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
E.9 Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
E.10 Elasticities at percentiles of Marshallian distribution: CES . . . . . 308
E.11 Baseline economy: calibrated parameters and targets . . . . . . . . 310
E.12 Returns to experience: statistics on hetereogeneity . . . . . . . . . . 311
E.13 Returns to experience: Frisch changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
E.14 Labour supply changes, Marshallian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
E.15 MRS estimates with simulated data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Chapter 1
Introductory Material
How do consumers make allocate their labour supply and consumption expenditures
as they age? How do these aspects of consumer choice change in response to shock
to their economic environment, such as wages or house prices?
This thesis examines questions such as these in six self-contained chapters
looking at household spending and labour supply decisions over the life-cycle.
1.0.1 Measurement of prices and expenditures
Before moving on to discuss empirical questions on consumer behaviour, we begin
by discussing two preliminary issues of measurement. Chapter 2 looks at household
budget surveys and their quality as assessed using comparisons with spending totals
from the national accounts. Chapter 3 looks at how we measure changes in the
overall price level (and in particular how we should aggregate price movements
for goods for which we have no corresponding expenditure data). The subsequent
chapters in this thesis, and a great deal of the research literature in this field more
generally, rely heavily on both of these data sources. These two chapters discuss
important potential limitations of the measures of prices and expenditure that we
use, which will be important to bear in mind in any empirical analysis of consumer
behaviour.
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1.0.1.1 A comparison of micro and macro expenditure measures
across countries using differing survey methods
Chapter 2 presents a comparative assessment of the performance of the household
expenditure survey programs in Australia, Canada, the UK and US. It uses cross-
country and time series variation in survey methodology to assess the role of factors
influencing the performance of household surveys.
The chapter starts by examining the coverage of aggregate expenditure as mea-
sured in each of the surveys relative to national account data. The chapter describes
how coverage rates are highest in Canada and the UK. It also shows that, over the
past three decades, coverage remained fairly stable in Canada and Australia, while
in the UK and US coverage rates declined sharply. It then goes on to consider sur-
vey response rates and top income shares in tandem with coverage rates. Falls in
response rates are found to be predictive of changes in coverage rates. Furthermore,
the change in coverage rates over time coincided with the growing concentration
of income, suggesting that growing inequality may have contributed to declining
coverage rates.
Finally the chapter moves on to examine the coverage of specific expenditure
components. There are no clear differences in levels or changes in coverage by
collection method. It is worth however noting the high and stable coverage of regu-
larly purchased items (e.g. food), along with the more volatile coverage of irregular
and larger expenditure items (e.g. vehicles, furniture and household equipment).
The chapter concludes that aggregate patterns in coverage cannot be attributed to
specific expenditure components or collection methods.
1.0.1.2 Is the Carli Index flawed?: assessing the case for the new
retail price index RPIJ
Chapter 3 discusses the relative merits of different formulae for use at the elemen-
tary aggregate level of price indices (i.e the level at which expenditure weights are
not observed). It does so in the context of the decision by the UK’s Office for Na-
tional Statistics to replace the controversial Carli index with the Jevons index in a
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new version of the Retail Prices Index - the RPIJ.
The literature on price indices has identified three ways to select index num-
bers. In effect, we can ask:
1. Does the index respond appropriately when prices change in different situa-
tions or does it give answers we might consider perverse?
2. Is the index a good statistical estimator of the general price change as distinct
from relative price changes across goods according to some measure (as we
will discuss below, exactly which measure is a matter of some debate)?
3. Does the index provide a good measure of how the cost of living is changing
for consumers (i.e the costs of obtaining a given level of welfare) ?
The first of these is called the test approach. This is because we determine
which index has the best properties by setting out a list of criteria (‘tests’) and then
asking which indices satisfy them. The second is called the statistical or stochas-
tic approach. The third is the interpretation of price indices that is used by most
economists and as such is referred to as the economic approach.
In this chapter, I explain what each of these approaches are and use them to
make my own assessment on the suitability of the Carli index for use at the elemen-
tary aggregate level of a price index. In doing so I make a number of contributions
not only to the current debate on the new RPIJ index but also to the way that elemen-
tary indices should be selected more generally. A primary concern of the ONS was
the Carli’s sensitivity to so-called price-bouncing which could lead to an upward
bias. I formalise these concerns in a new price-bouncing test for the test approach.
For the statistical approach, I present some evidence on the relative performance of
the Carli and Jevons. I find no clear evidence for the superiority of one index over
the other, and that the relative performances of the Carli and Jevons are not invariant
to factors such as the month the index is calculated; the sample size and the choice
of base month against which price changes can be compared; and the type of goods
included in the elementary aggregate. I also argue that the economic approach can
be applied to the elementary level, and moreover that it favours the Jevons index,
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by appealing to something analogous to the principle of insufficient reason from
information theory. Overall, I conclude that there is indeed a case for replacing the
Carli index with the Jevons.
1.0.2 Consumption spending at retirement
The next two papers discuss consumption patterns at older ages. Chapter 4 dis-
cusses spending declines in two countries - the US and the UK - and the role of
medical expenses in accounting for these differences. Chapter 5 attempts to shed
light on long-standing puzzles surrounding consumption around retirement using
non-parametric, ‘revealed preference’ tests of different models of consumption be-
haviour over the life-cycle.
1.0.2.1 Life-cycle consumption patterns at older ages in the US and
the UK: can medical expenditures explain the difference?
Chapter 4 documents how nondurable expenditures decline significantly more at
older ages in the UK compared to the US, in spite the fact that income paths are
similar. It then explores several possible causes, including: differential cohort ef-
fects in the two countries that may distort average life-cycle age profiles, differences
in timing of retirement in the presence of separabilities with employment, differen-
tial paths of housing expenditures possibly driven by institutional differences in
housing markets between countries, level and path differences in health status and
mortality, and finally the levels, prices and volatility of medical spending.
The chapter shows that, among all the potential explanations considered, those
relating to healthcare differences in levels and age paths in medical expenses and
medical expenditure risk can fully account for the steeper declines in nondurable
consumption in the UK compared to the US. This is because deteriorating health
with age in the US leads to higher spending there while this is not true in the UK
where healthcare is provided free by the National Health Service.
We show this in two ways. Firstly, we quantify differences in the paths of dif-
ferent variables for different cohorts as they age in the two countries. While there
are some differences in the way health, housing tenure, employment and mortality
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evolve in the two countries, these differences do not seem large enough to account
for the cross-country difference in spending patterns. Secondly, we examine the
role of different variables in explaining consumption changes in a regression con-
text. We find that controlling for health, housing, mortality and employment only
marginally reduces the cross-country difference in the decline in nondurable con-
sumption spending with age when medical expenditure is included. We then turn
to model non-medical consumption conditional on health status and real medical
expenditures. This approach allows preferences for non-medical consumption to
change in a non-separable way with health and the consumption of medical goods.
It also captures any substitution effects driven by the change in the relative price of
medical consumption. We also consider the role medical expense uncertainty may
play in explaining consumption profiles in the US, partly by exploiting differences
in the institutional environments in the two countries. We find suggestive evidence
that precautionary savings against medical expense risk play an important role in
US consumption decisions. Controlling for both medical uncertainty and relative
prices fully explains the cross-country difference in spending declines.
Our regression estimates imply that medical uncertainty increases consumption
growth at older ages in the US by around 0.90 percentage points per year on average
for the ages we consider. Precautionary motives against medical expense risk in the
UK are, by contrast, negligible.
1.0.2.2 Revealed preference and consumption behaviour at retire-
ment
Simple versions of the life-cycle model predict that households’ consumption
should not respond to anticipated changes in economic circumstances. However,
a number of studies have documented falls in consumption as workers retire. Since
retirement should be largely foreseeable for most workers, and a failure of con-
sumers to smooth their consumption around this event violates a central prediction
of the standard life-cycle model, this tendency is referred to in the literature as the
“retirement consumption puzzle”.
In Chapter 5 I probe the performance of the life-cycle model around the retire-
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ment period by applying non-parametric, “revealed preference” tests to households
in a Spanish consumption panel. These tests allow us to examine whether the be-
haviour of retirees can be rationalised by specific variants of the life-cycle model.
The tests themselves are non-parametric and avoid making specific assumptions on
the form of the utility function (beyond it satisfying standard properties such as
concavity, continuity, transitivity and so on).
I test whether household’s behaviour can be rationalised under the standard
life-cycle model, and the extent to which this affected when we tighten assumptions
on consumer’s foresight, allow for non-separabilities in preferences over consump-
tion and labour force participation, or allow for revisions in the marginal utility
of wealth at the point of retirement. Tests of the life-cycle model without perfect
foresight are equivalent to tests of the Generlised Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP) and have little probative force. The perfect foresight life-cycle model per-
forms poorly in the sense that it is largely rejected in our data. Results for this
model are not substantially improved when one allows for a revision in expecta-
tions at the point of retirement. I also find that minimising deviations from the
perfect-foresight life-cycle model suggests rising marginal utility of wealth over
time. Thus the smoothest possible paths of marginal utility that rationalise the data,
are associated with wealth decreasing faster than we would otherwise expect. I
show that this particular result is unlikely to be due to changing family composition
over the retirement period, aggregate shocks over the period we consider or credit
constraints.
This final conclusion cannot be interpreted as strong evidence of consumer
myopia however. The path of marginal utility could be more stable over time if one
allowed larger deviations from the perfect foresight model (due to either uncertainty
or perhaps measurement error in the prices and interest rates used). Perhaps one key
lesson that we can draw from the results of these exercises is the limits on what we
can learn given only data on prices and quantities. The same data can often be
rationalised by increasing or decreasing marginal utilities of wealth, depending on
exactly what one assumes about the nature of the utility function. It is therefore not
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easy to conclude whether consumption patterns over retirement are consistent with
smoothed marginal utility or not on the basis of expenditure data alone.
1.0.3 Household responses to economic shocks
In a final section, we examine how consumers’ spending and labour supply choices
are affected by changes in their economic environment. Chapter 6 looks at how
households responses to house price changes are affected by their initial leverage.
Chapter 7 considers how women’s labour supply responds to changes in wages
along both intensive and extensive margins.
1.0.3.1 Consumption spending, housing investments and the role of
leverage
Do house price booms induce households to borrow and re-leverage their balance
sheets? And can leverage make households more sensitive to future house price
shocks (whether good or bad)? It is now widely believed that increases in debt and
leverage that accompanied the international house price boom prior to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis both deepened and prolonged the length of the slump in consump-
tion spending that followed. As a result, recent years have seen policy-makers
showing increasing interest in macro-prudential measures that limit leverage growth
among households during boom periods, and relax them when economic conditions
weaken.
In Chapter 6, we use two-sample IV methods to combine panel data on house-
hold wealth and leverage with detailed household spending survey data to examine
the borrowing, spending and investment decisions of existing homeowners in re-
sponse to house price increases. In particular, we consider whether these responses
differ according to households’ initial leverage (where leverage is defined as the
ratio of households’ mortgage debts to their net housing wealth). We use variation
in credit conditions over time to isolate exogenous differences in households’ lever-
age positions. We find that households who were initially more leveraged are more
likely to both purchase other residential properties and invest in their own homes
in response to local house price increases than other households. However they do
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not disproportionately increase their consumption spending as house prices rise, as
would be expected if household spending were driven by traditional housing wealth
effects, or if changes in house values helped to relax consumers’ credit constraints.
We show using a simple model how this behaviour can be rationalised in a
framework where households treat leverage as a portfolio choice, choosing leverage
to optimise the risk and return on their assets. Households respond to house price
increases by borrowing and investing in housing (including their own homes) in
order to maintain their desired loan-to-value ratios. More leveraged households
experience a larger reduction in the portfolio share of housing for a given price
increase, and so we would expect that their residential investment spending should
respond more strongly than other households’.
1.0.3.2 Aggregating elasticities: Intensive and extensive margins of
women’s labour supply
For a long time economists have disagreed on how much hours of work and labour
market participation rates respond to changes in wages. Labour economists have
tended to estimate small labour supply elasticities from individual level data, while
macroeconomists, who use business cycle fluctuations of wages and hours, have
tended to find that that labour supply elasticities are considerably larger.
Chapter 7 aims to show that to understand labour supply behaviour and to
calculate aggregate labour supply elasticities, it is crucial to both account for het-
erogeneity across individuals and to quantify responses along both intensive and
extensive margins of labour supply. To make these points precisely, we estimate a
life-cycle model of intratemporal and intertemporal choices over consumption, sav-
ing and work and characterise the response of women’s labour supply to different
types of wage changes. We consider both intertemporal and intratemporal choices,
and identify intensive and extensive responses using data from the US Consumer
Expenditure Survey. In estimating such a model, we use a flexible specification of
preferences that allows us to test some of the assumptions commonly used both in
the macro and labour literature on labour supply. We show that there is substantial
heterogeneity in women’s labour supply elasticities at the micro level and highlight
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the implications for aggregate behaviour.
We find substantial heterogeneity in labour supply responses, and that this het-
erogeneity is prevalent at both the intensive and extensive margins. The median
static Marshallian elasticity is 0.18, but has a 90-10 range of -0.14 to 0.79. The
corresponding Hicksian elasticity is 0.54, with 90-10 range of 0.38 to 1.16; and
the corresponding Frisch wage elasticity is 0.87, with 90-10 range of 0.8 to 1.92.
Responses at the extensive margin explain about 54% of the total labour supply re-
sponse for women under 30, although this declines with age. Aggregate elasticities
are higher in recessions, and increase with the length of the recession.
The heterogeneity that we find at the level of individual households implies that
the aggregate labour supply elasticity is not a structural parameter: any aggregate
elasticity will depend on the demographic structure of the economy as well as on
factors such as the distribution of wealth and the particular point in the business
cycle.
Chapter 2
A Comparison of Micro and Macro
Expenditure Measures Across Countries
Using Differing Survey Methods
Household-level consumption lies at the centre of research into many important eco-
nomic questions. The measurement of microeconomic phenomena such as house-
hold poverty requires the observation of consumption choices made by households
to provide useful information on economic hardship. At the macroeconomic level,
the understanding of responses to booms and busts is enhanced by observing house-
hold consumption responses. Reliable consumption data are necessary to engage in
meaningful empirical research in these areas.
However, there are ongoing concerns about the reliability of expenditure sur-
veys in many countries. These concerns have led to efforts to renew expenditure sur-
vey methodology. In the United States, this activity centres on the ‘Gemini Project’
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, tasked with improving the Consumer Expenditure
Survey.1 In Canada, the Survey of Household Spending was revised in 2010 with
similar goals in mind.2
In this paper, we aim to contribute to these discussions by providing an in-
ternational comparison of the performance of household expenditure survey data
1Edgar and Safir (2011) provide an overview of the Gemini Project.
2Tremblay et al. (2010) report results from a pilot project from 2007 evaluating several changes.
Many of these changes have been implemented for the 2010 Survey of Household Spending.
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across four ‘Anglosphere’ countries: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Our international comparison is a useful way to gather some evi-
dence on the potential sources of problems with expenditure surveys, as differences
in experience and methodology provide sources of variation that may give insights
into the importance of factors influencing the performance of expenditure surveys.
Our strategy is to compare household expenditure survey data to expenditure
measured in the national accounts of each country. While this ‘coverage’ approach
is frequently adopted in country-specific studies of expenditure behaviour, the nov-
elty of our contribution is to produce comparable results across four countries.3
Attanasio et al. (2006), in assessing the expenditure behaviour of poor households
in the US and UK, provide an assessment of micro survey evidence benchmarked
against the national income. In comparison to their paper, we provide more recent
years of data, two more countries with differing methodology, and a more detailed
accounting of the survey differences. Deaton (2005) provides a comparison of a vast
array of countries, with analysis of the same kind of ‘survey vs. national accounts’
comparison we perform here.
The paper proceeds first by reviewing the survey methods employed in the four
target countries. We then discuss in more detail the construction and interpretation
of household survey vs. national account comparisons, and examine the trends
in aggregate ratios of survey to national account data across countries. Next, we
consider how survey response rates have varied across countries and relate them to
our aggregate coverage measures. We then compare the coverage measures to high
income concentration through time and across our countries. Finally, we look at
selected subcategories of expenditure to observe how trends vary across countries.
2.1 Expenditure survey methodology
In this section, we provide some background on the methodology employed for
the household expenditure surveys in each of the four countries in our focus. We
3Some well-known examples of this measurement approach are Slesnick (1992), Garner et al.
(2006), Garner et al. (2009) for the United States. Adler and Wolfson (1988) perform a similar
exercise for Canada. Passero et al. (2015) also provide an updated approach to comparing the CE
survey with PCE.
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describe the target population, survey design, and other special features for each
country. We begin with Australia, and proceed through Canada, the United King-
dom and the United States. At the end of these descriptions, we provide a summary
table of the key elements of the survey methodologies.
2.2 Australia: Household Expenditure Survey
Our analysis draws on seven waves of the Australian Household Expenditure Sur-
vey (HES): 1975-76, 1984, 1988-89 and 1993-94, 1998-99, 2003-2004 and 2009-
10. The HES is conducted over a 12 month period, typically coinciding with the
financial (July-June) rather than calendar year, with households enumerated evenly
over the survey period. The primary purpose of the HES is to collect compre-
hensive information on household expenditures, along with household income and,
since 2003/ 04, wealth. The original objective of the HES program was to provide
information for the construction of commodity weights in the consumer price index
(CPI) - for more details on the HES background and methodology see Australian
Bureau of Statistics (2011).
Expenditures are recorded in HES on an acquisition basis, with details on most
regular expenditures collected using diary methods. Regular expenditure items for
each household member aged 15 years or older are recorded in a personal diary
covering a two week reporting period.4 The fineness of the expenditure categories
used in the survey has increased over time, with 660 items separately recorded in
the 2003-04 and 2009-10 surveys.
Expenditures on infrequent, irregular or expensive items are recorded by per-
sonal interview with each household member aged 15 years or older. The recall
period for irregular purchases varies, ranging from three months for major house-
hold furniture and appliances, 12 months for motor vehicle registrations, and three
years for house purchases. Items such as insurance, rent payments and utility bills
are recorded in the interview with respondents asked the value of the last payment
and the period of time that payment covered. Given the recall periods for items
4The HES records regular expenditures using one-week diaries for two consecutive weeks. In
the 1975-76 and 1984 HES, the reporting period for rural respondents was four weeks.
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recorded in the household interview questionnaire, some of these expenditures will
refer to time periods prior to the reference year. The public release HES reports av-
erage weekly expenditures for all items, with expenditures on some items converted
to average weekly amounts. Additional information on household demographics
and income are also collected during the household interview on a recall basis.
The scope of the HES includes “usual residents of private dwellings in urban
and rural areas of Australia.” Excluded from the survey are residents of non-private
dwellings such as hotels, boarding schools, boarding houses and institutions. Fur-
ther exclusions are residents of very remote districts (or Indigenous Communities).5
In addition, “non-usual” residents of a private dwelling (e.g. visitors) are not in-
cluded in the survey. Approximately 97-98 percent of the Australian population are
within the scope of HES.
Sampling is based on a stratified multistage cluster design. The strata are based
on census collector districts. Individual household records are weighted according
to the probably of initial selection into the survey adjusted according to population
benchmarks based on the demographic characteristics of household size and age
composition, geographic location and labour force status.6 The sample size of the
individual HES collections is typically 7,000 households, though has ranged from
4,492 in 1984 to 9,774 in 2009-10. For the most recent survey we use, the response
rate in the HES was 71.9 percent.
2.3 Canada: The Survey of Household Spending
The Survey of Household Spending (SHS) has been the primary household expen-
diture survey in Canada since it replaced the Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX)
starting in 1997.7 The methodology is described in detail in Statistics Canada
(2001). When relevant, we also referred to the methodological description in the
5Non-Australian defence forces stationed in Australia and the diplomatic personnel of overseas
governments located in Australia are also excluded.
6The two initial HES did not use population benchmarking.
7The differences between the SHS and FAMEX are outlined in Statistics Canada (2000). The
sample size increased, the survey became annual, population coverage broadened, and some minor
changes to survey content were implemented. We include some data from the FAMEX in our work
here, but primarily focus on the SHS.
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User Guide from 2009 Statistics Canada (2011). A detailed comparison of the SHS
with the American Consumer Expenditure Survey is provided in Brzozowski and
Crossley (2011). These sources provide the foundation for the description of the
SHS below. We also use the FAMEX surveys for some of our analysis, but the
primary focus is on the more recent SHS.8
The SHS targets individuals living in Canadian private households, as well as
residents of Indian reserves and Crown Lands. This definition excludes those who
are official representatives of foreign countries living in Canada, as well as those
who are representing Canada abroad. It also leaves out residents of institutions,
hotels and rooming houses, religious orders and members of the Canadian Forces
living in camps. For the lower 10 provinces, the coverage is around 98 per cent of
the population. For the sparsely populated northern territories, coverage is over 80
per cent.
Sampling is based on the Labour Force Survey sample design, which uses
stratified clusters. The strata are based on geography within each province. Spe-
cial strata of households in areas with geographical concentrations of high and low
income residents are also used. Clusters are chosen, and then a sample of house-
holds is chosen from each cluster. Extensive follow-up is engaged for households
who refuse to comply, including further phone calls, visits, and letters. Sample
size started at 18,031 in 1997. From then until 2007, the number of observations
slid down to 13, 939. For 2008 and 2009, budget cutbacks meant a jump down to
samples of 9,787 and 10,811.
The SHS attempts to gather information on the 12 month period from January
1st to December 31st. The information is gathered via a face-to-face recall survey
of one household member in the January, February, or March following the end of
the target calendar year. The survey respondents are encouraged to gather source
documents such as credit card statements, mortgage statements, and their income
tax records. The average survey takes one hour and forty minutes to complete.
8FAMEX surveys were conducted in 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992, and 1996.
The 1984 and 1990 surveys are less comparable because in those years only residents of certain large
cities were surveyed.
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A ‘balance edit’ is applied when the difference between expenditure, income, and
savings, exceeded a 20 percent tolerance level.9 Item non-response is countered by
imputing data based on ‘nearest neighbor’ imputations.
For 2009, weights are provided to account for non-response according to cells
defined by province, age, household size, and family income as measured by ad-
ministrative tax data. This weighting strategy has changed several times. Impor-
tantly, starting in 1999 tax-filing data from the Canada Revenue Agency were used
to match on wage and salary income.10 This is helpful if there is a concern that
lower response rates are particular to certain parts of the income distribution, as the
weights can account for such systematic patterns.11
2.4 United Kingdom: Living Costs and Food Survey
The information in this section is drawn from Office for National Statistics (2010).
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK has carried out some form of
annual survey of household expenditures since 1957. From 2008 this survey has
been known as the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS). Prior to this it was known
as the Expenditure and Food Survey, which brought together what were two separate
surveys for food and expenditure the Family Expenditure Survey and the National
Food Survey in 2001. The survey is conducted continuously throughout the year.
Participation in the survey is voluntary. In 2009, the survey selected over
12,000 addresses, but only 5,825 of these were included in the survey. The re-
maining addresses were either ineligible to be included (because, for instance, the
addresses were for businesses), refused to participate or were not possible to con-
tact. Households in Northern Ireland are sampled separately and oversampled rel-
ative to the rest of the UK in order to achieve the sample size required for separate
analyses. The response rate among eligible addresses was 56% in Northern Ireland
and 50.4% in the rest of the UK.
9Brzozowski and Crossley (2011) look into the impact of this balance edit in detail, by examining
the data from 2006 when no balance edit was imposed.
10The income weights account for incomes in the following percentile ranges: 0-25th percentile,
25th-50th, 50th-65th, 65th-75th, 75th-95th,95th-100th).
11Sabelhaus et al. (2015) show that response rates in the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey are
in fact much lower at the top of the income distribution.
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Households who are surveyed are first asked a series of questions on income,
demographic characteristics, large purchases over the last year or so (on white
goods, vehicles, holidays etc.) and committed expenditures such as magazine sub-
scription costs. Each household member over 16 is then given a spending diary in
which they record all purchases made over the next two weeks. Simplified diaries
for children aged 7-15 have also been included since 1998. At the end of the two
weeks, each adult who kept a diary is paid £10 ($16) for completing the survey
(children who kept a diary are paid £5 ($8)). Spending is grossed-up using weights
from the most recent population Census (which have in the past been carried out
once every 10 years - although 2011 may be the last). Weights are chosen so that
the sample distribution matches the population in terms of region, age group and
sex.
Data collected in the LCFS are used for a number of official purposes. As well
as being used for the construction of the National Accounts, the LCFS is used to
calculate expenditure weights for headline inflation measures.
2.5 United States: Consumer Expenditure Survey
The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) has been collecting information about
American expenditure patterns on an ongoing basis since 1980.12 The Bureau of
Labor Statistics publishes the Handbook of Methods, of which Chapter 16 is de-
voted to the Consumer Expenditure Survey (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011a)). A
short summary is also provided in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011b). A review of
changes to methodology through time is provided by Goldenberg and Ryan (2009).
We draw on these sources in forming our description of the CE survey in this sec-
tion.
The CE survey combines two one-week diaries of around 7,000 households
with a series of five quarterly recall surveys of another 7,000 households. The
target is the total US civilian non-institutional population, which excludes military
personnel living on base, nursing home residents, and people in prisons. Sampling
12There were antecedents to the ‘modern’ CE in 1960-61 and 1972-73, as well as earlier years.
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takes place by choosing households from a list within each of 91 clusters. The list of
addresses comes from the most recent Census file, augmented by new construction
permits. For the 2010 survey, the response rate was 73.4 percent.
The diary component starts with an interview for demographic information on
the first day. The diary of expenditure is to be completed every day during the week.
The diary is collected at the end of the first week and a second diary is delivered.
When the second diary is picked up, more questions are used to collect information
on work and income from the previous year. The data are put through edits and
adjustments when being processed. Some imputations are performed as well.
The quarterly recall survey component aims to gather information on less-
frequently purchased items, with a three-month recall window. The raw data from
the surveys is put through various checks, with imputed values being imposed for
missing data. With the switch from pencil and paper to Computer Assisted Per-
sonal Interview in 2003, the time to complete the interview survey fell from about
90 minutes to around 65 minutes. In what follows we report results for the coverage
of the interview survey only.
The survey is available annually from 1980 to 2010. For several quarters in the
early 1980s, rural households were not surveyed. In our analysis below, we retain
these years but they do stand out on several of the graphs for this reason.
Weights in the CE survey are calibrated to 24 population counts, including
age, race, household tenure, region, and rural/urban. The target population counts
are updated quarterly, and the demographics of the sample are assigned weights
to match the population on these 24 factors. Of note, there is no adjustment for
income.
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Table 2.1: Features of the data sets
Australia Canada (SHS) United Kingdom United States
Recall vs. Diary Diary (regular) Recall (irregular
or large items)
Recall Diary
(regular) Recall
(irregular or
large items)
Recall/ (and di-
ary)
Interview recall period Varies; up to 3
years
Annual About a year Five quarterly
surveys
Balance Edit? No Yes No No
Weighting benchmarks Age, house-
hold size, state,
labour force
status, income
source
Age, province,
earnings, house-
hold size
Age, region and
sex
Age, race, re-
gion, urban/rural
status
Typical Sample Size 7,000 10,000 to 18,000 6,000 7,000/(7,000)
Notes: Source is the documentation for the surveys in each of the four countries, as referenced in the text.
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2.6 Comparison
In Table 2.1, we summarise the main features of the survey data in each country.
The data from Canada are different in a number of ways, including the annual focus,
having no diary, weighting based on administrative income data, and featuring a
balance edit. In Australia, there is some weighting by income but just the source
of income is used. The recall window for the surveys varies across countries. In
Australia, it goes back up to three years for some items. In the UK, one interview
goes back for a period of a year. For the United States, the survey is a sequence of
five quarterly-focused questionnaires.
2.7 Aggregate coverage rates
The first step in our assessment of the performance of the household expenditure
surveys is the examination of coverage rates of aggregate expenditure for each of the
four countries. That is, we take the ratio of expenditures observed in the household
survey, grossed up to the aggregate level, to the total expenditures taken from the
national accounts. We compare this ratio across time and across countries.
There are several well-known reasons to expect this ratio not to be 100 percent.
(See, for example, Meyer and Sullivan (2009)) The population covered by each
source may differ. For example, foreigners living in the host country and nationals
living out of the country receive different attention in the national accounts and the
expenditure surveys, as do military personnel and native peoples. In addition, the
categories of expenditure available in the national accounts may not match those
available in the expenditure surveys. For example, imputed housing rent is included
in the national accounts, but not in the expenditure surveys. Finally, expenditure
in the household sector of the national accounts includes spending by non-profit
institutions serving households (such as charities), which does not appear in the
expenditure surveys.
To make the best possible comparison, we adjust both the national accounts
data and the expenditure survey data to remove items where they do not overlap.13
13For a detailed description of the methodology used for our UK sample, please see Crossley and
O’Dea (2010).
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For example, non-cash items such as imputed rent and food grown and consumed
at home are taken out of the national accounts measure of household expenditure.
Similarly, some items from the expenditure surveys, such as insurance purchases,
are removed. With these adjustments made, we calculate the ratio of the grossed
up expenditures from the household expenditure survey to the aggregate from the
national accounts. This ratio is referred to as the ‘coverage rate.’ This coverage
calculation is performed for expenditures in aggregate (as we do here in this section)
as well as category by category comparisons (some of which are presented in a later
section).
Figure 2.1: Coverage rates
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Notes: Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national
accounts that is accounted for in the household surveys. Calculations by
authors.
The coverage rates are graphed in Figure 2.1 for each of the four countries. In
order to emphasise the nature of the decline, we have adjusted the y-axis to start
at 0.5. Both the levels and trends differ sharply across countries. The Australian
coverage rate stays in the 60 to 75 percent range, with no discernible trend. For
Canada, the coverage rate is close to 1.0 for both the FAMEX (1969-1996) and
the SHS (1997-2009) periods. There is no sign of an aggregate drop in coverage.
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The coverage rate for the UK drops steadily over the years, from 90 to 67 percent.
Finally, the United States shows coverage rates lower than Canada, but follows a
very similar trend to the United Kingdom.14
In the two following two sections of the chapter, we investigate two aspects of
this decline in our four countries. First, we look at the impact of declining response
rates and increasing income inequality for the expenditure surveys on coverage.
Following that, we compare different categories of expenditures, looking across
diary and survey categories, as well as frequently and less frequently purchased
items.
2.8 Candidate explanations for declining coverage
Many possible explanations for declining coverage rates have been offered. Here,
we use our four countries to explore two possibilities. First, we look at declining
survey participation rates.
A decline in survey participation rates has been observed around the devel-
oped world, a trend that began accelerating around 1990.15 This trend coincides
with the decline in the coverage rate in the CE survey in the United States, making
non-response a candidate explanation for the decline in coverage. Response rates
are relevant for the representativeness of samples, and reliability of micro-level ev-
idence on expenditures. In particular, if the decline in response rates is not random
across the population (and cannot be corrected adequately by sampling weights)
then the results of the survey will no longer be representative of the population. For
example, if high expenditure households have become increasingly less likely to re-
spond, and if weighting did not account for this change, then coverage rates would
be expected to decline.16
14The extra dip down in 1982-1983 is likely related to the discontinuation of rural data collection
from the 3rd quarter of 1981 to the first quarter of 1985. We have checked our calculations against
those in Meyer and Sullivan (2009) and found our coverage rates to be very similar.
15See de Leeuw and de Heer (2002) for international evidence. Tourangeau (2004) provides a
discussion of the trends.
16Tourangeau (2004) reviews the evidence on the causes of declining survey participation, but
does not discuss how non-participation is correlated with characteristics such as income. D’Alessio
and Faiella (2002) find that non-response in the Bank of Italys Survey of Household Income and
Wealth is more frequent among wealthier households. Finally, Sabelhaus et al. (2015) show that
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The second possibility we examine is the impact of income inequality on sur-
vey accuracy.17 The large trends in the concentration of income are documented
across countries in Atkinson et al. (2011). This concentration has been especially
acute in the ‘Anglosphere’ countries on which we focus. None of the four coun-
tries we study oversamples high income households for the expenditure surveys.18
If increasing concentration of income is leading to an increasing concentration of
expenditures, an increasing share of expenditure may be missed if the upper tail of
expenditure is not adequately included in the survey sample. We also investigate
this possibility. In addition, it is possible that the income inequality effect interacts
with survey non-response. If the change in non-response is occurring more at the
top of the income distribution, then the two effects (declining response rates and
increasing income distribution) would reinforce each other.
With either survey response rates or income inequality, we will be comparing
time series trends that happen to coincide with the change in coverage rates. It is
prudent to be cautious in the interpretation of these results as causal. That said, we
do get some mileage out of our cross-country comparison by including in our re-
gression specification common time trends, allowing us to exploit the cross-country
variation in the coverage, response rate, and inequality trends.
2.8.1 Response rates
Figure 2.2 shows the basic response rates for the expenditure surveys for the four
countries, with the y-axis starting at 0.5. Each country exhibits declining responses
rates, with the steepest occurring in the United Kingdom - where the drop is from 72
percent to 53 percent. The decline begins in the early 1990s in Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, but is not observable in Canada until the 2000s.
While Canada was later starting downward, the decline exceeded 10 percentage
points over the last decade.
To compare coverage and response rates, we graph the data from Figure 2.1
response rates in the CE are much lower at the top of the income distribution.
17We thank Angus Deaton for suggesting this possibility to us.
18Canada uses the Labour Force Survey sampling frame, which does target certain high income
areas when choosing strata from which to sample. However, there is not explicit oversampling of
high income households within the survey.
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Figure 2.2: Response rates
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Notes: Response rate is the proportion of contacted households with completed
surveys. Source is the documentation for the surveys in each of the four coun-
tries, as referenced in the text.
and Figure 2.2 together for each country as a scatter plot in Figure 2.3. The axes
are different for each country in order to highlight the nature of the relationship
in each country. For Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, there
does appear to be a positive relationship between the response rate and the coverage
rate. For Canada, the positive relationship in the figure is perhaps deceptive - the
variation in the coverage rate is quite small - it ranges only from just under 1.0
to just under 1.07. The UK shows a fairly tight positive relationship across the
35 years available. In the US, the data are clustered in two groups that together
suggest a similar positive relationship between coverage rates and response rates.
For Australia, in contrast, there is no apparent relationship between response rates
and coverage rates, although the limited number of surveys makes any conclusion
difficult.
Figure 2.4 stacks together the data for all four countries in one plot with com-
mon axes. Looking across countries, the data display little clear relationship. How-
ever, within-country the United States and United Kingdom reveal positive relation-
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Figure 2.3: Response rates vs. coverage rates
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Notes: Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national accounts that is
accounted for in the household surveys. Response rate is the proportion of contacted households
with completed surveys. Calculations by authors.
ships. Later in the paper, we can confirm these relationships in regressions.
2.8.2 Trends in high income concentration
The other trend we compare to declining coverage rates is the increase in income
inequality. We draw on data from the high incomes database maintained at the Paris
School of Economics (Alvaredo et al. (2012)). We use the proportion of income
earned by those in the top one percent of the income distribution for our analysis
here, although other high income measures showed similar results.
Figure 2.5 shows how the top one percent income shares have evolved in our
four countries. Through the mid-1980s, there is little to be seen - although the
top income share does start to rise in the UK following 1980. From around the
beginning of the 1990s, there is a strong upward trend in each of the countries. The
weakest of these upward trends is in Australia and the strongest is in the US. This
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Figure 2.4: Response rates vs. coverage rates, all countries
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Notes: Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national
accounts that is accounted for in the household surveys. Response rate is the
proportion of contacted households with completed surveys. Calculations by
authors.
timing does correspond to the decline in coverage rates which accelerated in the
1990s.
We compare the trends in top income shares to the trends in coverage rates
across all four countries in Figure 2.6, with separate scales for each country’s axes.
All four countries show signs of a negative relationship. Canada, again, has little
variation in the coverage rate across years, so looks a bit different from the others.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, there is a clear negative relationship
between income inequality and the coverage rate.
Some parallels may be drawn here between our findings and those of Deaton
(2005). In that paper, he finds that the coverage rate across countries is declining in
the log of GDP, so higher income countries are experiencing worse coverage.19 One
of Deaton’s explanations is that higher income countries tend to have higher income
concentration, which may be captured less well in surveys. This is consistent with
19When comparing to our results, though, it must be remembered that much of the impact Deaton
finds is concentrated among those countries with very low incomes.
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Figure 2.5: Top 1 percent income shares, all countries
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Notes: Top one percent income share is the share of total income received by
those in the top one percent. Source is Paris School of Economics World Top
Incomes Database, Alvaredo et al. (2012).
our findings here.
2.8.3 Regression analysis
The relationships from these figures can be summarised with some basic regres-
sions. The coverage rate is regressed on the response rate, with country and time
controls using Ordinary Least Squares. The equation takes the following form.
Coverageit = β0+ResponseRateitβ1+Top1%shareβ2+Countryiβ3+Yeartβ4+eit
(2.1)
We report these results in Table 2.2. The dependent variable in all cases is
the country-year coverage rate, and each column reports the results from a different
specification. We report the regression coefficient, with the standard error beneath
in parentheses. In column (1), we include no controls other than the constant term
and the response rate variable. This effectively estimates a best-fit line through the
data points as seen in Figure 2.4. The small and insignificant estimated coefficient
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Figure 2.6: Coverage rates vs. top income shares
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Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national accounts that is accounted
for in the household surveys. Source is calculations by the authors.
confirms the lack of relationship across countries. The second column of the table
includes country fixed effects. Here, the within-country relationships are used in the
estimation, essentially taking an average of the relationships shown in the country-
specific scatter plots in Figure 2.3. The coefficient swings strongly positive, at
0.779. This suggests that for every percentage point increase in the response rate,
there is a 0.779 percentage point increase in the coverage rate. Taking the US as
an example, the response rate dropped by 11.86 points from 1990 to 2008, so this
coefficient explains a (0.779*11.86) 9.24 percentage point drop in coverage, which
is larger than the 6.85 percent drop that occurred. On this basis, we interpret this
coefficient as large.
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Table 2.2: Coverage and response rates
Dependent Variable: country-year coverage rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
no add country add add with linear add year
controls fixed effects top 1% interaction trend fixed effects
Response Rate 0.084 0.779 0.342 0.407 0.345 0.337
(0.154) (0.078) (0.111) (0.255) (0.112) (0.207)
Top 1% income share -1.006 -0.642 -1.232 -1.026
(0.203) (1.307) (0.362) (0.688)
Response X top share -0.487
interaction (1.731)
Canada 0.406 0.413 0.414 0.420 0.416
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028)
United Kingdom 0.237 0.197 0.199 0.204 0.191
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.036)
United States 0.086 0.153 0.154 0.166 0.147
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.047)
Linear trend 0.0007
(0.0010)
Year fixed effects no no no no no yes
Adjusted R-Squared -0.009 0.912 0.933 0.932 0.933 0.928
Number of Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Unit of observation is a country-year. Excluded country dummy is Australia.
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In column (3) of Table 2.2 we include the top one percent income share vari-
able. The coefficient on the response rate drops, but remains statistically significant
and positive. The coefficient on the top income share is -1.006, which suggests that
a one percentage point increase in the top income share is associated with a 1.006
percentage point decrease in the coverage rate, all else equal. To interpret these
magnitudes differently, consider that the top one percent share in the US increased
by 4.69 percentage points from 1990 to 2008. Over that same period, coverage
dropped by 6.85 percentage points. The -1.006 coefficient means that the decline in
top income share predicts a (1.006*4.69) 4.72 point drop in coverage, which is 68.9
percent of the 6.85 point drop.
Column (4) includes an interaction of the response rate and the top income
share. This change leads to negative (but insignificant) coefficients on the top one
percent share term and on the interaction term. The large standard errors on both
estimated effects indicate that the interaction term is not well identified from the
linear effect of the top one percent share on coverage rates. Indeed, a joint test
for significance of these two variables shows they are highly jointly significant.20
Further, the magnitude of the partial effect of an increase in the top one percent
share evaluated at the mean US survey response rate of 0.81 based on the estimates
in column (4) is numerically very similar to the linear partial effect of -1.006 in
column (3). Together, the insignificance of the interaction terms and the comparable
estimated partial of income inequality on coverage rates with the two specifications
indicate no evidence that the effects seen in column (3) were driven by an interaction
of the two factors.
In the last two columns of Table 2.2 we try alternative controls for time. Col-
umn (5) has a linear time trend. This time trend accounts for any global trend that
is common to the four countries in our study. The coefficient on the response rate
changes slightly to 0.345, while for the top income share the coefficient jumps up to
a larger (in absolute value) magnitude. Finally, the last column includes dummies
20The calculated F-statistic for the interaction of the top one percent variable and the response rate
and the one percent variable itself is 12.19. For both main effects and the interaction, the calculated
F-statistic is 50.83. For the response rate and the interaction the joint test yields an F-statistic of
4.69. All of these are highly significant.
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for each year of the sample, which controls flexibly for any common calendar time
effects across countries. This is a fairly demanding specification given the number
of observations we have and the nature of the variation we are using. Since there are
only four observations per year, it may be difficult to detect any effect in this spec-
ification. The resulting coefficients remain fairly stable—but both lose statistical
significance in this final specification.
This graphical and regression analysis shows that the trend downward in re-
sponse rates is common across all four countries, and that the decline in expenditure
coverage in surveys compared to national accounts has a positive relationship with
changes in survey response rates. Top Income shares are also shown to be nega-
tively related to coverage rates. Taken together, our results suggest that declining
survey response rates and increasing income inequality may prove to be important
determinants of the decline in expenditure coverage rates.
2.9 Coverage rates within expenditure categories
The next step in our analysis is to compare different categories of expenditure across
countries, looking for evidence that aligns with differences in survey methodology.
Canada here is the most noticeable outlier in survey methodology, as the SHS uses
an annual recall survey for both frequently purchased and infrequently purchased
items - with no diary component. There is also a balance edit, and substantial
income weighting. The four categories we consider are food at home, alcohol pur-
chased in stores, new and used motor vehicles, and furniture appliance and house-
hold equipment.
The first category we examine is food consumed in the home. These data
are collected through a diary in Australia, the UK, and the US, but with recall in
Canada. Food for consumption at home is a basic non-durable commodity that has
been used as a summary measure of household welfare, and has been the focus
of many studies testing predictions of consumption smoothing at the household
and aggregate level. We graph the coverage rates in Figure 2.7.21 The UK shows
21For Canada, we now show only the SHS results, as the category-by-category analysis tends to
exhibit seams between the FAMEX and SHS survey years.
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Figure 2.7: Coverage rates, food in the home
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Notes: Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national
accounts that is accounted for in the household surveys in this category. Source
is calculations by the authors.
a decline of 10 percentage points since the early 1990s. However, there is little
evidence of a similar trend in the other three countries.
The second expenditure category considered is alcohol purchased in stores.
This category is collected using the same methods as for food consumed at home.
This category is of interest because alcohol consumption is generally viewed as
socially undesirable which may lead individuals to underreport these expenditures
in household survey. As Figure 2.8 shows, it is the case that survey coverage of this
item is very low - being around 50% for Australia and Canada, and substantially
less for the US.22 However, conditional on the lower level of coverage, the coverage
rates for this item are remarkably stable in each of these three countries. For the UK,
the coverage rate is higher and has declined through time.
The final two graphs show more infrequently purchased items. In all countries,
these data are collected with recall surveys. Figure 2.9 shows new and used vehicles,
while Figure 2.10 has household equipment, furniture and appliances. There are
22Apart from atypically high coverage in the Australian HES in 1975-76.
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Figure 2.8: Coverage rates, alcohol purchased in stores
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accounts that is accounted for in the household surveys in this category. Source
is calculations by the authors.
Figure 2.9: Coverage rates, new and used vehicles
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Figure 2.10: Coverage rates, furniture, household equipment, and appliances
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accounts that is accounted for in the household surveys in this category. Source
is calculations by the authors.
no easily discernible patterns for vehicles. For Australia, coverage rates for these
categories are neither consistently rising nor falling. In Canada, there is an upward
trend for new and used vehicles, and perhaps small downward movement for the
other two. For the UK, coverage of vehicles appears quite cyclical, but do not show
a long term decline. The series for furniture, household equipment, and appliances
shows a fairly slow and steady decline, although Australia does rebound at the end.
This examination of category-by-category patterns has revealed little clear ev-
idence about differences across countries. In all countries, the frequently consumed
product (food) seems to have high coverage. In contrast, the less frequent big-
ger purchases appear to be much more volatile year to year, and have a more pro-
nounced downward trend on average. This is consistent with the evidence shown
previously in Meyer and Sullivan (2009) and elsewhere for the US. The income elas-
ticity of demand for the goods likely plays a role as well. As income concentration
increases, coverage rates for goods consumed more by higher income households
may decline.
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2.10 Conclusions
In this paper we provide a comparative assessment of the performance of the house-
hold expenditure survey programs in Australia, Canada, the UK and US. The survey
methodologies employed in each country share a number of common features while
containing distinct elements. There are also differences in survey response rates and
income concentration across the countries. We use this variation across countries to
assess the implications for the performance of the household surveys.
After first outlining the key features of the household expenditure surveys for
each country, we assess the coverage of aggregate expenditure relative to the na-
tional account benchmark. Both the survey expenditure aggregate and the national
accounts data are adjusted to ensure the expenditure concepts are comparable. Cov-
erage rates are highest in Canada and the UK; for Canada, and Australia coverage
remained fairly stable over the past three decades. In contrast, in the UK and the
US coverage rates have sharply declined over the past three decades.
Next, survey response rates and top income shares were considered in tandem
with coverage rates. This analysis is motivated by the widely observed decline in
participation rates for household surveys over time, and the strong concentration
of income that has occurred in many countries. From a series of graphical com-
parisons and regression models it is found that the fall in response rates over time
are predictive of changes in coverage rates within countries. Further, the pattern
of changes in coverage rates over time within our sample of Anglosphere countries
coincided with the timing of the growing concentration of income. The prima facie
evidence is that the growing concentration of income has been associated with an
increasing concentration of expenditures which has not been captured well by the
micro surveys, hence contributing to declining coverage.
The last component of the analysis examined coverage rates for specific com-
ponents of expenditure. Individual expenditure items considered were food at home,
alcohol purchased in stores, new and used motor vehicles, and furniture appliance
and household equipment. This list included categories which were collected using
divergent methodologies (e.g. food by diary in Australia, UK and US; by annual
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recall in Canada) and by comparable methods (e.g. motor vehicles, furniture and
recreational equipment collected by recall in interviews in all countries). From this,
there was no clear pattern across countries by collection method. Rather, most ev-
ident is the high and stable coverage of regularly purchased items (such as food),
along with the more volatile coverage of irregular and larger expenditure items (such
as vehicles, furniture and hold equipment). Therefore the aggregate patterns in cov-
erage cannot be readily attributed to specific expenditure components or collection
methods.
Overall, our comparative assessment of the household expenditure surveys
across the four Anglosphere countries studied has shown the sharpest differences
between Canada and Australia vs. the United Kingdom and the United States. How-
ever, the many unique aspects of the Canadian survey methodology make it difficult
to identify specific features of the methodology that are pivotal to its performance.
Given the Canadian methodology changes that were put in place for 2010, further
information may now be available on the reasons for the relative success of the
Canadian data.
Chapter 3
Is the Carli Index flawed?: assessing the case
for the new retail price index RPIJ
In March 2013, the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) started publishing a
new inflation index - the RPIJ. This index is identical to the long-standing Retail
Prices Index (RPI), except that it uses a geometric mean of price relatives (known
in inflation circles as the Jevons index) rather than an arithmetic mean (the Carli in-
dex) to calculate price changes of goods at the so-called ‘elementary’ level - where
expenditures on individual goods are not observed and so only price survey data are
used. The Jevons index has long been used in the UK’s other measure of consumer
price inflation, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Around the same time as the RPIJ
was introduced, the United Kingdom Statistics Authority, UKSA, decided that con-
cerns the ONS had raised about a potential for upward bias in the Carli index meant
that the old RPI would no longer be recognised as a National Statistic.1 The old RPI
is still published but it is now clearly marked with a health warning in the ONS’s
inflation publications.
These decisions have been quite controversial. Over the period 1998-2013, the
RPI gave an average inflation rate of 2.9% compared to 2.5% that would have been
given by the RPIJ. The use of the Jevons in the CPI, and the fact that this tended to
mean it gave a lower measure of inflation than the RPI, has already generated some
amount of mistrust in official numbers - particularly as in the last few years the
1To be classified as a ‘National Statistic’ published numbers must meet certain standards set out
on the Code of Practice for Official Statistics.
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government has replaced the RPI with the CPI for the indexation of state benefits,
government pensions, and tax thresholds (all measures which are predicted to save
the government money). This chapter will look at the original reasons for replacing
the Carli index. It seems clear that this index has fallen out of favour with national
statisticians in the UK, but what are the concerns with this particular index and how
should we select index numbers at the elementary level more generally? Did the
ONS and UKSA make the right decision? Answering these questions is important
not just to decide whether a new RPIJ should have been created in the first place,
but also for the more current debate about the whether the existing RPI should be
considered “deficient” and demoted in the way it has been. This will require us to
delve into the theoretical and practical reasons for preferring one index over another.
The literature on price indices has identified three ways to select index num-
bers. In effect, we can ask:
1. Does the index respond appropriately when prices change in different situa-
tions or does it give answers we might consider perverse?
2. Is the index a good statistical estimator of the general price change as distinct
from relative price changes across goods according to some measure (as we
will discuss below, exactly which measure is a matter of some debate)?
3. Does the index provide a good measure of how the cost of living is changing
for consumers (i.e the costs of obtaining a given level of welfare) ?
The first of these is called the test approach. This is because we determine
which index has the best properties by setting out a list of criteria (‘tests’) and then
asking which indices satisfy them. The second is called the statistical or stochas-
tic approach. The third is the interpretation of price indices that is used by most
economists and as such is referred to as the economic approach. The three ap-
proaches are essentially separate and can on occasion come to conflicting conclu-
sions. As part of a consultation on the future of the RPI which led to the creation of
the new RPIJ index, Diewert (2012b) pointed out that the Carli index failed some
important axioms of the test approach, that the statistical approach favoured the
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Jevons, and that the economic approach was inapplicable at the elementary level
(when quantity weights were unobserved). These conclusions were essentially en-
dorsed by the ONS and underlay the decision to replace the Carli index in the new
RPIJ.
In this chapter, I explain what each of these approaches are and use them to
make my own assessment on the suitability of the Carli index for use at the elemen-
tary aggregate level of a price index. In doing so I make a number of contributions
not only to the current debate on the new RPIJ index but also to the way that elemen-
tary indices should be selected more generally. A primary concern of the ONS was
the Carli’s sensitivity to so-called price-bouncing which could lead to an upward
bias. I formalise these concerns in a new price-bouncing test for the test approach.
For the statistical approach, I present some evidence on the relative performance of
the Carli and Jevons. I find no clear evidence for the superiority of one index over
the other, and that the relative performances of the Carli and Jevons are not invariant
to factors such as the month the index is calculated; the sample size and the choice
of base month against which price changes can be compared; and the type of goods
included in the elementary aggregate. I also argue that the economic approach can
be applied to the elementary level, and moreover that it favours the Jevons index,
by appealing to something analogous to the principle of insufficient reason from
information theory. Overall, I conclude that there is indeed a case for replacing the
Carli index with the Jevons.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.1, I discuss
the historical and technical background to the ‘formula effect’ difference between
the RPI and CPI in the UK. In Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 I discuss the test, statistical
and economic approaches. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 The RPI and the CPI
The UK has for a long time been blessed with two headline measures of consumer
price inflation - the RPI and the CPI. The RPI is the older of the two, dating back to
an ‘Interim index’ that was introduced in June 1947 based on an expenditure survey
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carried out in 1937/38, and for most of its history was the UK’s principal measure of
consumer prices. The CPI is the UK’s version of a Harmonised Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP), which was developed by the European Union to ensure that member
states published comparable measures of inflation.
These two indices differ in a number of ways which mean they can give quite
different measures of price changes from year to year. For instance, in 2011 CPI
growth averaged 4.5% compared to 5.2% for RPI growth. The differences are a
result of the data they draw from, the coverage of the indices, and the methods used
to calculate average price changes at the so-called elementary level. In recent years,
the CPI replaced the RPI for a number of policy purposes, including the uprating
of state benefits and pensions and the indexation of tax thresholds. Consequently,
the large gap between the two measures, and particularly the factors that mean that
the CPI tends to give a lower measure of inflation than the RPI, came increasingly
under scrutiny.
Since 2010, the largest factor contributing to the gap between the RPI and CPI
has been the differences in the way price changes are calculated at the lowest level
of aggregation in the two indices (which became known as the ‘formula effect’).
In October 2012, questions about the formula effect culminated in the opening of
a consultation on changes to the methods used in the RPI. In January 2013, the
consultation concluded that the Carli index “did not meet international standards”
(Office for National Statistics (2012b)) and that consequently a new RPIJ index
would be published in which the Carli was replaced with the Jevons.
3.1.1 The formula effect
The formula effect is the difference between the RPI and CPI that results from
the different indices they use at the first stage of aggregation. Aggregation refers
to the process by which an overall index such as the RPI or CPI is calculated in
successive stages. The calculation of both the RPI and CPI starts with (essentially
the same) sample of prices collected across the country in each month. 2 This
2There are a few differences. The CPI uses a different approach to gathering car prices to the
RPI.
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Table 3.1: Examples of goods at different levels of aggregation in the UK
Level Price
Elementary aggregate 800g white unsliced bread sold in the south east of England
Item 800g white unsliced bread
Section/class Bread
Group Food
sample is then used to produce weighted averages of price changes relative to a
base month (in the UK, January, for details, see section 2 of Office for National
Statistics (2012a)). In the very first stage, where the ONS does not have expenditure
information, an unweighted average of price changes for particular products is taken
within different ‘strata’, defined by either region, type of shop (independent or chain
retailer), or both. These give what are known as elementary aggregate indices. An
expenditure-weighted average of these elementary aggregates is then taken to give
an overall national average price index for an ‘item’. These different item indices
are then aggregated further through expenditure-weighted averages into ‘sections’
or ‘classes’, which are in turn aggregated into ‘groups’. Finally, an overall price
index is calculated from the different group indices. Some examples of the ‘goods’
at each stage of aggregation are given in table 3.1.
There are various indices which can be used to calculate elementary aggregate
price changes. These include
1. The Carli index (Carli, 1764): PC (p0,p1) = 1N ∑
N
i=1
(
pi1
pi0
)
2. The Dutot index (Dutot,1738): PD (p0,p1) =
1
N ∑ p
i
1
1
N ∑ p
i
0
3. The Jevons index (Jevons, 1865): PJ (p0,p1) =∏Ni=1
(
pi1
pi0
) 1
N
= ∏
N
i=1(p
i
1)
1
N
∏Ni=1(p
i
0)
1
N
4. The Harmonic index (Coggesshall, 1887):3 PH (p0,p1)=
[
1
N ∑
N
i=1
(
pi1
pi0
)−1]−1
5. The Carruthers-Sellwood-Ward-Dale`n index (CSWD, proposed as an el-
ementary index by Carruthers et al. (1980), and also Dale´n (1992)):
PCSWD (p0,p1) =
√
PC (p0,p1)×PH (p0,p1)
3Diewert (2012a) points out that it was also mentioned earlier in passing in Jevons (1865).
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The Carli is an arithmetic mean of price changes (or price relatives), while the
Jevons is a geometric mean. The Dutot is the ratio of average prices in the base year
and the current year. The Harmonic index is simply the harmonic mean of price
relatives. The CSWD index is a geometric mean of the Carli (arithmetic) and the
Harmonic indices.
The RPI uses the two arithmetic averages: the Carli and the Dutot indices.
The CPI by contrast makes use of the Dutot and the Jevons. This puts the CPI
closer into line with international practice. Indeed, the RPI’s use of the Carli is
quite unusual. None of the other 27 European countries that reported a Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) to Eurostat surveyed in Evans (2012) made use
of the Carli index in their national price indices. Indeed there seems to be have been
a general move away from the Carli index. Evans (2012) lists some countries that
have abandoned the Carli index in favour of either the Jevons or the Dutot over the
last few decades including Canada (in 1978), Luxembourg (in 1996), Australia (in
1998), Italy (in 1999) and Switzerland (in 2000). In 1996, the Boskin Commission
in the USA recommended that a Carli-like index used in the US CPI should be
replaced with a the Jevons (Boskin, 1996) - a change that was put into effect in
1999. Eurostat regulations also do not allow the use of the Carli in the construction
of members’ HICP indices except in “exceptional cases” (see Section 3, pg 180 of
Eurostat, 2001).
The proportions of elementary aggregates that use of each of these formulae
in the RPI and CPI are shown in Table 3.2. For the remaining ‘other’ goods in the
table, no elementary aggregates are calculated and weights are used at every stage
in the calculation of prices. The new RPIJ index uses the Jevons in place of the Carli
but continues to use the Dutot for the same goods as the old RPI. The reason for
the even split between the Carli and Dutot in the old RPI is that both indices can be
distorted in particular situations. The Carli can be too sensitive to situations where
individual goods see large price changes (such as when a sale for some items ends).
The Dutot on the other hand can be dominated by the price movements of a single
good, if that good is much more expensive than others included in the calculation
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Table 3.2: Importance of different formulae used in the RPI and CPI
Index RPI CPI
Carli 27% 0%
Dutot 29% 5%
Jevons 0% 63%
Other (weighted) formula 43% 33%
Note: Source is ONS (2012c)
(see Section 9.3 of Office for National Statistics (2012c)).
What impact do these differences have in practice? Figure 3.1 shows the for-
mula effect over time from 2005-2012. It shows that the formula effect consistently
works to substantially reduce the growth of the CPI relative to the RPI. The effect
averaged 0.5 percentage points over the years 2005 -2009, which increased to 0.9
since 2010 (for comparison, the average annual increase in the RPI over the same
period was 3.4%). The sudden increase in the formula effect can be almost entirely
attributed to a change in the sampling of clothing prices that came into effect in that
year (Morgan and Gooding (2010)).
Figure 3.1: The size of the formula effect, 2005-2012
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Note: Data from Office for National Statistics.
This systematic difference is primarily driven by the fact that the Carli and the
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Jevons - being the geometric mean and the arithmetic mean of the price relatives -
satisfy the classic inequality:
PJ (p0,p1)≤ PC (p0,p1) (3.1)
with equality if and only if p
i
1
pi0
= pi for all i (Hardy et al. (1934), p.26): that is
the Jevons will always give either the same or a lower price increase than the Carli.
It is not possible to establish a similar general result for the relationship between the
Dutot and the other indices (and thus the formula effect needn’t necessarily always
be positive). Depending on the circumstances the Dutot could be greater or less than
the Carli and greater or less than the Jevons. To understand more precisely what
drives the formula effect we will need to delve a littler deeper into the mathematical
relationships between the different indices. I do this by presenting the following
three facts which will be useful when we turn to evaluating the different indices.4
Proofs can be found in the supplied references and are also provided in the Appendix
to this chapter.
Fact 1. The difference between the Carli index and the Jevons index is bounded from
below by the variance of the price-relatives (proof given in Hardy et al. (1934)):
PC (p0,p1)−PJ (p0,p1)≥Var
(
pi1
pi0
)
This fact helps to explain the growth in the size of the formula effect in Figure 3.1.
In 2010, a change to the methods used to sample clothing prices led to an increase
in the variance of price relatives, which is what led to an increase in the difference
between the Carli used for clothing prices in the RPI and the Jevons used in the CPI.
Fact 2. The difference between the Dutot and the Carli equals the covariance of
base period prices and price relatives divided by the mean base period price (proof
given in Carruthers et al. (1980)):
4Some useful results on the relationships between these and the other indices discussed above
using a theorem from Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz can be found in von der Lippe (2012).
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PD(p0,p1)−PC(p0,p1) =
Cov
(
pi0,
(
pi1
pi0
))
E[pi0]
(3.2)
Finally, by writing the price of the ith good in the tth period as a multiplicative
deviation from its expected value eit where E
(
eit
)
= 0
pit = E
(
pit
)(
1+ eit
)
(3.3)
we obtain the following useful approximation between the Jevons and Dutot
Fact 3. The difference between the Jevons and the Dutot depends on the change in
the variance of the prices (a result first obtained by Carruthers et al. (1980), proof
also given in Diewert (2012b)):
PJ (p0,p1)≈ PD (p0,p1)
(
1+
1
2
[
Var(ei0)−Var(ei1)
])
The preceding discussion indicates that the choice of elementary index clearly mat-
ters a great deal. This makes it all the more important that in any inflation measure
the most appropriate indices are chosen - the question to which we now turn. Since
there is no definitive set of criteria that we can use to pick one index over another,
we try to form judgements applying each of the three approaches used to select el-
ementary indices in the literature (test, statistical and economic). We start with the
test approach.
3.2 The test approach
This approach posits a number of desirable properties for index numbers. These
form tests (or ‘axioms’) against which alternative index number formulae can be
ranked - with index number formulae which satisfy the most, or the most important,
axioms being ranked highest. This approach does not consider any behavioural
interdependence between the price and quantity data unlike the economic approach
which I discuss below. The test approach has its roots in the mathematical literature
on functional equations, the general problem being that of determining an unknown
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functional form (i.e. what is the functional form for the price index?) given a set
of requirements on the function. The properties are selected to be reasonable given
the context.
When we have data on prices and quantities from two periods t in {0,1}
the problem is to determine the forms of the price index linking the two period
P(p0,p1,q0,q1) and the corresponding quantity index Q(p0,p1,q0,q1) such that
nominal growth rate is (multiplicatively) decomposable in that part reflecting price
changes and that part reflecting real changes:
P(p0,p1,q0,q1)Q(p0,p1,q0,q1) =
x1
x0
.
This decomposition property is sometimes called weak factor reversal and of-
ten isn’t counted as a ‘test’ but as a defining property of bilateral index numbers.
If this holds and neither are zero then once we have chosen one index number, the
other is chosen implicitly. For example, given a price index we can recover the
quantity index implicitly:
Q(p0,p1,q0,q1) =
x1
x0
1
P(p0,p1,q0,q1)
In the case of elementary price aggregates, quantity weights are not observed.
Thus the bilateral index number problem is restated slightly as that of finding a
price index P(p0,p1) (and implicitly a quantity index Q(q0,q1) =
x1/x0
P(p0,p1)
), which
satisfies certain tests, such that
P(p0,p1)Q(q0,q1) =
x1
x0
The tests themselves have been developed over the course of well over a cen-
tury mainly for the case in which pricesand quantities are observed (for an author-
itative discussion of these, see Section 2 of Diewert (1992b)). In most cases the
tests relating to the price index do not depend on the quantity vectors and so will
have obvious analogs for the elementary aggregates case where quantities are not
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known.5 I divide the tests into 4 groups: those that simply establish basic properties
for an index, those that consider the effects of scalar transformations to prices, a
test that bounds the price index, and some tests that establish invariance properties.
In the rest of this section, I will discuss each of these groups in turn. Throughout I
assume that pt ∈ RK++. If I want to set p1 = p0 I call the common vector p.
3.2.1 Basic properties
The first set of tests establish some basic properties which we would expect any
price index to have. The first of these is the positivity test: we want our price index
to be positive for any set of prices, P(p0,p1)> 0 (Diewert (2012c) attributes this to
Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)). A non-positive price index would cause all sorts of
problems (for instance with chaining). A second basic property is that if no prices
change between two periods, we would expect our price index to simply equal one,
i.e P(p,p)= 1. This is the identity test which is sometimes called the constant prices
test (Diewert (2012c), points out that this test was suggested by Laspeyres (1981),
Walsh (1901), and Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)). Finally there are two further tests
which establish that certain changes to the prices we feed into the index should
always result in a greater or smaller index. The first of these is the monotonicity
in current prices test which states that if we increase one of our current prices, the
index as a whole should be greater than it was. That is P(p0,p1)< P(p0,p) if p1 <
p. Similarly, if we increased any base period price, then the index as a whole should
decrease P(p0,p1) > P(p,p1) if p0 < p which gives us the monotonicity in base
prices test.6 These last two tests are due to Eichhorn and Voeller (1976) (who
actually include these two properties in a single ‘monotonicity’ axiom). Fortunately,
all the elementary indices mentioned in Section 3.1 satisfy all four of these tests.
5This is not always true. There is, for example, no obvious parallel to the Tabular Stan-
dard/Basket/Constant Quantities Test P(p0,p1,q,q) = p′1q/p
′
0q or the Invariance to Proportional
Changes in Current Quantities Test P(p0,p1,q0,λq1) = P(p0,p1,q0,q1) for λ > 0 in the context
of elementary aggregates. The approach of adapting those tests which are independent of quantities
to use for elementary indices was used by Diewert (1995a), who drew on the work of Dale´n (1992)
and Eichhorn (1978).
6Here I adopt the notation of Eichhorn and Voeller (1976) for vector inequalities. If x =
(x1,x2 . . .xn) and y = (y1,y2 . . .yn), then x ≥ y if x1 ≥ y1, . . .xn ≥ yn but x 6= y. In other words,
all elements of x are equal or greater than those in y, with at least one strictly greater.
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3.2.2 Scalar transformations
This next few tests consider the effects of scalar transformation of the price data.
The first two of these demand that the price index should be homogenous of
degree 1 with respect to current prices and homogenous of degree -1 with re-
spect to base prices, i.e P(p0,λp1) = λP(p0,p1) for λ > 0 and P(λp0,p1) =
λ−1P(p0,p1) for λ > 0. These two requirements are called the linear homogeneity
and homogeneity of degree minus one tests (Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)). These
two tests further imply the dimensionality test (Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)) which
states that the index should not be affected by common changes in scaling to all
prices, i.e P(λp0,λp1) = P(p0,p1). This means among other things that calcu-
lating price changes using pence rather than pounds should make no difference
to our indices. The identity and linear homogeneity tests together imply the pro-
portionality test (Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)) which states that increasing all
prices by a common positive scalar λ should give a price index equal to λ : or
P(p0,λp0) = λ for λ > 0. All our indices satisfy these requirements.
3.2.3 Bound on indices
The next test states that the index itself should fall somewhere in between the price
relative of the good with the smallest price increase and the price relative of the
good with the largest price increase, or
min
k
{
p11
p10
, ...,
pK1
pK0
}
≤ P(p0,p1)≤max
k
{
p11
p10
, ...,
pK1
pK0
}
This is the mean value test (Eichhorn and Voeller (1976)). Whilst this last test is
a fairly intuitive requirement it can be shown that it is implied by monotonicity in
current and base prices, linear homogeneity, and identity tests (Eichhorn and Voeller
(1976), pg 10). Since all our indices satisfy these weaker axioms, they all satisfy
this test.
3.2.4 Invariance properties
The final group of tests are concerned with invariance properties of various kinds.
This group of tests will help us discriminate between our three elementary indices
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and so I will discuss them in a bit more detail.
The first states that the index should be invariant to the ordering of goods. This
implies for instance that if we took price quotes from the same outlets in a different
order (but still keeping the order the same in base and current periods), then this
would have no effect on the index.
Commodity Reversal Test/Symmetric treatment of outlets: rearranging the or-
der of the components of both current and base period price vectors in the same way
should have no effect on the index. That is,
P(Ap0,Ap1) = P(p0,p1)
where A denotes some permutation matrix which we use to reorder our price vector.
Diewert (1992a) attributes this test to Fisher (1922). It can easily be shown that all
of our indices pass this test. The next test concerns invariance to the units in which
goods are defined.
Commensurability Test: Multiplying prices in both periods by a vector λ
should not affect the index.
P
(
λ 1 p10, . . .λ
M pM0 ;λ
1 p11, . . .λ
M pM1
)
= P
(
p10, . . . p
M
0 ; p
1
1, . . . p
M
1
)
= P(p0,p1)
For all λ 1 > 0 . . .λM > 0.
Diewert (1992a) attributes this test to Fisher (1911). This test implies that,
ignoring quantity discounts and the like, a change in the units defining an individual
item (such as switching from a single item of fruit to a bunch of fruit) should not
affect the index. The Dutot index fails this test as it is not in general invariant to
changes in the units in which individual goods are sold. If we were to double the
base and current period price of one particular item (by for instance, measuring the
price of a pair of gloves rather than a single glove), then the Dutot index would
change, while our other indices would be unaffected. This comes about because
the level of the Dutot index depends on the value of base period prices relative to
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their mean.7 As Diewert (2012b) points out, this means that the Dutot will not be
appropriate for elementary aggregates where there is a great deal of heterogeneity
and items are measured in different units, as in these situations “the price statistician
can change the index simply by changing the units of measurement for some of the
items.” However, in most cases goods at the elementary level are typically fairly
homogeneous, and so a sleight of hand involving an arbitrary change in the units
in which one brand is defined while leaving the definition of other nearly identical
products the same may be more easily noticed. If we trust that this is the case, we
may be satisfied that the index satisfies the weaker dimensionality test referred to
above (which the Dutot passes).
The next test states that if prices go up one period and return to their previous
level the next, a chained index should record no price increase.
Time Reversal Test: if the data for the base and current periods are inter-
changed, then the resulting index is the reciprocal of the original
P(p0,p1) =
1
P(p1,p0)
Diewert (1992a) attributes this to Fisher (1922). A sufficient (but not neces-
sary) condition for an index to satisfy this property is that it can be expressed in a
form f (pt)/ f (p0) as it is of course always true that
f (x)
f (y)
=
1
f (y)/ f (x)
The Jevons and the Dutot can be written in this form and so pass the test. The
CSWD cannot but still satisfies time reversal. The Carli and Harmonic indices on
other the hand do not. In fact, if prices go up and then return to their former level
the Carli will record an increase in prices (unless all prices increase in the same
proportion), since it can be shown that
PC (p0,p1)PC (p1,p0)≥ 1
7The Dutot can be rewritten as E
[
pi0
E[pi0]
(
pi1
pi0
)]
and so can be thought of as an index where price
relatives are weighted by base prices.
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Similarly it can be shown that
PH (p0,p1)PH (p1,p0)≤ 1
Thus, these indices both fail the time reversal test in a biased way. The use
of the term bias here is due to Fisher (1922) who uses it to refer to a “foreseeable
tendency [of an index] to err in a particular direction” (pg. 86). In this case it refers
to the difference between the value of P(p0,p1)P(p1,p0) and the ‘correct’ value
of unity. It is important to note that it does not refer to bias in the statistical sense
of the difference between the expected value of a statistic and its population value.
Two indices may both be ‘unbiased’ yet differ considerably in terms of the price
changes they record.
If we then consider price changes over more than two periods, we get the fol-
lowing test.
Circularity Test: The product of a chain of indices over successive periods
should equal the total price change over the whole period.
P(p0,p1)P(p1,p2) = P(p0,p2)
This is a transitivity test.8 If this test were not satisfied, then different inflation
rates over a given period could be obtained by chaining the index over different
subperiods. One consequence of this is that an index could go up or down even if
prices had not changed. For instance, consider a case where prices increased from
p0 to p1 between periods 0 and period 1, but in period 2 returned to p0. In this case,
a chained index that didn’t satisfy circularity could potentially record inflation over
the three periods when there had in fact been none.
Eichhorn and Voeller (1976) prove that, unlike in the case of the time reversal
test, it is both necessary and sufficient that the index can be written in the form
f (pt)/ f (p0) to pass circularity. The circularity test therefore implies the time re-
8A related test that is sometimes included is the multiperiod identity test that requires that the
index satisfies P(p0,p1)P(p1,p2)P(p2,p0) = 1 (Diewert (2012c), attributes this to Walsh (1901)).
The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for demonstrating that this is in fact just an implica-
tion of the circularity test.
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versal test. The Carli does not satisfy the circularity test since it is E
[
pi1/p
i
0
]
and in
general
E
[
x
y
]
6= E
[
x
z
]
×E
[
z
y
]
The Harmonic and CSWD indices also fail this test.
A final test we could add to this list concerns so-called price ‘bounces’. This
is concerned with how an index would change if different outlets merely exchanged
prices from one period to the next. One test of this property, attributed to Dale´n
(1992) is as follows
P(Ap0,Bp1) = P(p0,p1)
where A and B are different permutation matrices. The Jevons and Dutot pass this
test, but the Carli, Harmonic and CSWD indices fail it. This test has been criticised
(Diewert (2012b), for instance calls it “suspect”) on the grounds that prices should
be matched to outlets in a one to one manner across periods (that is, that p0 and
p1 should not be permuted in different ways), for the simple reason that outlets
vary by quality, and so even when the same good is bought in different places it
ought to be considered a different product. This is true, but a sensitivity to price
bouncing may still be a problem, as it is possible for an index to register a price
increase if outlets exchanged prices with one another but then swapped back - a
property which is somewhat harder to justify. Indeed, the problem of the Carli’s
sensitivity to price bouncing was highlighted by the ONS in its consultation (Office
for National Statistics (2012c)). This concern suggests the following revised price
bouncing test:
Price bouncing test: The price index should not change over three periods if
prices are just rearranged from the first to the second period and then returned to
their original order in the third
P(p0,Ap0)P(Ap0,p0) = 1
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for any possible permutation matrix A.
This test will be satisfied by any index that satisfies a stronger property
P(p0,Ap0) = 1 (which we may call the strong price bouncing test). This could
itself be introduced as a separate test, but by testing how an index would respond
to a change which doesn’t match outlet prices across periods, it would be subject
to the same criticism as Dale`n’s price bouncing test. This property is similar to
the time reversal test, and indeed it will be satisfied by any index that satisfies time
reversal. The two properties are however independent as an index may satisfy the
price bouncing test but not time reversal. For instance it can be shown that the index
∑i∑ j
(
p1i
p0 j
)
+
[
∑i∑ j
(
p1i
p0 j
)−1]−1
∑i∑ j
(
p0i
p0 j
)
+
[
∑i∑ j
(
p0i
p0 j
)−1]−1 (3.4)
satisfies the price bouncing test, as well as positivity, identity, linear homo-
geneity, homogeneity of degree minus one, monotonicity in current and base prices,
proportionality, dimensionality, and commodity reversal - but not time reversal or
circularity.
The price bouncing test is also independent of its stronger version. Again, we
can demonstrate this with a example. Consider the following index, which com-
bines two geometric means of price relatives, weighted by base and current prices
P(p0,p1) =
√√√√√ N∏
i
(
pi1
pi0
) pi0
∑ pi0 ×
N
∏
i
(
pi1
pi0
) pi1
∑ pi1
=
N
∏
i
(
pi1
pi0
) pi0∑ j p j1+pi1∑ j p j0
2∑ j p
j
0∑ j p
j
1
This index satisfies time reversal and so the weak price bouncing test (and
indeed all our other tests with the exception of commensurability and circularity),
but fails the strong price bouncing test.
The Jevons and Dutot indices satisfy price bouncing as they are in any case in-
variant to any reordering of prices. While the CSWD index failed Dale`n’s old price
bouncing test, it passes this new one as it is time reversible. The Carli and Harmonic
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Table 3.3: Price bouncing example
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Store A price 1 1.25 1
Store B price 1.25 1 1.25
Period (0,1) Period (1,2) Chained index
Carli ... (1.25+0.8)2 = 1.025 1.025 1.0506
Harmonic ... [12 × ( 11.25 + 10.8)]−1 = 11.025 11.025 0.952
Dutot ... 1.1251.125 = 1 1 1
Jevons ...
√
1.25×0.8 = 1 1 1
CSWD ...
√
1.025× ( 11.025) = 1 1 1
indices on the other hand fail this test, as I illustrate with a simple numerical exam-
ple. Table 3.3 shows how different indices respond to price bouncing in a case with
two goods sold in different stores. In period 1 we swap the period 0 prices between
store A and store B, and in period 2 we swap them back. In both periods 1 and 2,
the Carli index increases by 2.5%, with a cumulative increase over both periods of
5.06%. Similarly, the Harmonic index decreases by 2.5% in each period for a cumu-
lative reduction of 4.8%. This is despite prices in period 2 being no different to what
they were in period 0! In fact, the Carli will always show an increase in these sorts
of situations and the Harmonic index will always show a decrease (for the same rea-
son that in general PC (p0,p1)PC (p1,p0) ≥ 1 and PH (p0,p1)PH (p1,p0) ≤ 1). The
Jevons, Dutot, and CSWD indices on the other hand, will correctly record no price
change, as they do in the example.
Given this list of requirements we can now ask, how do our elementary indices
measure up? Table 3.3 summarises the results
The Jevons passes all the tests listed, while the Dutot only fails the commen-
surability test. The Carli and Harmonic indices fail the time reversal, circularity
test and (both) price bouncing tests. The CSWD index fails the circularity test and
the original price bouncing test (but not my revised test). Not all of the tests are
necessarily as important as each other and, in principle, this might present us with
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Table 3.4: Test performance of the elementary aggregate formulae
Test Carli Dutot Jevons Harmonic CSWD
1. Positivity X X X X X
2. Identity X X X X X
3. Monotonicity in current prices X X X X X
4. Monotonicity in base period prices X X X X X
5. Linear homogeneity X X X X X
6. Homogeneity of degree minus one X X X X X
7. Proportionality X X X X X
8. Dimensionality X X X X X
9. Mean value X X X X X
10. Commodity Reversal X X X X X
11. Commensurability X × X X X
12. Time reversal × X X × X
13. Circularity × X X × ×
14. Price bouncing test × X X × X
an aggregation problem (how to weight the different tests). However, luckily the re-
sults are definitive: whatever the weights we place on the individual tests the Jevons
emerges with the strongest axiomatic backing. If we were to consider the impor-
tance of the different tests, many would point to the Carli’s and Harmonic indices’
failure of time reversal as being particularly serious. These indices fail this test in a
biased manner, meaning that the Carli for instance will tend to give a higher rate of
inflation than other indices that satisfy time reversal. This bias will then be reflected
in the price changes used in calculations at higher stages of aggregation (as the in-
dices used later satisfy monotonicity), biasing the whole index. Fisher (1922) (pg
66) was fairly unequivocal in his condemnation of the Carli index for its failure to
satisfy this test, and it was on the basis that the Carli index failed the time reversal
test - with an upward bias - that Diewert (2012b) recommended that the Carli index
should no longer be used in the RPI. That said, there is not universal agreement on
the importance of time reversal. Eichhorn and Voeller (1976) for instance introduce
the time reversal and circularity tests by saying a price index needn’t “necessarily”
satisfy these (the only “indisputable” conditions a price index should satisfy ac-
cording to these authors were their monotonicity, linear homogeneity, identity and
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dimensionality tests - the positivity test was included as part of the definition of a
price index). Furthermore, while the Carli’s failure to satisfy time reversibility (and
other tests) is indeed a problem, it is important to realise that the RPI and CPI which
these elementary aggregates eventually feed into are themselves not time-reversible,
and nor would they be even if the elementary aggregates were time-reversible.9 This
means that fixing this particular problem associated with the RPI may not be of that
great a benefit (though as the preceding discussion indicates, it is true that replacing
the Carli with a time-reversible index would reduce any upward time reversal bias
of the whole index).
3.3 The statistical approach
The statistical or stochastic approach to index numbers was originally associated
with Jevons (1884) and Edgeworth (1925). More recent discussions of the statisti-
cal approach can be found in Selvanathan and Prasada Rao (1994), Diewert (1995b),
and Clements et al. (2006). The statistical approach treats the problem of deciding
on the correct price index as an estimation problem. The aim is to separate out a
‘common’ change in prices over two periods (a signal) from relative price changes
(which can be considered noise). Different estimators indices can then be eval-
uated according to the standard statistical considerations of (statistical) bias, and
efficiency. The bias of any index is measured against the population object of in-
terest, but unfortunately, there seems to be little agreement in the literature for this
approach on what the ‘common’ price change in the population should be.
The ‘unweighted’ stochastic approach aims to estimate the average price
change from a population of price relatives
(
pi1/p
i
0
)
. Selvanathan and Prasada Rao
(1994) start off by supposing that each price change is made up of a systematic part
that is common to all prices and a zero-mean random component ui, so
9After the level of the elementary aggregates, the RPI makes use of the Young and Lowe indices
to aggregate further. The Young index is not time reversible, while the Lowe index is only time
reversible for some comparisons. For an explanation of these see chapter 1 of International Labor
Organization (2004). Diewert (2012b) also recommended that the Young index no longer be used in
the RPI.
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Dpit = αt +u
i (3.5)
where Dpit = ln p
i
t − ln pit−1 = ln
(
pit
pit−1
)
(i.e the log increase in prices) and αt the
common trend in all prices which we aim to estimate. The International Labor
Organization’s consumer price manual (International Labor Organization (2004))
and Diewert (2012b) both use this statistical model to justify the Jevons index. This
is because αt = E
[
ln
(
pi1/p
i
0
)]
= lnPJ (p0,p1) gives the average log of the price
changes and taking the anti-log of this gives the Jevons index. However, there are
two issues with this conclusion.
Firstly, we can reasonably question whether this is the correct object of interest
to consider. A longstanding criticism of the unweighted approach (associated with
Keynes (1930), and Walsh (1901)) is that it treats all items equally regardless of their
economic importance. Diewert (2012b) for instance refers to this (in the context of
higher level indices) as a “fatal flaw”. We might instead think that if for every £1
spent on item A £5 are spent on item B then we should assign B five times the
weight of A. This is achieved straightforwardly if we imagine the population to be
the price relatives associated with each pound spent rather than associated with each
individual item regardless of its price or budget share. This would give us the object
of interest E[wi
(
pi1/p
i
0
)
] where wi is the budget share of good i.10
A second more fundamental issue is that, even if this object of interest is the
correct one, the Jevons does not necessarily give us a good statistical measure in this
case. The elementary aggregate price change is one plus the percentage increase in
prices and the motivation for using Dpit is to make use of the fact that
ln pit− ln pit−1 ≈
pit
pit−1
−1
(when growth rates are small). Ultimately our object of interest here is E
(
pi1/p
i
0
)
.
But we know that if this is the case then the Jevons is biased downwards (an ob-
servation first pointed out, in this context, by Greenlees (2001)). This is because
10This can also be motivated by the “Expenditure Based Regression Model” in Selvanathan and
Prasada Rao (1994).
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Jensen’s inequality tells us that E [ f (xi)] ≥ f (E [xi]) when f is a convex function
(with equality when all of the xi’s are the same). When we take the anti-log of αt
we have f as the exponential function and xi = ln
(
pi1/p
i
0
)
so
PJ (p0,p1)= exp [lnPJ (p0,p1)]= exp
[
1
N∑ ln
(
pi1/p
i
0
)]≤E [exp[ln(pi1/pi0)]]=E [pi1/pi0]
=⇒ PJ (p0,p1)≤ E
[
pi1/p
i
0
]
An alternative way to approach this problem is to note that the price-relatives
themselves can generally (except in some extreme cases) be described by a decom-
position into their mean and an additive, mean-zero, deviation
pi1
pi0
= E
[
pi1/p
i
0
]
+ ei (3.6)
where E
[
ei
]
= 0 and the variance of ei is σ2.
We can then estimate E
[
pi1/p
i
0
]
in an unbiased way by taking its sample ana-
logue
1
N∑
pi1
pi0
= PˆC (p0,p1)
which is the Carli index of price relatives in the sample. Notice that this con-
clusion is not based on any arguments about how price relatives evolve or whether
(3.5) is a more realistic model of the process generating price relatives than (3.6).11
This needn’t mean that the use of the Jevons is ruled out by the unweighted
statistical approach however, as bias is not our only consideration here. The overall
performance of an estimator can be summarised by its mean squared error (MSE),
which measures its expected squared deviation from the true population value of the
parameter of interest (equal to the sum of its squared bias and its variance). That is,
for some estimator θˆ of a population parameter θ
11The data generating process in (3.5) implies that current period prices in all outlets would be
described by pi1 = E[p
i
1/p
i
0]p
i
0+e
i pi0, which means that they would equal base period prices inflated
by a common factor plus a heteroskedastic deviation. In a process described by Dpit = αt +ui how-
ever, log prices in both periods would be decomposable into a mean and a homoskedastic deviation
ln pit = E[ln p
i
t ]+u
i
t for t = 0,1 where u
i = ui1−ui0. The latter seems the more realistic model of the
way the data is generated. However, this has no bearing on the question of what the object of interest
should be, or on whether the Jevons is biased as an estimator of E[pi1/p
i
0].
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MSE(θˆ) = E[
(
θ − θˆ)2] =Var(θˆ)+Bias(θˆ)2 (3.7)
The sample Jevons PˆJ may be a biased estimate of the unweighted population
parameter of interest PC = E
[
pi1/p
i
0
]
while the Carli PˆC is unbiased, but the Jevons
may still perform better than the Carli in cases where it has a lower variance.
Using (3.7), we can define a measure of the performance of our indices relative
to an arbitrary population object of interest P. Assuming we have a statistically
random sample, the mean squared error of the estimator provided by the sample
Carli index is simply the variance of the sample mean of price relatives σ2/N plus
the Carli’s squared bias
MSE(PˆC) = E[
(
P− PˆC
)2
] =
σ2
N
+(P−PC)2 (3.8)
In the case of the Jevons index, the mean squared error (using a variance approxi-
mation in Dale´n (1999) cited in Elliott et al. (2012) is
MSE(PˆJ) = E[
(
P− PˆJ
)2
]≈ σ
2
N
(
1− σ
2
P2C
)
+(P−PJ)2 (3.9)
where σ
2
N
(
1− σ2
P2C
)
is the approximate variance of the Jevons. Since it can be shown
that
(
1−σ2/P2c
) ≤ 1, this means that the approximate variance of the Jevons will
always be smaller - by a constant factor - than the variance of the Carli.
Combining (3.8) and (3.9) tells us that the ratio of MSE’s of the Carli and
Jevons for our purposes will be given by
MSE(PˆC)
MSE(PˆJ)
≈ σ
2/N+(P−PC)2
σ2
N
(
1− σ2
P2C
)
+(P−PJ)2
(3.10)
The expression (3.10) suggests that it is possible that MSE(PˆC)/MSE(PˆJ) is greater
or smaller than one 1 depending on the relative biases and variance of the two in-
dices. To say anything further at this point, we need to settle on an appropriate
object of interest. The preceding discussion indicates that this would likely be a
weighted average of price relatives. I shall adopt period 0 weights in what follows,
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although one could equally well choose period 1 weights (or some combination
of weights in the two periods). This decided, we can now attempt to evaluate the
performance of the Carli and Jevons in different circumstances.
3.3.1 Empirical exercise
To investigate this, I make use of data from the Kantar Worldpanel. This is a panel
run by the market research firm Kantar which surveys households throughout Great
Britain (Northern Ireland is not included). In this survey, participating households
are issued with barcode readers and are asked to scan all barcoded products brought
home. In principle this includes groceries purchased from all retailers including
online outlets, and not just supermarkets. Households also record information on
the stores visited. Information on the prices is obtained from till receipts which are
mailed to Kantar who then match the prices paid to the purchase record. Where
no receipts are available, prices are taken from centralised databases of store- and
product-specific prices, or otherwise imputed. The data also record any promotional
deal attached to a purchase. The Kantar Worldpanel therefore provides us with ex-
tremely detailed data on household’s expenditure on individuals products, including
the date they were scanned and the shop where they were purchased, and whether
or not they were on offer. The household purchases recorded in the survey give me
sample of prices to use in my analysis.
To investigate the statistical performance of the Carli and Jevons indices, I first
use the data to construct a ‘population’ of price relatives for different goods. To
calculate price relatives for goods seen in different months, I first need to define
what is meant by a ‘good’ and then how to decide on its monthly price. I take a
good to be a particular product sold in a particular store (products are identified
by barcode). Thus two identical loaves of bread sold in two different supermarkets
would be considered different goods. The price of goods for a particular month
is then taken to be the modal price consumers paid for one unit of this good in
that month. The price relative for that month is calculated by deciding on a base
month, and then calculating the ratio of prices in the following months relative to
that month. I drop any prices that are not observed in every month (leaving us with
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a balanced panel of prices) which serves to exclude seasonal items that are only
purchased at certain times of the year. I also drop the prices of any goods that are
on any kind of promotion (such as those subject to quantity deals). The idea behind
all these choices is to try and replicate what the ONS or other statistical agency
would sample when calculating its elementary aggregates.
To estimate the mean squared errors of the Carli and Jevons indices, I then
employ the following procedure:
1. Drawing a random sample of price relatives of size n without replacement
from this population
2. Calculating sample Carli and Jevons estimators
3. Drawing another sample, and so on for 30,000 iterations
I repeat this procedure for different sample sizes (for n= 20,50,80,110,140,170,200),
and using different base months. In each case we will get a distribution of sam-
ple Carli and Jevons indices which I use to obtain direct estimates of their biases
(the average difference between the sample Carli and Jevons and the population
weighted mean of price relatives), their mean squared errors (the average squared
difference between the sample Carli and Jevons and the population weighted mean
of price relatives) and their variances. I look at the prices of two categories of
goods: alcohol and bread. The above selection procedures leave me with 518 price
quotes for alcohol in each month and 2,319 for bread. Ideally I would like to look
at clothing as this is the category of spending for which the formula effect is largest
(see Morgan and Gooding (2010)) and therefore the group for which the question
of whether the Carli or Jevons is best statistically is most important. Unfortunately
spending on this is not covered by the Kantar Worldpanel which only records
grocery spending. My data cover the months of January to October 2010.
This work builds on a similar analysis by Elliott et al. (2012) who also used
alcohol prices in the Kantar Worldpanel covering the years 2003-2011 to look at
the statistical performance of different estimators (Elliott et al. themselves remain
agnostic as to what the object of interest should be, and consider the performance of
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different estimators for various different target indices). They find that the MSE of
the Carli tended to be smaller than that of the Jevons E
[
wi0(p
i
1/p
i
0)
]
was the object
of interest - especially as the sample size increased. In very small samples the
Jevons could however perform better, suggesting that the statistical approach might
favour one or the other in different circumstances. I build on the analysis of Elliot et
al. by comparing the performance of the different base months and different times of
the year. The interest in the impact of the choice of base month on the two estimators
relative statistical performance stems from its potential to influence the size of the
formula effect. Fenwick (1999) points out that January sales might increase the
variation of prices (especially for goods such as clothing), and since prices in all
subsequent months will then be compared with January, these would have a knock
on effect on the variance of price relatives and hence the size of the difference
between the Carli and Jevons throughout the rest of the year. Different budget
shares between goods in different months also mean the choice of base month may
affect the indices’ relative biases in our case.
The population variance of modal prices in different months for alcohol is
shown in Figure 3.2. There is little evidence of an impact of January sales in partic-
ular on the variance of prices, and the differences from month to month are small.
The same is true for the prices of bread which I omit due to space considerations.
This suggests that the channel Fenwick (1999) proposed for differences between the
two indices across base months may not be too important in this data. For alcohol
the variance is greatest in August (and smallest in March).
The variance of the Carli and Jevons estimators are shown in Figures 3.3 (for
bread) and 3.4 (for alcohol). These plot the variance for each sample size and each
month using a January base month. The expected relationships hold in that the
Jevons consistently has a lower variance than the Carli and the variances of both
estimators decline approximately with the square root of the sample size.
The other component of the mean squared error is the bias. Both the Carli
and Jevons are biased estimators for our chosen object of interest, and it is not
certain a priori which index will be more biased. The Jevons naturally attaches
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Figure 3.2: Variation in population modal alcohol prices by month, 2010
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Note: Author’s calculations from Kantar Worldpanel.
Figure 3.3: Variance of Carli and Jevons for bread prices
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Figure 3.4: Variance of Carli and Jevons for alcohol prices
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less importance to the largest price changes, so if these good also have the smallest
weights, then the Jevons may be less biased than the Carli for example. The biases
of the Jevons for different sample sizes for alcohol are shown for each month in
Figure 3.5 below (again using a January base month). It is clear that unlike the
variance, the bias remains roughly constant as the sample size grows. The same is
true for the bias of the Carli for alcohol and the biases of both indices for bread,
which I do not plot to save space. For bread, the Carli is positively biased for some
months and negatively biased for others (March and April), while it always has a
negative bias for alcohol prices. The Jevons has a positive bias for bread and a
negative bias for alcohol prices (though the bias for alcohol prices is smaller than
that of the Carli).
We have seen that the Jevons consistently has a lower variance than the Carli
(which falls with sample size for both estimators) while the biases of the two esti-
mators are essentially unaffected by the size of the sample. What does this imply
for the two estimators’ mean squared errors? The ratio of the MSE for the two esti-
mators is shown below in Figures 3.5 and 3.7. For bread the ratio falls as the sample
size increases, but the number of months where the Carli has a greater MSE than
the Jevons is greater only after the sample size reaches exceeds 110. Even then, in
3.3. The statistical approach 81
Figure 3.5: Bias of the Jevons index for alcohol prices
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Note: Author’s calculations from Kantar Worldpanel.
some months the Carli performs much worse than the Jevons (sometimes with an
MSE that is more than twice as high even when the sample size reaches 200). For
alcohol the Jevons seems to perform better in all samples, and the ratio of the MSE’s
favours the Jevons as the sample size gets larger. This is because the constant biases
have a larger relative impact on the ratio as the variance of the two indices shrinks
(and the Jevons is less biased than the Carli).
I now turn to the question of how the MSEs of the two estimators vary with the
time of year. I plot the MSE ratios for different sample sizes in each month for bread
and alcohol respectively in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 (keeping the base month at January).
For alcohol, the Jevons consistently outperforms the Carli in terms of MSE in every
month. For bread, this can vary. In June, the Carli has a lower MSE for all sample
sizes, while in February, May and July the Jevons always has the lower MSE.
A final question concerns the impact of the choice of base month. The Carli-
Jevons MSE ratio for different months given different base months is shown for
bread in Figure 3.10 and for alcohol in Figure 3.11. For these plots I keep the sample
size constant at 200. I calculate the ratio of MSEs for every month following the
base month in the year (so when the base month is September we will only have
price relatives for October). It’s clear that the choice of base month matters. In my
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Figure 3.6: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by sample size
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Figure 3.7: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by sample size
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Figure 3.8: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by month
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
3.5 
4 
4.5 
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep  Oct  
M
S
E
(C
)/
M
S
E
(J
) 
Sample size=20 
Sample size=50 
Sample size = 80 
Sample size = 110 
Sample size = 140 
Sample size = 170 
Sample size = 200 
Note: Author’s calculations from Kantar Worldpanel.
Figure 3.9: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by month
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data for bread it appears that the case for using the Carli seems stronger when the
base month is February for instance than in January. Similarly for alcohol, the case
for using the Jevons seems much stronger when using a January base month than
when we use other base months.
Figure 3.10: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for bread by base month (sample size =200)
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Figure 3.11: Ratio of Carli and Jevons MSEs for alcohol by base month (sample size =200)
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To summarise, the statistical approach does not decisively favour either the
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Carli or the Jevons for bread in the data I use, but the Jevons consistently outper-
forms the Carli for alcohol. This contrasts with the findings of Elliott et al. (2012)
who find, using data covering a longer time period, that the Carli tended to perform
better as a measure of the population base weighted price relatives for alcohol (at
least when we use a January base month). We also find that the relative perfor-
mance of the two estimators varies over the year and according to the base month
used. These results have implications for discussions around the size of the for-
mula effect. Since 2010, a change to the methods used to collect clothing prices
has led to a particularly large difference emerging between the Jevons index used
for these goods in the CPI and the Carli used in the RPI. The changes tended to
increase the sample sizes used for calculating clothing price relatives. One might
have thought that this would favour the Carli over the Jevons as the variance of the
Carli declines faster with sample size, and indeed this would be true if the object
of interest was unweighted. However with our weighted object of interest, as the
sample size increases and the variance decreases, the bias of each index becomes
a more important element in determining their relative MSEs. Whether the Carli
or Jevons is more biased for our object of interest depends on which goods see the
fastest price increases, and how dispersed the price relatives are. These factors vary
over time and across goods, making it difficult to offer any general rules for when
the Carli or Jevons may be more suitable. This suggests caution when trying to
generalise results such as those found in Elliott et al. (2012).
One potential pitfall with analyses such as these is that they are based on draw-
ing a random sample of price relatives from some population (and implicitly as-
sume that national statistical agencies would do the same). However, in practice the
ONS sample for instance would not appear to be completely random. At present
the ONS price sample consists of price quotes for a list of specific items judged
in advance to be representative of broader categories: and the selection of these
representative items is often a matter of judgement, (see Gooding (2012)). The
list of representative items is updated annually based on a range of considerations.
In 2012 walking/hiking boots replaced outdoor adventure boots as a representative
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item for footwear. A bag of branded chocolate also replaced candy coated chocolate
as a representative item as its price had been becoming more difficult to collect (for
more details see Gooding (2012)). It’s not clear how this might affect the relative
statistical performance of the sample Carli and Jevons. The fact that price rela-
tives are not independently distributed also makes it impossible to calculate reliable
standard errors for the elementary aggregates since the actual variance-covariance
matrix of ei in (2) will in practice be unknown. This is unfortunate as the prospect
of publishing standard errors alongside inflation rates has been mentioned as a key
attraction of the statistical approach, (see for instance Clements et al. (2006)).
3.4 The economic approach
The economic approach to index number construction aims to answer the question:
how much more income would a typical consumer require to maintain the same
standard of living following a price change? We are typically only interested in
maintaining the same ‘economic welfare’ over two periods, by which we mean that
we only seek to compensate the consumer for changes in the prices they face, and
not for changes in other environmental factors such as air quality, or changes in the
consumer’s tastes, which are held constant for the purposes of our comparison.
The question is answered conceptually by a cost of living index (COLI). The
COLI is defined by means of a cost function c(pt ,ut), which tells us for any given
level of prices pt , the minimum level of expenditure needed to achieve a given level
of welfare or ‘utility’ ut . The ratio of cost functions in two periods, holding the
target utility constant at some level u defines the COLI or Konu¨s index (dating back
to Konu¨s (1939))
PK (p0,pt ,u) =
c(pt , u¯)
c(p0, u¯)
Every household will have its own COLI, and in order to calculate an economy-
wide inflation measure it is necessary to aggregate these in some way. Various ways
of doing this are discussed in Crossley and Pendakur (2010) and aggregation issues
are also discussed in Diewert (2001). The COLI is distinct from a Cost of Goods
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Index (COGI) which conceptually aims to compare the cost of buying a fixed basket
of goods in two different periods (rather than to achieve the same utility). The ONS
rejects the interpretation of both the CPI and RPI as attempts to measure changes
in the cost of living (see Office for National Statistics (2011)) and instead regards
these as COGIs.
Under the economic approach, the price index chosen should reflect the degree
to which consumers mitigate the welfare impact of price changes by shifting their
purchases away from goods and services that have become relatively more expen-
sive and towards goods that have become relatively cheaper. This means it should
explicitly take account of the dependence of prices and quantities over time given
by the demand function qt(pt). Economists traditionally do this is by representing
consumers’ decision making (their preferences) with a utility function that ranks
different bundles of goods and services, and more importantly is associated with
particular demands and particular substitution responses. Each utility function is
associated with its own cost function, and if a price index coincides with the ratio of
two cost functions for a particular utility function, it can be thought of as represent-
ing the COLI for those particular preferences. Two noteworthy price indices that do
just this are:
1) The Laspeyres index
PL (p0,p1) =
∑ pi1q
i
0
∑ pi0q
i
0
=∑wi0
(
pi1
pi0
)
where wi0 gives the budget shares of good i in period 0. This corresponds to the
Leontief preferences, where the consumers utility is given by
ut = min[α1q1t ,α
2q2t ....α
NqNt ]
The consumer maximises this for any given vector of prices by selecting quantities
such that
α1q1t = α
2q2t = ....= α
NqNt
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Thus for Leontief preferences, there are no substitution responses: the ratios of
different quantities remain constant as prices change.
2) The Geometric Laspeyres
PGL (p0,p1) =
N
∏
i=1
(
pi1
pi0
)wi0
= exp(∑wi0 ln
(
pi1
pi0
)
)
This corresponds to Cobb-Douglas preferences
ut =
(
q1t
)β 1× (q2t )β 2 ...× (qNt )βN
which are in turn associated with the demand functions
qit =
β i
∑ j β j
M
pit
where M is the consumers income. For these preferences, the budget shares will be
constant, as q
i
t p
i
t
M =
βi
∑ j β j
, regardless of prices. This implies that a 1% increase in the
price of a good results in a 1% reduction in the quantity demanded.
If we think that substitution between products occurs within certain groups
but not between those groups and others (or if preferences within the group are
described by Cobb-Douglas or Leontief ‘subutility’ functions), then we could cal-
culate sub-COLIs within groups using these formulae and then combine them to
get an overall index in a manner similar to the process of aggregation used to con-
struct the RPI and CPI. For instance, a Geometric Laspeyres could be used within
categories of goods where we thought substitution responses were realistically de-
scribed by Cobb-Douglas preferences, and a Laspeyres index could be used if we
thought that it was more appropriate to assume zero substitution.
These indices differ from the unweighted Carli and Jevons and Dutot indices
that are actually used in the RPI and CPI, but their resemblance is sometimes used to
justify the choice of indices used in the calculation of the elementary aggregate price
changes. The Jevons for example is thought to approximate a Geometric Laspeyres
within an elementary stratum, and this was one reason behind the Boskin Commis-
sion’s (Boskin et al. (1996)) recommendation that the US CPI should make use of
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the Jevons for elementary aggregates (when this change was put into effect, the BLS
also argued that it would better capture consumers’ substitution responses, see for
instance Dalton et al. (1998)). This kind of logic has however been criticised by
Diewert (2012b) who writes that “...the economic approach cannot be applied at the
elementary level unless price and quantity information are both available.” Since at
the level of elementary aggregates such information is not available, it follows that
the economic approach should have nothing to say on the subject of which index is
preferable.
There are two problems with applying the economic approach when quantities
are unknown. The first of these is that without knowledge of the weights which
should be given to each price or price relative, we will not know if elementary
indices are greater than or smaller than the Laspeyres and Geometric Laspeyres - in
other words the direction and scale of their bias will be unknown. There are in fact
particular assumptions about the way prices are sampled under which elementary
indices will equal their COLI counterpart (set out in Chapter 20 of International
Labor Organization, 2004). Most importantly for our purposes, the Carli will equal
the Laspeyres index and the Jevons the Geometric Laspeyres if the price relatives
of good i are sampled with a probability equal to their base period expenditure
shares.12
These conditions will be true under random sampling in the base period pro-
vided outlets stock goods in proportion to consumers’ expenditures on them. How-
ever, as we saw in the last section, this assumption is unlikely to hold in practice. If
these conditions are not true, and they are essentially impossible to verify, then our
elementary indices may end up calculating something rather different from what we
intended. Indeed, they may be upward or downward biased. Thus, unless we had
some reason to think that the Carli or Dutot will approximate a true Laspeyres, or
that the Jevons would approximate a Geometric Laspeyres, then we should be wary
about economic justifications for one elementary index over another.
12The Dutot will equal the Laspeyres if the probability of sampling good i in the base period
is equal to the ratio of purchases of i in the base period to the total purchases of all goods in i’s
elementary stratum in the base period.
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The second problem from a lack of quantity information at this level is that it
means we will be ignorant of the nature of the interdependence of prices and quan-
tities (consumers’ substitution responses), which it is necessary to understand in
order to choose whether our target COLI index should be a Laspeyres or Geometric
Laspeyres.
These problems are often used to argue that the economic approach should not
be used to choose index numbers at the level of the elementary aggregates, and that
different approaches such as the statistical or test approach should be used instead
(see for instance Diewert (2012b)). Switching to some other approach is however
not a particularly satisfying solution. A statistical agency that was employing the
economic approach to calculating inflation would still wish to estimate the appro-
priate COLIs at the elementary level: even if there was insufficient information to
construct adequate approximations to these, this doesn’t by itself give us justifica-
tion to adopt entirely different criteria to select index numbers at this level and this
level only. The elementary indices chosen for instance using the test approach could
also be greater than or less than what would be suitable given consumers’ spending
weights and substitution behaviour, and so would be equally problematic. Employ-
ing a different approach all together does not solve the problems posed by a lack of
information.
Given then that we do seem to have an alternative, how can we select index
numbers to approximate consumers’ COLIs when we lack all the relevant data? It
turns out that, in situations such as these, there is a constructive principle that can
be used to guide our choice of index number. This is the principle of maximum
entropy (PME), which I now explain.
3.4.1 Principle of maximum entropy
Our problem is that the vectors of budget shares in the base and current periods
are unknown at the elementary aggregate level. If we had grounds for selecting
one particular vector of base period budget shares for each period from the infinite
number of possible combinations for a set of goods, then we could use these to
construct indices that approximated either the Laspeyres or Geometric Laspeyres.
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If in addition we could select a vector of current period budget shares, then by
considering the dependence between shares and prices over time we could also
decide which of these two target indices was a more accurate reflection of the COLI
for these goods. The question is: why should we choose one particular combination
over another? In situations where we have limited knowledge, the PME provides
a criterion which we can use to guide our choice of budget shares. This was first
proposed by Jaynes in two papers (Jaynes (1957a), Jaynes (1957b)) in the context
of selecting probability distributions.
To see how this approach works, consider the following example. Suppose we
have a die that has been rolled many times. By ‘many’ we mean that a sufficient
number for us to ignore any problems of sampling variation. Suppose that the only
thing we are told about these dice rolls is the value of the average roll. What can we
say about the probability of rolling a particular number given only this information?
This problem would normally be considered insoluble, as Jaynes (1983) notes “on
orthodox statistical theory, the problem is ill-posed and we have no basis for making
any estimate at all.”
Laplace’s ‘principle of insufficient reason’ provides us with a first step for
assigning probabilities in situations such as these. This states that in any situation
where you want to assign probabilities to different outcomes, you should set them to
be equal unless you have reason to do otherwise. The maximum entropy combines
the principle of insufficient reason with any information we do have, and in doing so
reflects the idea that we do not want to favour any outcome unless we have adequate
justification to do so.
An objective function that will achieve this outcome is the entropy function
proposed by Shannon (1948).
H (p) =−∑
i
pi ln pi
where in the dice example pi is the probability of rolling number i.
This function is maximised when probabilities are uniform and minimised
when probabilities are degenerate on a particular outcome. In any given applica-
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tion, we will want to maximise entropy subject to constraints given by the knowl-
edge we have (in the dice example, subject to knowledge of the average roll). The
constrained optimum to this problem then best represents the current state of knowl-
edge. To choose a distribution with lower entropy than the solution would be to
assume information (as measured by Shannon’s function) which we do not possess.
To choose a distribution with higher entropy would violate the constraints provided
by the information which we do possess from the data. By solving this problem, the
maximum entropy approach provides us with estimates of probability distributions
in cases where there is insufficient information to use standard statistical methods.
3.4.2 Application of maximum entropy to elementary aggre-
gates
The PME is traditionally applied to situations where we must choose a vector of
probabilities. To apply it to our case, we need only note that the budget shares w
have all of the necessary properties of probabilities so we can apply the PME to
these in the same way. In particular they conform to the Kolomogorov axioms of
probability measures (so by definition we can treat them exactly like probabilities).
This suggests the following entropy measure
H (w) =−w′ lnw
where the budget shares take the place of the probabilities. In the simplest case in
which we have no other information (i.e. no constraints aside from the fact that
budget shares should sum to one) the maximum entropy problem is
max
w
H (w) =−w′ lnw subject to ∑wi = 1 (3.11)
This is solved by equal budget shares.
Proposition 1. The solution to the maximum entropy problem (3.11) is wi = 1/N
for all i.
Proof. See Appendix to this chapter.
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The intuition behind this solution is as follows. Our problem for selecting
budget shares at the level of elementary aggregates is analogous to the dice problem
but in a case where we do not even know the average roll. It seems we just cannot
know what the budget share of each individual good is in the same way as we
couldn’t know what the chances of rolling a 1 in the dice example were, which is
the reason for rejecting the economic approach. However, just as we can assign
some probabilities to dice rolls using the principle of insufficient reason, we can
similarly assign weights using a budget share equivalent: if we do not have any
reason to think that one good should have a greater or smaller budget share than any
another, we will assign them all equal budget shares. 13
This provides us with a constructive principle which can be used to address
our first problem with applying the economic approach to elementary aggregates.
The principle of maximum entropy justifies the Carli as an approximation for the
Laspeyres index and the Jevons as an approximation of the Geometric Laspeyres.
This is another way of saying that without additional knowledge, we will not assign
any one good a higher base period budget share than another when calculating our
Laspeyres or Geometric Laspeyres.
Our second problem concerned our lack of knowledge of the interdependence
of prices and quantities over time. We can proceed in spite of this by noting that
the PME can be applied to the vectors of budget shares in both periods t = 0,1. For
instance we can solve
max
w0,w1
H (w0,w1) =−∑
t
wt′ lnwt subject to ∑
i
wit = 1 for t = 0,1 (3.12)
We can add constraints imposed on the consumer’s behaviour by economic theory to
this problem. Suppose that we also have available the total expenditure on the sum
of all of the items in the elementary stratum in each period: denoted {x0,x1} where
x0 = p′0q0 and x1 = p
′
1q1. This is the kind of data which may be used to weight
13Diewert (2012a) also suggests that an assumption of equal weighting could be used at the ele-
mentary level. He uses this to justify both the Carli and Harmonic indices as Cost of Goods Indices.
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elementary aggregates in the next level up. Given this additional data the economic
approach to index numbers provides constraints on the budget shares. They must
satisfy certain axioms of behaviour provided by the Generalised Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) (for details see Afriat (1967); Diewert (1973); Varian (1982)):
{p0,p1;w0,w1;x0,x1} satisfies GARP
GARP is a set of inequalities involving the prices, budget shares and total expendi-
tures14 which provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the standard economic
model of consumer choice. Note that these restrictions are fully nonparametric in
the sense that they do not require any knowledge of the consumer’s preferences.
These constraints can then be added to the maximum entropy problem which be-
comes:
max
w0,w1
−∑
t
w′t lnwt subject to {p0,p1;w0,w1;x0,x1} satisfies GARP and ∑
i
wit = 1 for t = 0,1
(3.13)
The result will be a set of weights which satisfy economic theory and the infor-
mational content (as measured by Shannon’s index) of the data. We can show that
this problem is also solved by equal budget shares in both periods (since this solves
the unconstrained problem and it turns out that the restrictions from GARP are not
binding).
Proposition 2. The solution to the maximum entropy problem (3.13) is wit = 1/N
for all i, t.
Proof. See Appendix to this chapter.
This means that when you have no data on quantities or budget shares, the
PME provides a constructive argument for equal shares across good and periods
of time. These budget shares would be chosen by consumers who had equally
weighted Cobb-Douglas preferences. In terms of the choice of elementary index,
14Typically GARP is applied to prices and quantities but it can easily be rewritten in terms of
prices and budget shares since qit = w
i
txt/p
i
t .
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this would justify the Geometric Laspeyres as a COLI (since this corresponds to the
COLI for Cobb-Douglas preferences), and also justify the Jevons index (since when
budget shares are uniform, an unweighted index will equal the COLI). To choose
different vectors of budget shares would assume information which we do not have
at this level, and so would not be justified without additional evidence. As was noted
before, the PME can also be used to justify the Carli index as an approximation of
the Laspeyres. Thus, the Carli could also be used in some elementary aggregates if
one had some a priori grounds for believing that a Leontief utility function (i.e no
substitution) better reflected consumers’ preferences. For instance, the Carli might
be more appropriate for elementary aggregates covering pharmaceuticals or goods
sold in very different regions.
3.5 Conclusion
Now that I have set out my views on the different approaches to assessing elemen-
tary indices, we can now ask whether the UK’s national statisticians are right to
regard the Carli index as flawed and the Jevons as superior. This after all is the
reason underlying both the creation of the new RPIJ index and the decision to stop
classifying the old (and venerable) RPI as a national statistic. Here I will sum up my
conclusions from the test, statistical and economic approaches and give an overall
judgement.
Under the test approach, I noted that the Carli index fails to satisfy various
properties which one would expect of a price index, including the important time
reversibility test, while the Jevons satisfied all the tests considered. I also find that
the Carli fails a new, revised version of the price bouncing test. It is true however,
that the Carli’s failure to satisfy time reversibility does not provide very strong rea-
sons to replace it in the RPI, an index which is itself not time reversible, and which
would not become time-reversible were the Carli index to be replaced (although this
would serve to reduce the time-reversal bias of the index).
For the statistical approach I noted that there is no a priori reason to prefer
either the Carli or the Jevons. Even when our object of interest is an unweighted
3.5. Conclusion 96
average of price relatives, the Jevons, despite its bias, may still have a lower mean
squared error than the Carli. This is because the Jevons can have a lower variance
than the Carli. My view is that it is more appropriate to use the population weighted
price relatives as the target to be estimated. We looked at the relative performance
of the Carli and Jevons as estimators for this in different contexts for bread and
alcohol. This exercise showed that the relative performance of the Carli and Jevons
are not invariant to considerations such as sample size, the goods included in the
elementary aggregate, the base month and the month of the year. This suggests that
results found in one context needn’t necessarily generalise to others.
A common view in the literature is that the economic approach cannot be ap-
plied at the level of elementary indices, where quantity information is by definition
not available. However, I showed that in the absence of additional information, the
principle of maximum entropy provides a constructive argument for equal shares
across goods and across periods. This approach provides justification for both
the Jevons as an approximation to the Geometric Laspeyres and the Carli for the
Laspeyres. When applied across periods, the PME suggests use of the Geometric
Laspeyres as a target index, as this is consistent with constant budget shares over
time. This would favour the use of the Jevons for elementary aggregates when infor-
mation on consumers’ actual preferences was not available (which will in practice
be true for most categories).
Thus, the test and economic approaches both seem to favour the Jevons index
over the Carli, while the statistical approach doesn’t provide clear, general guid-
ance. I therefore concur with the general conclusion of the ONS and UKSA that the
Jevons should be preferred to the Carli.
Chapter 4
Life-cycle Consumption Patterns at Older
Ages in the US and the UK: Can Medical
Expenditures Explain the Difference?
As populations in advanced countries continue to age, a key concern for policy-
makers is whether individuals have saved enough to fund their consumption needs
over increasingly long retirement periods. Understanding trajectories of consump-
tion and wealth as individuals age is crucial to resolving this question. Research on
life-cycle consumption patterns has typically concentrated on working ages with an
emphasis on expected paths in labour income, economic wage shocks, and retire-
ment; see for example the Review of Economic Dynamics special issue on micro
facts (Krueger et al. (2010)). However, this leaves out an important and growing
span of life during the post-retirement years where other factors such as health, mor-
tality, health expenses and shifts in housing expenditures and recreation may play
an increasingly central role. Moreover, these are areas where there are large cross-
country institutional differences - for example in housing markets and in whether
medical care is privately or government financed - that may have important impli-
cations for patterns of non-durable consumption at older ages.
In the United Kingdom, average non-durable expenditure between the ages of
45 and 79 falls by 2.2 percent each year. This compares to 1.4 percent for the United
States. To illustrate, the first panel of Figure 4.1 plots non-durable expenditures in
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the UK and US by age averaged across birth cohorts. Its clear that spending remains
roughly constant after age 50 in the US while it falls much more rapidly in the UK.
What can explain a difference of this magnitude? An obvious starting point is
to examine age paths of income to assess the extent to which consumption expen-
ditures are tracking age paths in household income. But the second panel in Figure
4.1, which plots cohort averaged paths of household income at older ages in the two
countries, demonstrates that, if anything, incomes decline at a slightly faster rate in
the US than the UK.1 This therefore seems unlikely to be the major reason for a flat-
ter spending profile in the US. In this chapter we investigate other possible reasons
that may explain the dramatically different patterns of non-durable consumption of
older ages in the two countries by investigating differences in inter-temporal con-
sumption for households around and beyond retirement age.
Figure 4.1: Non-durable spending and incomes in the US and UK by age, 1984-2010
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Notes: Authors calculations using BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey 1984-2010 and ONS Living
Costs and Food Survey 1984-2010. Values are in US$ (2010). Figures equivalised using the modified
OECD scale. The definition of spending includes medical expenditures.
The set of factors that we explore in this chapter include: differential cohort ef-
fects in the two countries that may distort average life-cycle age profiles, differences
1In both countries income is measured as the sum of salary, investment, interest, rental and
transfer income and other income net of tax payments. In neither country does income include
capital gains on property or other investments. UK Prices are converted to US dollars with PPP
indexes.
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in timing of retirement in the presence of separabilities with employment, differen-
tial paths of housing expenditures possibly driven by institutional differences in
housing markets between countries, level and path differences in health status and
mortality, and finally the levels, prices and volatility of medical spending, as in the
US deteriorating health with age leads to higher spending there while this is not true
in the UK because of the National Health Service (NHS). Figure 4.1 shows paths
of non-durable spending including and excluding out-of-pocket medical spending
in the two countries. It is immediately clear that excluding medical spending helps
account for a significant fraction, though not all, of the difference between the two
countries.2 As we detail below, once medical expenditures are removed, the dif-
ference in the decline in spending between the two countries shrinks by around
three quarters. Different papers have made different decisions about whether med-
ical expenditures should be included in the definition of non-durable consumption.
For instance, Heathcote et al. (2010) and Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) include
medical spending in their measures of expenditure while for instance Attanasio and
Weber (1995), Banks et al. (1997), Blundell et al. (2008), and Attanasio et al. (2012)
do not (often on the grounds that spending on healthcare is more akin to investment
than consumption spending). Our results highlight the importance of giving careful
consideration to such choices.
Medical spending is not the only difference between the two countries how-
ever. We therefore move on to quantify cross-country differences in three potential
factors - employment, housing status and health - and look for any immediate differ-
ences that might explain the differential consumption paths observed in Figure 4.1.
While there are some differences in the way these variables evolve in the two coun-
2Changes in medical spending at older ages could in principle be driven by changes in medical
consumption in the two countries or differences in the prices paid for medical care. Purchasing
Power Parities (PPP) for medical care from the OECD suggest that the level of prices (paid by both
government and consumers) is consistently higher in the US than the UK (see http://stats.
oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PPP2014). In 2005, for example, UK prices were
estimated to be 78 percent of costs in the US. In Appendix B.2, we also consider the rate of change
of medical prices in the US versus the UK for the period 1988-2010. Price movements in the two
countries track each other quite closely for much of this period but US medical price inflation is
higher in the latter years of the sample. If medical care is a normal good, this would tend to reduce
US consumption of medical care relative to the UK.
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tries, these differences do not seem large enough to account for the cross-country
difference in spending patterns.
We examine this hypothesis more formally in a regression context, finding that
controlling for these factors only marginally reduces the cross-country difference
in the decline in non-durable consumption spending with age when medical expen-
diture is included. We then turn to model non-medical consumption conditional
on health status and real medical expenditures. This approach allows preferences
for non-medical consumption to change in a non-separable way with health and
the consumption of medical goods. It also captures any substitution effects driven
by the change in the relative price of medical consumption. We also consider the
role medical expense uncertainty may play in explaining consumption profiles in
the US, partly by exploiting differences in the institutional environments in the two
countries. We find suggestive evidence that precautionary savings against medical
expense risk play an important role in US consumption decisions. Controlling for
both medical uncertainty and relative prices fully explains the cross-country differ-
ence in spending declines. Our regression estimates imply that medical uncertainty
increases consumption growth at older ages in the US by around 0.90 percentage
points per year on average for the ages we consider. Precautionary motives against
medical expense risk in the UK are, by contrast, negligible.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe
in more detail the essential features of the data we assemble to look at these issues
and document cohort specific paths of non-durable spending and household income
for both countries. We then move on to look at various potential explanations for the
cross-country differences in turn. To illustrate, Section 4.2 provides a description
for cohort specific age paths in employment in the two countries and discusses their
implications for consumption profiles, Section 4.3 provides a parallel treatment for
housing by describing age paths of housing ownership and Section 4.4 focuses on
levels and paths of health status and differential levels and age patterns of medical
expenditures. Section 4.5 presents results obtained from an inter-temporal model of
growth rates in total non-durable expenditures for each country to identify factors
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that may account for different shaped consumption paths at older ages. The final
section highlights our main conclusions.
4.1 The life-cycle pattern of consumption and income
We use two repeated cross-sectional surveys widely viewed as containing the high-
est quality measurement of household expenditure and its components in each coun-
try the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) in the US and the Living Costs and
Food Survey (LCFS) in the UK. While these surveys do not cover the same individ-
uals for long periods of time, we organise the data to create a pseudo-panel and track
cohort consumption behavior by age (in the manner of Browning et al. (1985)). To
do this we group individual observations by 5-year birth cohorts and take averages
within each year. Cohorts are determined by the age of household head. Following
this approach allows us to merge in information from other surveys at the cohort-
year level where necessary.
The LCFS is an annual cross-sectional survey that has been running in one
form or another since 1961. The LCFS, formerly known as the Family Expen-
diture Survey, is conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the UKs
national statistical agency and has been the basis of a number of studies of intra-
and inter-temporal spending patterns. Currently it interviews around 6,000 house-
holds throughout the UK and continuously throughout the year. The survey begins
with an interview with questions about demographic characteristics, income, large
purchases over the last year and regular expenditures (such as magazine subscrip-
tions, internet subscription costs and so on). Each household member over 16 then
records all spending in a diary over the next two weeks.
For the USA, we make use of the Consumer Expenditure survey (CEX). This
survey has carried out by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on a continuous basis
since 1980. For some quarters prior to 1984, the survey only covered households
living in urban areas. The CEX includes two separate surveys, a diary survey which
works much like the LCFS, and an interview survey, where households are asked
to recall their spending on a range of spending categories over the previous three
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months. The interview survey is also a short panel, as the same households are
interviewed on up to 5 occasions. The first of these interviews collects some basic
data on family characteristics. Each subsequent interview updates this information
and asks questions concerning household spending over the previous 3 months.
Information on incomes and labour force participation are however only collected
in the 2nd and 5th interviews (except for new household members and members
who have newly started work), meaning that income and spending data for the 3rd
and 4th interviews need not cover the same time periods. In this chapter we only
make use of the interview survey.3 Around 5-8000 households are interviewed in
each quarter.
Table 4.1: Spending categories
Food in Food at home
Food out Food in restaurants, school dinners, catering.
Other non-durables Alcohol, tobacco, clothes, books,
child care, pet goods and services.
Medical Health insurance premia, fees for services from
health professionals, drugs, medical equipment,
care in nursing homes, care of invalids.
Housing related Electricity, gas and water bills,
domestic services, repairs, building insurance.
Recreation Sporting goods, musical instruments, CDs,
entertainment, holidays
Transport Motoring costs, petrol, fares for public transport,
air fares.
Durables Vehicles, appliances, entertainment equipment.
In both UK and US surveys, spending data are provided for hundreds of highly
disaggregated individual product codes. We allocate these goods into 8 broader
categories defined to be consistent across the two countries: food in, food out,
3While the methodology employed in the CEX diary survey is arguably more similar to that used
in the LCFS than the interview survey, the diary survey has lower sample sizes, tends to exhibit
greater variability in responses, and tends to under report spending relative to the interview survey
(Bee et al. (2015)). For these reasons, we make use of the interview survey instead.
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other non-durables, medical, housing related, recreation and transport and durables.
Some examples of what are included in these categories are given in Table 4.1. We
do not include rental payments or mortgage interest in any of these definitions as
we do not observe the shadow price of owned housing in the LCFS, nor can we es-
timate it easily (the CEX does include a self-reported imputed rental cost for owned
properties). We define total non-durable expenditures to include all rows in Table
4.1 with the exception of the final row measuring durable spending.
Household income data are derived from the same surveys and cohort age pro-
files obtained in the same manner. Household income is defined comprehensively to
include all sources of income for the head of household, the spouse/partner, and all
other household members net of taxes. US expenditures and incomes are deflated
to 2010 terms using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). UK variables are deflated to
2010 terms using the Retail Prices Index and then converted into dollars using PPP
exchange rates for that year taken from the OECD. Both surveys contain measures
of standard definitions of labour force participation. From 1994 onwards, the CEX
also contains detailed questions on the nature of households health insurance poli-
cies and Medicare coverage. In both data sets we restrict our attention to households
where the head is aged 45-79. This is because ages in the LCFS are top-coded at
age 80 from 2002 onwards.4
To control for measurement error and impacts of extreme values on life-cycle
paths, we trim households in the top or bottom 1 percent of distribution of income
and expenditure. In the CEX we take data from 1984 (to consistently include a
nationwide sample) until 2010. For the LCFS we take data from 1978 until 2010.
We stop in 2010 in both countries as we do not have mortality data for either country
after this date.
Figure 4.1 shows spending at different ages average across different birth co-
horts and different years. This means that differences between the two
countries shown there may partly be driven by differences in cohort and time
4We also plotted spending, income and demographics up to age 85 in the two countries using
data up to 2001 only. The patterns in the two countries are very similar. Results are available on
request.
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Figure 4.2: Non-durable spending by cohort and age
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Each line represents average log non-durable
expenditures at each age for 5-year birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages
45 and 79 over the period 1984-2010. Average differences across cohorts are removed by regressing
spending on cohort dummies and taking the residuals. Values are in US$ (2010). UK prices are
converted to dollars with PPP indexes. Figures equivalised using the modified OECD scale.
Figure 4.3: Log household income by cohort and age
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Each line represents average log incomes
at each age for 5- year birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over
the period 1984-2010. Average differences across cohorts are removed by regressing incomes on
cohort dummies and taking the residuals. Values are in US$ (2010). Figures equivalised using the
modified OECD scale.
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effects. To understand whether the patterns in Figure 4.1 are driven by cohort ef-
fects, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show how spending and incomes decline within cohorts
in the two countries. Before plotting these, we remove average differences across
cohorts by regressing spending and income on cohort dummies and taking the resid-
uals. It is clear that cohort effects by themselves cannot account for the main puzzle
with which we motivated this chapter. Although the spending decline observed in
the UK is somewhat smaller when one looks within individual cohorts rather than
averaging across them, the age pattern non-durable consumption at older ages in
the USA remains relatively flat. Within cohort declines in incomes are also similar
across the countries.5
4.2 Differences in employment and retirement
One dimension of labour force behavior at older ages that has been studied in the
context of consumption age profiles involves the impact of retirement on levels and
time paths of consumption. Consumption levels and paths may not be independent
of the retirement decision if preferences over employment and consumption are
not separable, or individuals do not fully anticipate income reductions coincident
with labour market retirement (Banks et al. (1998)). The importance of this in
explaining consumption trajectories at older ages is substantial. In the US, it has
been estimated that work related expenditures account for the entire decline in non-
durable spending from middle age to age 75 (Aguiar and Hurst (2013)). In addition
to any direct costs associated with work, movements out of employment may also
be associated with having more time to spend shopping for discounts or for home
production of some goods (Aguiar and Hurst (2007)). This could partially explain
cross-country differences if there are differences in the links between labour supply
and consumption expenditures in the two countries, or if declines in employment
were more rapid in one country than another (or both).
5In the CEX there were two changes to the way incomes were measured that matter for Figure
4.3. One occurred in 2001 and the other in 2004. The first introduced a bracketing question for
those who did not report their incomes first time round. The second introduced imputation for non-
responders. The income definition we employ makes use of non-bracketed responses only from
2001 and non-imputed values for income from 2006 onwards. In 2004 and 2005 it is not possible to
remove non-imputed income values.
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These declines in male employment by age are somewhat more rapid in the
UK compared to the United States. However, in the absence of non-separabilities in
employment and consumption, differences in paths of employment at older ages
in the two countries do not seem large enough to be the major explanation for
the substantial differences in consumption profiles. We will examine the role of
non-separabilities between labour supply and consumption in explaining the cross-
country difference in consumption profiles in more detail in Section 4.5 below.6
4.3 Housing ownership and downsizing
Housing related decisions and expenditures represent another spending category in
which there are important institutional differences between the countries that may
affect levels and age paths of expenditures at older ages. We have provided evidence
in other work that there exists far less geographical mobility in Britain compared to
the United States and more downsizing in the US compared to the UK as a mean-
ingful fraction of older Americans move to smaller homes (i.e., fewer rooms) with
little evidence of such downsizing in Britain (Banks et al. (2010, 2012)). While
this lower rate of British mobility was characteristic of both owners and renters, the
differential was particularly high among renters.
For British households over age 50, the probability of being a homeowner is
about thirteen percentage points lower than for an American household, a deficit
mostly offset by a higher probability of renting in highly subsidised social housing.
The major secular changes in housing tenure at older ages have decidedly taken
place in the UK and not the US. The fraction of older British people owning their
own home increased by almost thirty percentage points (from less than half to over
80 percent) from the 1908-12 cohort to the 1943-47 cohort. In contrast over the
same set of birth cohorts and age groups, the fraction of older American households
who were home owners has remained relatively stable at around 80 percent.
The primary reason for this secular change in home ownership rates for older
British households is due to changes in the proportion of individuals in social hous-
6Age paths for women (not shown) also display the same pattern of rapid declining employment
rates with age as women exit the labour force in both countries.
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Figure 4.4: Employment rates: men by cohort and age
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Each line represents average employment
rates for men at each age for 5-year birth cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages
45 and 79 over the period 1984-2010.
ing. In the UK, there is a system of subsidised housing, often referred to as local
authority, social or council housing. Those who are allocated a property pay a
below-market rent, and the landlord will be either the local authority or a housing
association. Individuals entitled to such a rental property are placed on a waiting
list until suitable accommodation becomes available. While entitlement to live in
social housing is subject to a strict means test, once allocated a property, tenants can
usually stay for life irrespective of any changes in circumstance. Social renters have
a severely reduced incentive and ability to move or to downsize their property, for
several reasons. Even if a tenants current circumstances mean that they are still en-
titled to social housing, moving can be very difficult because of shortages of social
housing. Existing tenants are treated the same as new applicants, so if they are not
in a priority group, they may not be allocated a different property. For those whose
circumstances have changed in such a way that they would no longer be entitled
to social housing if they were to reapply, there is a large incentive not to move as
they may not be allocated a different property at all and may have to move into the
private sector and pay full market rent.
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There has been a sharp across cohort decline in social rental housing in the
UK that parallels the increase in home ownership across cohorts (which for space
considerations we do not plot). There was an almost 30 percentage point decline in
the fraction of British households in social rental housing, which is pretty much the
same percentage point increase observed in home ownership. Over the same set of
birth cohorts, ages, and years there was little change in the fraction of households
in private rental housing. These changes reflect the introduction of a Right-to-buy
in 1980 which required local authorities to sell council-owned housing at a discount
to eligible tenants (the policy was later extended to other forms of social housing).
The differences in levels and trends in ownership patterns between the two
countries may partially contribute to an understanding of the differences in age-
consumption profiles. We examine the impact conditioning on these differences
might play in Section 4.5 below.
4.4 Health and the divergence of medical expendi-
tures
Our health measures are based on self-reported health status, age specific mortality
rates, and out-of-pocket medical expenditures by cohort, age, and gender. Neither
the CEX nor LCFS include information on health or mortality, so we draw these
from other sources.
4.4.1 Health status
For the UK health status data come from two cross-sectional surveys, the Health
Survey for England (HSE) and the General Household survey (GHS). These sur-
veys contain information on households self-reported health which we average by
age, sex and cohort. Two surveys are used as we do not have GHS data after 2006,
and HSE data before 1991. In addition, there are two breaks in the GHS (in 1997
and 1999), due to redesigns of the survey, which interrupt the series. We make use
of GHS data up to 1997 and HSE data from 1997 onwards. In the GHS, respondents
are asked about their general health status over the last 12 months which they an-
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swer on a three-point scale: answers can be good, fairly good, or poor. In the HSE,
households are asked to report their general health on a 5-point scale -very good,
good, fair, bad, or very bad. For consistency, we group these into three categories
(by putting the final three responses into a single worst health group). We then av-
erage health status by age, year, and sex and use this information to impute health
of household heads in the LCFS. The switch from the GHS to the HSE surveys in-
troduces a downward shift in the level of self-reported health statuses beginning in
1997. In what follows we remove this discontinuity by regressing health status in
both surveys on a GHS dummy and taking the residuals. To our self-reported health
data, we add data on mortality rates by age, sex and cohort/year from the ONS
Mortality tables. For the US we use the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS).
NHIS is an ongoing nationwide survey of about 40,000 households. Since 1982,
NHIS used a 5-point scale to measure respondents general health status Would
you say your health in general was excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor? We
create three categories for consistency with our UK measure. These three groups
are excellent or very good, good, and fair or poor. We use these to impute health
statuses to household heads and spouses in the CEX in the same way we do for
the LCFS. We also calculate the proportion of responses that are self-reported in
each cell to use as a control. Mortality data for the United States are obtained
from the Berkeley life tables which also give death rates by age, gender and year
(http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/˜bmd/states.html).
Figure 4.5 plots proportions of those in worst health in both countries showing
several distinct patterns in health status in both countries. First, levels of worse
health are always higher in the UK than in the US. However, these different levels
of subjective health status in the UK compared to the US have been shown to be
due to different subjective health thresholds between the two countries. In the age
groups we are considering, the British are typically healthier than the Americans
with prevalence of almost all diseases higher in the US compared to the UK (Banks
et al. 2006). At the same objective health levels, the British report themselves in
worse health on subjective scales. The second pattern to note in Figure 4.5 is that
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of responders in worst health by cohort and age
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Notes: Data for the UK is from the HSE and GHS surveys spliced together (adjusted to remove dis-
continuity between the surveys). Data for the US is from the NHIS. Each line represents proportion
of household heads reporting being in the worst health condition at each age for 5- year birth cohorts
over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984-2010.
the fraction of a cohort in poor health rises with age in both countries. The third
pattern concerns cohort effects in these paths of health at older ages. While there
is little evidence of cohort differences in the UK, cohort differences are however
apparent in the US. Finally, we note that subjective health declines faster with age
in the UK than the US. We attempt to account for the potential role of health status
in explaining the different expenditure patterns we observe in Figure 4.1 in our
regression analysis below.
The impact of declining health on consumption decisions in a life-cycle model
will depend on how it affects the marginal utility of consumption. If poor health
reduces the marginal utility of consumption, then we will observe that consump-
tion declines more steeply with age as health deteriorates. Various papers have
investigated the dependence of the marginal utility of consumption on health with-
out achieving consensus on either its sign or magnitude (Finkelstein et al. (2009))
for a survey of the available literature). Lillard and Weiss (1997) find that there is
substantial positive effect on marginal utility using panel data on consumption (as
inferred from income flows and asset changes) and health shocks. By contrast, em-
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ploying a novel approach that combines data on permanent income, utility proxies
and health data, Finkelstein et al. (2013)) find a substantial negative effect. Other
studies have essentially found no effect. DeNardi et al. (2010)) estimate a model
allowing preferences over consumption to be health dependent. They find that the
parameter governing the effect of health on the marginal utility is negative but sta-
tistically insignificant.
4.4.2 Life expectancies and age paths of mortality
We present information on life expectancies at different ages in two countries in
Table 4.2. The top panel shows life expectancies in 1984. The bottom panel shows
equivalent figures for 2010. For both men and women, life expectancies at each
given age tended to be greater in the US than the UK in the early part of our sample
(these differences had largely disappeared by the end of our sample period in 2010).
In the standard life-cycle model, higher age specific mortality risk acts like a
decline in the interest rate encouraging current consumption and producing a steeper
decline in consumption with age. Mortality risk rises steeply with age in both coun-
tries with mortality risk about ten times larger at age 70 compared to age 45. There
is evidence of cohort improvements in mortality that are larger in the UK compared
to the US. However, the shape of the age mortality risk function appears to be sim-
ilar in the two countries suggesting once again that differential mortality risk by
age, see Hurd (1989), does not appear to be the likely source of the significantly
differently age shapes in consumption in the two countries documented in Figure
4.1. In any case, we account for mortality’s potential role in explaining spending
differences within a regression framework in what follows.
4.4.3 Medical expenses
On the health side of potential explanations, we have so far explored age patterns at
older ages in general health status and mortality. While both health dimensions may
play a role in shaping consumption profiles at older ages, their ability either alone
or together to account for the much flatter non-durable consumption with age in the
United States compared to the UK seems limited. The final health dimension we
4.4. Health and the divergence of medical expenditures 112
Table 4.2: Life expectancies at different ages, 1984 and 2010
Age UK US
1984
Males
60 16.60 17.79
65 13.24 14.48
70 10.31 11.52
75 7.86 8.99
80 5.91 6.82
Females
60 21.06 22.48
65 17.20 18.63
70 13.63 15.03
75 10.44 11.77
80 7.70 8.85
2010
Male
60 22.03 21.64
65 18.03 17.89
70 14.33 14.39
75 11.00 11.19
80 8.10 8.37
Females
60 24.92 24.63
65 20.66 20.50
70 16.61 16.63
75 12.88 13.05
80 9.55 9.83
Notes: For the UK these are taken from the ONS lifetables. US fig-
ures are obtained from the Human Mortality Database (http://www.
demog.berkeley.edu/˜bmd/states.html)
4.4. Health and the divergence of medical expenditures 113
examine - health expenditures - appears to us to offer far more potential since there
are large differences between the two countries. While consumption of medical
services may increase in both countries as individuals age, differences in how the
costs of these are financed will show up as differences in both the level of measured
out-of-pocket expenditures and their dispersion.
How health costs are financed at older ages in the two countries are quite dif-
ferent. To a large extent, UK medical costs at all ages are paid by the state with very
little absorbed by the individual. State provision not only includes medications and
doctor visits, but hospitalizations as well. Charges are however typically levied for
prescription drugs and dental care. There are also often charges for long term care
costs as we discuss below.
The situation is very different in the US where government assistance for health
care is incomplete and a large proportion of the costs of medical insurance are met
by employers or directly by households rather than by government. Government
assistance for health care in the US is mostly provided through the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.7 Figure 4.6 shows enrolment under the two schemes over the
ages we consider. Medicare provides some insurance for the vast majority (over 90
percent) of households with heads over 65 but only a limited proportion of younger
households. The share of households which report receiving some support from
Medicaid increases somewhat from around 7 percent to around 10 percent as indi-
viduals age from 45 to 75.
While previous studies have found that Medicare eligibility reduces both the
mean and variance of out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expenditures (Barcellos and Ja-
7Medicare is a government insurance program for the elderly. Most individuals become eligible
for the scheme when they turn 65. Eligibility is automatic for those who have worked and accumu-
lated Social Security credits for at least 10 years prior to reaching this age, but those who do not
meet this requirement may also qualify on the basis of their spouses contribution history. There are
however some groups who can qualify at younger ages. For example, those who have received So-
cial Security disability benefits for at least 24 months automatically receive partial coverage. Around
12 percent of the population is already enrolled by the time they reach age 65 (Card et al. (2009)).
Medicaid is general scheme that provides reduced cost or free health services for low-income and
low wealth households, including those attempting to meet the costs of their long term care. Exactly
who or what is eligible varies from state to state with the federal government specifying minimum
standards of coverage. Over half of long term care costs are paid through Medicaid (O’Shaughnessy
(2014)).
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cobson (2015)), it does not eliminate the need for them entirely. Coverage is neither
free nor comprehensive with various direct costs for households. While hospital
insurance (Medicare Part A) is typically provided free of charge, insurance for doc-
tors services and prescription drugs (covered under Parts B and D) involve income-
contingent premia. Individuals covered under Medicare Part C (or Medicare advan-
tage) contract with a private company to receive their part A and B coverage and
may pay a higher premium for additional coverage. In addition, Medicare does not
cover the costs of all treatments and even when treatments are covered patients must
pay deductibles, co-payments and co-insurance from their own resources. A further
institutional difference between the two countries is that, in the US, a large fraction
of individuals have their private insurance costs covered by third parties (usually
employers). This proportion tends to decline with age however as individuals retire
and leave the labour market. Prior to age 65, a majority of American households
have their insurance at least partially paid for by some third party but this falls to
around 40 percent at age 70 as the left panel in Figure 4.7 shows. Similarly, the pro-
portion of households who have insurance but pay nothing (shown in right panel of
Figure 4.7) falls from 20 percent at age 45 to less than 3 percent at 75. For workers,
the share of health costs paid by employers is substantial, at around 75-80 percent
of the total.8
The institutions in the two countries naturally have consequences for paths of
medical expenditures as individual’s age. We plot the budget shares for medical
spending in for the two countries in the two panels of Figure 4.8. Not only are
medical costs in the UK lower as a share of the budget (always under 5 percent),
but there are only modest increases in this share with age. In contrast, the US graph
indicates much higher and sharply rising medical costs shares at older ages in the
US that are not due solely to cohort effects. To illustrate, medical costs shares
in the US are approximately eight percent at age 45 and rise steadily until they are
around 20 percent of the total budget by age 70. The decomposition of these medical
8See Exhibit 4.1 in http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/
MEPSICChartbook.pdf
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expenditures for a single cohort is shown in Figure 4.9.9 In the UK, the majority of
medical spending goes towards non-insurance costs. In the US, insurance premia
are far more important. Medicare spending begins to rise when the head reaches
age 65 but the trajectory of overall spending is smooth.
Figure 4.6: Proportions covered by government programs, US
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Notes: Data from CEX. Each line represents proportions of households with at least one member
covered by Medicare or Medicaid at each age for 5- year birth cohorts over the periods they are
observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1994-2010.
Information on the distribution of medical expenses, and the riskiness of such
expenses, is harder to come by, particularly in the UK. Table 4.3 compares the
distribution of annual OOP medical expenses by major categories in the UK and US,
for all households aged 60 or over.10 The HRS only includes medical equipment
spending in later years and so these are not included in the US data. Consistent
with the graphs for the 1928-1932 cohort in Figure 4.9 above, the table shows that
average costs in the US are almost seven times larger in the US than they are in the
UK, with a mean of over $5,201 per year compared to just $762 in the UK. Even
though insurance makes up proportionately more of the US expenses, the country
9Results from other cohorts are very similar.
10The best source of information to breakdown such expenses is the longitudinal ageing surveys,
and we use the US Health and Retirement Survey for this analysis. Since the level of out-of- pocket
medical expenses is so low, the English equivalent of the HRS does not collect information on such
spending, so we use the cross-sectional LCFS data as in rest of our analysis above.
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Figure 4.7: Insurance paid for by others, US
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Notes: Data from CEX. Each line represents average coverage rates at each age for 5- year birth
cohorts over the periods they are observed between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1994-2010.
The left panel shows the proportion of households who report insurance policies wholly or partially
financed by third parties. The right panel shows the proportion of households who pay no insurance
costs but report being covered by insurance paid for by third parties.
Figure 4.8: Share of cohort spending on medical care
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Each line represents average budget shares
out of non-durable expenditures at each age for 5- year birth cohorts over the periods they are ob-
served between ages 45 and 79 over the period 1984-2010.
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Figure 4.9: Composition of out-of-pocket medical spending (1928-32 birth cohort)
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Values shown over the period 1994-2010.
Values are in US$ (2010).
differences are of the same order of magnitude if we exclude insurance payments.
But the US data also exhibit considerably greater variance. To illustrate, health
expenses at the 95th percentile are around 17,313 per year (compared to $3,788 in
the UK), indicating a much larger risk of very large medical costs in the US.11
One final “institutional” difference between the two countries may be in the
nature or extent of family ties and caring by family members, and this may have ef-
fects on medical expenses. A full investigation of the links between family care and
other medical expenses is an important topic for future research, but it is beyond
the scope of this chapter. We briefly investigated the link between health, family
care and OOP medical expenses in the HRS data. For individuals reporting three
11Since the HRS data are a panel, we can also look at longer term spending totals, and indeed the
persistence of expenses over time. As well as being highly concentrated, medical expenses are also
shown to be strongly persistent over the six-year period, with the correlation between total medical
expenditures in 2002 and total medical expenditures two and four years later being 0.66 and 0.6
respectively. (Full results available from authors on request).
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Table 4.3: Yearly out-of-pocket medical expenditures by country- 2000-2006 Age 60+
A. UK
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 P90 P95
Total 762 0 46 375 1,729 3,788
Excluding insurance 574 0 13 255 989 2,243
Private insurance 188 0 0 0 88 881
Prescription drugs 118 0 0 129 342 553
Health services 234 0 0 0 0 1,118
Hospital 41 0 0 0 0 0
Medical equipment 180 0 0 0 0 145
B. US
Variable Mean P25 Median P75 P90 P95
Total 5,201 443 2,458 6,125 11,929 17,313
Excluding insurance 3,361 225 1,122 3,025 6,568 11,152
Private insurance 1,772 32 509 1,592 3,711 5,889
Prescription drugs 1,841 0 150 2,429 5,701 8,236
Health services 964 6 189 718 1,838 2,952
Hospital 301 0 0 0 365 1,062
Notes: Data from the Health and Retirement Survey in the US and LCFS in the UK. Values are
annual averages for households where at least one member is aged 60 or over. Values are in US$
(2010). Figures exclude spending on nursing homes.
or more limitations in Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs), 97 percent
reported receiving some assistance from family, but this had no relationship with
OOP expenses. In the UK, we cannot make a similar calculation since there is no
dataset with OOP expenses and health, disability or the receipt of family care, how-
ever since OOP expenses are so low for so many individuals, as discussed above,
such a relationship between family caring and OOP medical expenses is unlikely to
be important.
4.4.4 Long term care costs
One important source of medical cost uncertainty is in the cost of long term care.
This tends to be most important at older ages (for instance, rising over three-fold in
the US for those aged over 85 compared to those aged 75-84 (Fahle et al. (2016)).
However, in so far as these expenses also generate precautionary motives, they
may also affect spending behavior of households within our sample (Ameriks et
al. (2015)).
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In the UK, long term care costs are not typically covered by the NHS, though
care costs are often paid for, wholly or partially subject to a means test of resources
by local authorities. Estimates on the relative importance of private versus public
spending on long term care indicates that the majority of costs in the UK are paid
for by the public sector. Private spending on formal care is roughly half the value
of spending by local authorities (National Audit Office (2014)) and only around a
quarter of over 65s receiving formal care report paying for it themselves (Crawford
and Stoye (2017)).
In the US Medicare does not directly cover the costs of long term nursing care,
though it can cover related costs such as care in skilled nursing facilities and home
health care. Longterm care costs are often covered under the Medicaid program,
subject to a means test of resources. In 2004, the proportion of total long term
care costs paid for under these two programs was nearly 60 percent (Congressional
Budget Office (2004)).
Despite differences in the institutions for funding long term care costs, both
the overall level and proportion of long term care financed through private spending
is similar in the two countries (OECD (2005)). Census data show that the propor-
tion of population aged 65 and over who are resident in institutions is also very
similar in the two countries at around 3.6 percent in the UK and 4.1 percent in the
US (Peeters et al. (2013), Fig.1). Nursing home costs are not well covered in our
household expenditure surveys so to make what comparisons we can we draw on the
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), which only includes nursing home
care costs in its most recent wave (covering spending in the period 2014-2016). We
then compare this to the latest wave of the HRS to which we have access (covering
the period 2012-2014). Even in these two surveys, which focus specifically on the
older population, the measurement of costs, and even the coverage of the survey, is
not comparable for those who are resident in institutions, with the main difference
being that the ELSA data does not currently include any measures of spending for
those currently residing in institutions. In this respect, HRS data has 3.7 percent of
households over aged 60 with at least one member resident in an institution and a
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mean spending over the last two years of $847 in 2010 prices. This is lower than
all but one component of out-of-pocket medical expenses identified in panel B of
Table 4.3 for the US. But the distribution is highly skewed for those who do incur
costs (median out-of-pocket spending over the previous two years amongst those in
institutions was $930, the 75th percentile was $31,157 and the 95th percentile was
$104,950). The ageing surveys do, however, have comparable measures for out-of-
pocket nursing home spending over the last two years for those currently residing
in the household sector. Once again, mean spending is low although a minority of
households pay high costs. These patterns are similar in the two countries. 98.3 per-
cent of the US household population over aged 60 either did not use nursing home
or institutional care in the previous two years or else paid nothing for their usage.
The corresponding number in England is 99.4 percent. Mean annual spending was
$53 in the US and $30 in England and, conditional on having to pay something
the top of the distribution in each country was rather similar. Further details of the
distribution of these transitory nursing home costs is in Table B.1 of Appendix B.1.
Taking all this evidence together, it is clear that nursing home costs are small
on average but a significant expense but for a small minority of households as would
be expected. But the risks of high nursing home expenses and the size of the out-
of-pocket costs if they are incurred are both somewhat similar in the two countries.
4.5 Inter-temporal allocations of consumption
In the previous sections we noted possible links between trends in demographic
variables and consumption at older ages. We highlighted differences in particular
in the decline in employment, and the pattern of home ownership between the two
countries. We also noted strikingly different patterns of medical expenditures, sum-
marised in Figure 4.8, largely reflecting differences in the delivery of health services
in the US and the UK.
To motivate our regression analysis of consumption growth, we consider the
case where intertemporal preferences for non-medical consumption had the CRRA
form, and where health and medical consumption is non-separable with non-
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medical consumption. We then write the following (approximate) conditional Euler
equation governing intertemporal spending allocations12
∆ lncit = lnrt +∆Xitβ +ζ∆Hi,t +η∆ ln pi,t +ui,t (4.1)
where ∆ is the first difference operator (i.e. ∆xt = xt − xt−1), rt is the real
interest rate, ci,t is non-medical consumption, ∆Xit the change in a variety of de-
mographic and household characteristics which we detail below, ∆Hi,t is a measure
of the change in health status by household members. The change in the real price
of medical consumption ∆ ln pi,t , captures the non-separability with medical con-
sumption.13 For example, this price term allows for substitution away from medical
consumption as the relative price of medical consumption increases.
In the application, we additionally allow for uncertainty in medical expenses
that might induce precautionary saving. To do this we follow Banks et al. (2001),
and incorporate an additional conditional variance term in the consumption growth
equation (4.1) to reflect uncertainty over shocks to future medical expenses.14 This
is explained in more detail in Section 4.5.2 below.
4.5.1 Growth rates in consumer expenditures
We now turn to our analysis of inter-temporal consumption changes controlling
for differences in health, labour supply, mortality and tenure, again tracking group
level averages over time. In this section we split households into groups defined
by education (whether or not the household head or their spouse completed high
school), as well as year and 5-year birth cohorts.
Table 4.4 shows results from taking an average over the rates of decline in
spending for non-durable goods, and non-durable goods not including OOP medi-
cal spending for our different cohort-education groups. Non-durable expenditures
12See, for example, Blundell et al. (1994).
13We could have conditioned directly on the change in medical consumption and used changes in
medical prices as instruments. We decided instead to include the price term to directly capture the
effect medical price inflation.
14As the preceding discussion shows, non-separabilities may be present within period (affecting
relative demands for particular goods but not the level of spending) or across time (affecting the
inter-temporal allocation of consumption). In the Appendix to this chapter, we examine the shares
of expenditure on different goods and looking for within-period non-separabilities.
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Table 4.4: Average percent consumption growth rates
UK US Country Difference
A. Expenditure
Non-durable -2.21 -1.37 -0.84
Non-durable less medical -2.28 -2.05 -0.23
B. Equivalised Expenditure
Non-durable -0.65 -0.05 -0.59
Non-durable less medical -0.72 -0.72 0.00
Notes: Observations weighted by cell size. Equivalised using the OECD scale.
Equivalised using the OECD scale. The OECD scale is 1 for first adult, 0.5 for
each additional adult and child 14 and over and 0.3 for each child under 14.
decline by 2.21 percent a year on average for cohort-education groups in the UK
compared to 1.37 percent in the US, giving a statistically significant difference of
0.84 percent between the countries (p-value 0.034). This difference in consumption
expenditures before equivalization between the two countries falls by just under
three quarters when OOP medical spending is taken out. This suggests that differ-
ing healthcare financing institutions may explain a significant part of the difference
between the countries.15
One reason consumption declines at middle and older ages is that people leave
the household for several reasons which include the exit of adult children into homes
of their own, divorce and the death of a spouse. This pattern is illustrated for both
countries in Figure 4.10 which plots by age and cohort the fraction of households
who contain three or more adults. These fractions decline significantly with age in
both countries, especially between ages 45 and 60 continuing at a somewhat slower
pace after age 60.
Declines in the number of adults in the household will of course play a role
in producing consumption declines at older ages. When we use equivalised con-
sumption expenditures instead in part B of Table 4.4, not surprisingly we see that
rates of decline in both measures of consumption are significantly reduced in both
15Both surveys have seen declines in expenditure relative to aggregate measures of household
spending as reported in the countries respective National Accounts. This steady decline in coverage
may have implications for cross-country differences estimated here. For the definition of spending
we are considering however, changes in coverage over time do not appear important for our results.
We discuss this further in Appendix B.3.
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countries. This indicates that reductions in the number of people in the house-
hold, primarily the exit of children and death of spouses, play an important role
in the rates of decline in both measures of consumption among those ages 45 and
above. However, the difference between the two countries in declines in total non-
durable consumption remains large (at 0.59 percent). Once again, this difference
between the countries disappears when we examine non-durable consumption less
OOP medical expenses.16
Figure 4.10: Proportion of households with 3 or more adults
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Notes: Data from LCFS in the UK and CEX for the US. Each line represents proportions of house-
holds with 3 or more adults (individuals over 16) for 5- year birth cohorts over the periods they are
observed between ages 45 and 79.
In addition to the role of OOP medical expenses, however, the results in the
previous section also highlight the potential importance of other key determinants
for instance relating to housing and employment. To see the extent to which con-
trolling for changes in these and other demographic trends can explain the steeper
decline in non-durable nonmedical consumption that we see in the UK, we estimate
an extended consumption growth equation of the form:
16In addition to considering differences in mean expenditure, we also examine growth across the
25th, 5th and 75th and 90th and 95th percentiles of the spending distribution. While the decline
in spending growth in both countries is faster towards the bottom of the distribution, there is no
clear evidence that cross-country difference in expenditure declines varies much across the spend-
ing distribution. This suggests that the UK-US differences are not driven by a few high spending
individuals at the top of the distribution in the US.
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∆ lncs,k,t = γ1US+ γ2UK+α lnrs,t +θ lnms,k,t +∆Xs,k,tβ +η∆ ln ps,k,t +us,k,t
(4.2)
where cs,k,t denotes non-durable consumption for a cohort-education group
k, in country s and year t (initially including OOP medical expenses which we
later remove). The variable US denotes a dummy for the United States and UK
a dummy for the United Kingdom, lnrs,t is the log real interest rate, lnms,k,t is
the log mortality rate, and Xs,k,t is a set of demographic controls including family
size, employment, health status, and housing tenure. Following the discussion of
non-separability between medical and non-medical consumption, for specifications
where we exclude medical expenditures we include a term for the change in real
medical consumption prices, ∆ps,k,t .
The difference between coefficients γ1 and γ2 in (4.2) indicates how much
faster expenditures decline in the US relative to the UK once other factors are con-
trolled, note there is no constant term. We think of this difference as the unexplained
component of the cross-country difference, and report it separately in the regression
results that follow (multiplied by 100 to give value in percentage point terms).17
Results for different versions of model (4.2) are shown in Table 4.5. Col-
umn (1) shows results using Weighted Least Squares (using cohort cell sizes as
weights) with no controls and including medical spending in the consumption mea-
sure. These results are the same as those shown in Table 4.4 except that to maintain
comparability across regression models, we use the same sample as we will use in
subsequent regressions. The difference in the average rates of decline across the
two countries is around 0.9 percentage points and significant at the 5 percent level.
Column (2) adds additional controls for employment, renter status, mortality
and health, as well as the interest rate. These additional controls, capturing possi-
ble non-separabilities and macroeconomic differences between the two countries,
17We also run specifications including country-age interaction terms. These were not significant
for either country, suggesting that the difference in the rates of decline in spending between the two
countries does not change with age.
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do not appear to explain the different rates of consumption growth between the
two countries. Declines in rates of employment and increases in the proportion of
renters within each group are both associated with lower spending growth. The
faster employment declines in the UK shown in Figure 4.4 therefore help account
for some of the differences between the countries. However, the effect of this on the
unexplained element of the cross-country difference is offset by the larger increase
in the proportion of renters in the US which other things equal imply faster spend-
ing declines there than the UK. Overall the unexplained component of the spending
difference with these controls is around 0.7 percentage points.
Column (3) takes the specification used in column (2) but removes medical
expenditures from the consumption variable and allows for the possibility of non-
separability between medical and non-medical expenses by including the change
in log relative medical prices in the regression (as implied in equation (1)). Rela-
tive medical prices are computed relative to non-medical non-durable consumption
spending using a Stone price index as described in Appendix B.2. The relative price
term enters significantly and indicates a negative gross substitution effect of med-
ical consumption. Other things equal a 1 percent increase in real medical prices
from one period to the next is expected to reduce consumption growth by 0.4 per-
centage points. Even after allowing demographics and real medical prices, there is
still an unexplained gap in spending growth between the two countries of similar
magnitude to what we had before medical expenditures were omitted.
We might expect some of the characteristics on the right-hand side of the con-
sumption growth specifications in columns (2) and (3) to be endogenous. House-
holds that move out of employment or change their tenure status may adjust their
spending because these developments are responses to unexpected shocks that also
lead households to reassess the value of their lifetime resources. For instance, esti-
mating the average change in consumption when households change their employer
statement may exaggerate the causal impact of employment on spending changes,
if households did not already anticipate the change in job status. To account for this
we run weighted instrumental variable regressions in which we instrument changes
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in employment, housing tenure, health and mortality with their first and second
lags. Under standard rational expectations assumptions, these should be correlated
with current realizations of these variables uncorrelated with unanticipated shocks
that enter us,k,t (we calculate lagged means excluding observations from those in-
terviewed in the following period for CEX). However, these IV models do not
produce significantly different results to those reported in Table 4.5 and Durbin-
Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity of these variables does not reject the null of
exogeneity. The parameters and test statistics are reported in Appendix B.4.
4.5.2 Precautionary motives
One omitted factor from our consumption growth analysis so far is uncertainty over
future OOP medical expenditures. As we showed in Table 4.3, older households in
the US still face a high risk of large OOP medical expenses in spite of the Medi-
care and Medicaid programs. The important role these risks potentially play in
wealth and consumption dynamics in retirement in the US have been emphasised
in Palumbo (1999) and DeNardi et al. (2010). The risks of such expenses are much
lower in the UK where households effectively enjoy a much greater degree of health
insurance coverage. The differences in the extent of risks of incurring high OOP
medical expenses are illustrated in Figure 4.11, where we plot the average differ-
ences between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the distributions of OOP medical
expenses in the two countries within cohort- education cells at different ages. We
plot the 90th 50th difference since, as we saw in Table 4.3, the distribution of OOP
medical is highly positively skewed in both the US and the UK, and the main risk
households in the US face is the relatively small but non-trivial probability of very
high OOP medical expenses. Figure 4.11 shows that in the UK this measure is
roughly a quarter of the size it is in the US. It also tends to increase with age and is
larger for more educated households.
What implications might these differences in the dispersion of OOP medical
expenses have for consumption profiles? A simple theoretical analysis, such as that
in Banks et al. (2001), suggests that the effect of uncertainty over shocks to future
medical expenses on consumption growth will depend on the product of three fac-
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Table 4.5: Changes in log non-durable expenditure
Incl. Medical Expenditure Excl. Medical Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US -0.013 -0.001 -0.004 -0.025
(0.003) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
UK -0.022 -0.008 -0.011 -0.026
(0.003) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Interest rate 0.040 0.163 0.206
(0.093) (0.096) (0.097)
Log Mortality 0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Head employed 0.082 0.095 0.093
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
∆ Renter -0.419 -0.400 -0.404
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
∆ Number of kids -0.009 -0.009 -0.003
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)
∆ Number of adults 0.228 0.222 0.220
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
∆ Single -0.249 -0.226 -0.228
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
∆ Worst health -0.216 -0.239 -0.236
(0.075) (0.076) (0.075)
∆ Log Medical Price -0.394 -0.388
(0.073) (0.072)
pi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t 0.002
(0.001)
(US-UK)100 0.877 0.691 0.747 0.106
(0.415) (0.390) (0.415) (0.543)
N 616 616 616 616
Notes: Estimates presented are for weighted regressions with weights given by cell sizes in each
education-year-cohort cell. The dependent variable is log nond-urable consumption (cols 1 and 2
with medical expenditure, cols 3 and 4 without). Additional controls for switch from GHS to HSE
surveys in the UK, change in proportion of households reporting own health in US, and the change
in proportion responding to subjective health questions. In column (4) we instrument the conditional
risk term pi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t with its lag value. Comparisons of columns (2) and (3) with fully instrumented
regressions described in the text are available in Appendix B.4, differences in parameters were not
found to be significant.
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tors κpi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t where κ is a constant scaling factor reflecting both the persistence
of shocks and the consumers risk aversion, pis,k,t−1 reflects the contribution of un-
certainty in medical expenses to uncertainty in overall wealth for group k in country
s and period t−1, and φs,k,t is some measure of the dispersion in OOP medical ex-
penses conditional on information available to each individual consumer in period
t−1.
Figure 4.11: Dispersion in OOP medical expenses
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Of the three factors, pi2s,k,t−1 can be approximated by the squared ratio of OOP
medical expenses to non-durable consumption excluding medical expenses in pe-
riod t− 1. This can be readily estimated from our cross-sectional data (which we
do using cohort level averages by education group).18 The patterns across cohorts
and countries is very similar to the patterns shown in Figure 4.8. The choice for
18Specifically, the approximation to pis,k,t−1 is calculated as the square of the cohort-level ratio of
medical expenditures to non-medical non-durable spending in each cohort-age-education cell.
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the measure of dispersion φs,k,t is less straightforward. We take φs,k,t to be the pe-
riod t 90th-50th range in OOP medical expenses in each cohort education group as
plotted in Figure 4.11. We then add pi2s,k,t−1 into the regression model in (4.2) and
instrument it using its lag since the term depends on t−1 spending and is therefore
endogenous. The coefficient on this term will then reflect the value of κ .19 This
approach identifies the scale of precautionary effects using cohort variation in the
importance of medical spending uncertainty. The effects of including this term in
our regression model are reported in the final column (4) of Table 4.5.20
The uncertainty term enters with the expected positive coefficient and is signif-
icant at the 10 percent level. The unexplained difference between the two countries
falls from 0.75 to 0.11 percentage points: a remaining difference which is not statis-
tically significant. Thus controlling for medical uncertainty eliminates the remain-
ing gap in spending growth between the two countries. Our results also allow us to
estimate the scale of precautionary motives to save against OOP medical expense
risk in both countries. To calculate this, we take the predicted spending profiles us-
ing our regression results and compare them with those predicted for a counterfac-
tual world in which there was no medical uncertainty (using results corresponding
to the model in column (4) of Table 4.5 and households from the cohort born in the
years 1933-1937). With medical uncertainty, the expected average annual decline in
spending (excluding medical) is 2.21 percent per year in the US and 1.80 percent in
the UK. Without medical uncertainty, the predicted declines are 3.10 percent in the
US and 1.81 percent in the UK. We therefore estimate that precautionary motives
raise consumption growth in the US by around 0.90 percentage points per year on
average for the ages we consider.
19Ideally, φs,k,t should not include any predictable changes in medical expenses, as these do not
generate precautionary motives. Calculating risk within cells defined by age, cohort and education
eliminates important sources of this heterogeneity. Other sources of heterogeneity that lead to mul-
tiplicative differences between the conditional and unconditional risk (for example that might arise
if lagged medical expenditures affect current spending through an autoregressive process) will be
absorbed in the coefficient on pi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t .
20To understand whether other sources of risk may generate create precautionary motives in the
US, we have also run a specification (otherwise the same as that in column (4)) where we include a
term for income risk that is analogous to the term we use for medical expense risk. This enters the
regression insignificantly and does not greatly affect the magnitude or sign of the medical expense
risk term.
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4.6 Conclusions
For many years, debates surrounding the question of whether individuals’ have
saved enough to fund their consumption needs have focused on whether docu-
mented declines in consumption spending over the retirement period could be fully
accounted for by optimal behavior within the framework of the life-cycle model.
For instance, early work on the “retirement savings puzzle” attributed declines
in spending between pre- and post-retirement periods to a failure of consumption
smoothing that indicated a lack of preparedness for retirement (Bernheim et al.
(2001)). More recent work has argued that those declines that are observed can be
fully accounted for through a combination of home production and non-separable
preferences (Hurst (2008)).
The work we have reported in this chapter has emphasised how the interpre-
tation of such profiles must be understood in terms of the institutional environment
that individuals face, and in particular the extent to which individuals are exposed
to uninsured OOP medical cost risks and uncertainties. Relatively large and unin-
sured risks can generate modestly declining spending profiles on average which do
not necessarily indicate sufficiency of resources. We have compared consumption
trajectories for older households in the UK and the USA. In the US, spending tends
to remain relatively flat at older ages, while it declines quite steeply in the UK.
These differences persist when we control for other variables including employ-
ment, health and so on that evolve differently in the two countries.
A key component in explaining this difference is OOP medical spending,
which rises in the US much faster than in the UK where medical expenses tend
to be covered by the state. Taking out OOP medical spending from our compar-
ison reduces the gap in the average decline in consumption spending by roughly
three quarters. Although other differences such as inheritance taxes, house price
movements, long term care costs and risks and income risk may also play a role
in explaining these differences, we find suggestive evidence that precautionary mo-
tives to save in the face of greater OOP medical risk in the US are sufficient to
eliminate the remaining gap.
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These findings have relevance for discussions of consumption behavior at older
ages. It is often found that older households, particularly in the US, tend to continue
to amass wealth as they age (see Love et al. (2009)). In this chapter, we point out and
account for differences between US households and households in an environment
where the risks of high medical expenses have been effectively eliminated and for
whom spending declines by much more.
Chapter 5
Revealed Preference and Consumption
Behaviour at Retirement
Simple versions of the life-cycle model predict that households’ consumption
should not respond to anticipated changes in economic circumstances. However,
a number of studies have documented falls in consumption as workers retire (see
for instance Banks et al. (1998); Bernheim et al. (2001); Luengo-Prado and Sevilla
(2013) etc.). Since retirement should be largely foreseeable for most workers, and a
failure of consumers to smooth their consumption around this event violates a cen-
tral prediction of the standard life-cycle model, this tendency is referred to in the
literature as the “retirement consumption puzzle”.
A number of explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed. Falls in
consumption could for example imply that households do not have adequate re-
tirement savings, and are thus unable or unwilling to smooth their consumption.
This could for example be evidence of myopia on the part of consumer or some
other behavioural bias (Bernheim et al. (2001)). Alternatively, preferences over
consumption may be non-separable with labour supply. For instance, consumers
may spend less on work-related clothing, travel expenses and food outside of the
home after they retire. They may also have more time for home production or to
shop for discounts and so reduce market expenditures (Aguiar and Hurst (2005)).
Finally, retirement may sometimes be driven by adverse shocks (such as job loss,
or worsening health) and so not be foreseen (Smith (2006)). These explanations
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clearly have very different implications for what we infer about the adequacy of
households’ retirement savings and the optimal design of social security systems
and pensions.
In this chapter I set out and apply non-parametric, “revealed preference” tests
to households over the period of retirement. Such tests allow us to test whether the
behaviour of retirees can be rationalised by specific variants of the life-cycle model.
The tests themselves are non-parametric and avoid making specific assumptions on
the form of the utility function (beyond it satisfying standard properties such as
concavity, continuity, transitivity and so on). They rely solely on data on prices and
the quantities of different goods that are consumed.
I test whether household’s behaviour can be rationalised under the standard
life-cycle model, and the extent to which this affected when we tighten assumptions
on consumer’s foresight, allow for non-separabilities in preferences over consump-
tion and labour force participation, or allow for revisions in the marginal utility
of wealth at the point of retirement. Tests of the life-cycle model without perfect
foresight are equivalent to tests of the Generlised Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP) and have little probative force (a fact discussed in Beatty and Crawford
(2011)). The perfect foresight life-cycle model performs poorly in the sense that it
is largely rejected in our data. Results for this model are not substantially improved
when one allows for a revision in expectations at the point of retirement. I also
find that minimising deviations from the perfect-foresight life-cycle model suggests
rising marginal utility of wealth over time. Thus the smoothest possible paths of
marginal utility that rationalise the data are associated with wealth decreasing faster
than we would otherwise expect. I show that this particular result is unlikely to be
due to changing family composition over the retirement period, aggregate shocks
over the period we consider or credit constraints.
This final conclusion cannot be interpreted as strong evidence of consumer
myopia. The path of marginal utility could be more stable over time if one al-
lowed larger deviations from the perfect foresight model (due to either uncertainty
or perhaps measurement error in the prices and interest rates used). Perhaps one
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key lesson that we can draw from the results of these exercises is the limits on what
we can learn given only data on prices and quantities. The same data can often be
rationalised by increasing or decreasing marginal utilities of wealth, depending on
exactly what one assumes about the nature of the utility function. It is therefore not
easy to conclude whether consumption patterns over retirement are consistent with
smoothed marginal utility or not on the basis of expenditure data alone.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 describes the life-cycle
model, parametric approaches, their findings and their various limitations. Section
5.2 then sets out the form of our battery of revealed preference tests. Section 5.3
describes the data we will be using. Section 5.4 presents our results. Section 5.5
discusses further empirical implications of the life-cycle model when we allow for
uncertainty. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.1 The life-cycle model
We begin by stipulating precisely what we mean by the “life-cycle model”. Con-
sumers are assumed to maximise a lifetime utility function that is separable across
time, has a geometric discount factor and incorporates uncertainty by having the
consumer maximise the expected sum of within-period utilities. That is the con-
sumer will solve
max
q1..qT
U = Et
[
T
∑
t=1
β t−1u(qt)
]
(5.1)
subject to the sequence of flow constraints
Ωt+1 =Ωt + yt−ρ ′t qt (5.2)
where β is a discount factor, qt is a vector of consumption commodities, yt is
income, and ρt is a vector of discounted prices for consumption commodities. Ωt ,
ρt and Ωt are discounted values of actual wealth Wt , prices pt using the discount
factor
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1/(1+ rt)(1+ rt−1) . . .(1+ r2) (5.3)
where rt is the (nominal) interest rate. Expectations are also assumed to be
rational - that is they incorporate all information available at time t, are on average
correct and are revised each period through a process of Bayesian updating. This
is of course a hypothesis that can be tested like any other. We also assume that
individuals can borrow or lend freely. Taken together, these assumptions form what
we will call the life-cycle model.
Each period the consumer produces a new plan according to their current in-
formation set. Writing out the Lagrangian Lt of the problem in (5.1) being solved
with period t information
Lt = β t−1u(qt)+Et
[
T
∑
τ=t+1
β τ−t−1u(qτ)
]
−
T
∑
τ=t
λ τt (Ωτ+yt+ρ
′
τqτ−Ωτ+1)−
T
∑
τ=t
ξτqτ
(5.4)
where the leads us the following vector of first order conditions for consump-
tion in periods t and t+1
u′(qt)≤ λ
t
t
β t−1
ρt (5.5)
u′(qt+1)≤ Et
[
λ t+1t
β t
ρt+1
]
(5.6)
This is an inequality rather than an equality as there may be zero consumption
of some commodities in some periods. Here λ τt is the Lagrange multiplier on the
budget constraint for period τ when the problem is being solved in period t. This
term can be interpreted as the (discounted) marginal utility of wealth: the utility
value of relaxing the flow constraint period t. For simplicity we will denote λ tt (the λ
term for the within period first order condition) as λt in the remainder of this chapter.
Similarly, λt+1 will refer to the lagrange multiplier on the time t + 1 constraint
when the consumer is solving their lifetime optimsation problem in period t + 1
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(i.e. with period t + 1 information). ξt is a vector of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on
the consumer’s non-negativity constraints. Further manipulation of these conditions
yields Euler conditions governing growth rates of consumption over time for each
good i
u′(qit)≥ βEt
[
ρ it
ρ it+1
u′(qit+1)
]
∀i (5.7)
5.1.1 The life-cycle model and retirement
The life-cycle model makes a number of predictions about behaviour. The most
important of these for individuals who are retiring is that consumer’s consumption
plans should only be revised from one period to the next if the consumer receives
new information. Foreseeable changes to income should not affect the consumer’s
optimal plan. When consumption is influenced by predictable changes in income
this is referred to as ‘excess sensitivity’.
As we noted in the introduction, the ‘retirement consumption puzzle’ is the
tendency of consumption expenditures to fall at the point of retirement. This phe-
nomenon was observed in the UK by Banks et al. (1998) using household expendi-
ture data from the UK, and it has since been observed in a number of other coun-
tries, including Italy (Battistin et al. (2009)) and the United States (Aguiar and Hurst
(2007)). The retirement consumption puzzle is ‘puzzling’ as the retirement event
should be largely foreseeable for many consumers, and so it should not result in a
failure of consumption smoothing (a prediction of some variants of the life-cycle
model). Some (e.g. Bernheim et al. (2001)) have argued that it represents evidence
of excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable income changes, which would
challenge the life-cycle view that expectations are formed rationally. This would be
troubling as it raises the possibility that households may not be saving adequately
to provide for their old-age out of myopia or some behavioural bias.
Various papers have however proposed or defended alternative explanations
for the puzzle that are consistent with the basic life-cycle model. Smith (2006) ob-
serves that in UK data food spending only falls for those who retire involuntarily
- due to poor health or job loss. This suggests that falls in consumption may be
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due to negative wealth shocks associated with the retirement decision. There is also
evidence to suggest that the declines in expenditure are mainly in food and work-
related expenses (Bernheim et al. (2001), Aguila et al. (2010) and Battistin et al.
(2009)). A decline in work-related expenditures at the time of retirement would
seem better explained by change in preferences over consumption goods following
retirement (non-separabilites between consumption and leisure in the utility func-
tion) than by excess sensitivity. By this we do not mean that consumer has a utility
function before and after retirement. Rather we mean that preferences over con-
sumption commodities will depend on the amount of leisure the consumer enjoys,
and that these will change at retirement. Aguiar and Hurst (2005, 2007) also show
that in the United States there is good reason to believe that a reduction in food
expenditures can be explained by an increase in home production of food and an
increase in time spent shopping around (allowing retired households to pay lower
prices for the same goods). Summarising these findings, Hurst (2008) deemed them
sufficient to declare the “retirement of a consumption puzzle”.1
Of special relevance to this chapter is that both Luengo-Prado and Sevilla
(2013) and Christensen (2008), find no evidence of a retirement consumption puzzle
in the Spanish data covering the late 80s and early 90s that we will be using. More-
over neither paper finds any evidence for change in preferences over consumption
goods. Christensen (2008) points out that income remains relatively stable over
retirement in Spain, and argues that this means that any changes in the allocation
of spending can be attributed solely to non-separabilities between consumption and
leisure. However, she finds no decline in any spending group except for medical
expenses (which are heavily subsidised for Spanish retirees). Somewhat surpris-
ingly, this includes a specially constructed category of work-related expenditures
(clothing, transportation, petrol and food out). Luengo-Prado and Sevilla (2013)
similarly find no decrease in expenditures on any of the sub-categories they define,
though they do find evidence for a decline in food spending in a successor survey
1As Hurst (2008) points out these findings do not necessarily imply that households save suf-
ficiently to provide for an adequete retirement, only that there is no evidence that this is what lies
behind a fall in expenditure at the point of retirement.
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covering later years. They argue with appeal to social attitude surveys that the dif-
ference between the two periods is linked to the development of more egalitarian
attitudes towards women. The retirement of the (usually male) household head did
not lead to an increase in home production in the earlier years as this was more often
considered the role of the wife.
5.1.2 Parametric approaches
One way of testing the predictions of the life-cycle model is to specify a paramet-
ric model of the utility function and to then take the Euler conditions in (5.7) to
data. Studies looking in consumption behaviour will typically make a few addi-
tional assumptions. First we can group individual, non-durable, commodities into
an aggregate ct , and then we can assume that all consumers have within-period
utility functions of the power form
u(ct) = exp(X ′t δ )
c1−γt
1− γ (5.8)
where Xt is a set of individual demographic and other characteristics (that
may include terms such as employment status and hours worked to capture non-
separabilities with leisure) and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Con-
sumption will never be negative so long as the consumer has access to some re-
sources whether in the current or future periods (as this is associated with an infinite
marginal utility) so in this case we get the following Euler equation
c1−γt = Et
[
β (1+ rt)exp((X ′t+1−Xt)δ )c1−γt+1
]
(5.9)
which can be ‘log-linearised’ to give
1
γ
∆ lnct+1 = lnβ + ln(1+ rt)+∆X ′t δ +ut (5.10)
where ut is a residual that captures individual heterogeneity, preference shocks
and any expectational errors (see Carroll (2001) for an explanation and a discus-
sion of some of the problems involved in doing this). Suitably instrumented for
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the endogeneity of the interest rate, this model can be used to test for evidence of
‘excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in circumstances by test-
ing the significance of variables that should be in the consumer’s information set
on the right-hand side as well as to estimate important preference parameters. An
equation of the form in (5.10) has been used to test hypotheses about consumption
behaviour at retirement in particular in a whole range of studies (Banks et al. (1998);
Bernheim et al. (2001); Smith (2006); Aguiar and Hurst (2005); Luengo-Prado and
Sevilla (2013) among others).2
5.1.3 Limitations of parametric approaches
As we have seen, the standard parametric model makes a number of quite impor-
tant assumptions. Firstly, the researcher must specify a functional form for within-
period utility that will essentially be ad-hoc. Secondly, all consumers are assumed
to have the same preferences with heterogeneity allowed in quite a restrictive man-
ner. For instance, in power utility models, all consumers will have the same (con-
stant) rate of relative risk aversion - a factor determining the curvature of the utility
function. Thirdly, we assume that consumers’ behaviour can be rationalised by an
appropriate utility function at all.
The findings on consumption behaviour at retirement summarised above do
not depend heavily on parametric assumptions: studies that look at the timing of
changes in expenditure are not necessarily committed to a particular functional
form for consumers’ utility functions. However, parametric assumptions make it
difficult to investigate important other, more general, questions about consumption
behaviour. Firstly, we cannot use a parametric model to answer whether any in-
dividual consumer’s choices can be rationalised by a stable utility function. Since
this is precisely the claim that the retirement consumption puzzle is supposed to
challenge, this is however certainly a question that is worthy of further investiga-
tion. Secondly, parametric models are not terribly useful for investigating questions
about what is happening to the marginal utility of wealth. As we discuss below, a
2Sometimes consumption is separated into different components, and sometimes the interest rate
is omitted.
5.1. The life-cycle model 140
set of observations for a given individual may be rationalised by both an increasing
or a decreasing path for the marginal utility of wealth over time - depending on the
curvature of the utility function and size of the discount factor. This means that if
we want to investigate the path of the marginal utility of wealth, we need to be open-
minded with respect to possible function forms. A parametric approach specifies a
functional form a priori.
Answering questions such as these will therefore require a non-parametric
method. In an ideal world we would like to estimate demands flexibly, individual-
by-individual, through an equation such as
qit = m(q
−i
t ,ρt ,et) (5.11)
where qit is one element of the vector qt , q
−i
t represents all the other elements,
et represents temporal shocks, and m is some (potentially) non-linear function. We
could then reject the hypothesis that a stable utility function rationalised the data if
the resulting demands were not integrable (an hypothesis that we can test statisti-
cally).3 If demands were integrable, we would then have a good deal of knowledge
about the consumer’s utility function and the possible paths of shocks they experi-
enced.
Unfortunately such methods are typically highly data intensive (they will be
subject to the curse of dimensionality) and so cannot by applied in most datasets.
An alternative, non-statistical, approach set out by Varian (1982) and in the context
of the life-cycle model by Browning (1989) is the method of revealed preference.
As we will show, this method can be taken to data covering only a few periods but
will nonetheless allow us to contribute to the literature on consumption behaviour
around retirement in a number of ways. In particular, it will allow us to directly test
whether choices over time can be rationalised by any utility function. Secondly, as
we will show the revealed preference approach will also allow us to directly inves-
tigate whether there is evidence for preference change when leisure time increases
3For instance, Haag et al. (2009) show how to impose and test Slustky symmetry in a nonpara-
metric demand system.
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at the point of retirement (that preferences between consumption and leisure are
non-separable). Thirdly, as I describe in section 5.5 the revealed preference proce-
dure can be used to investigate different hypotheses regarding the evolution of the
marginal utility of wealth.4
5.2 Revealed preference
The revealed preference approach starts with the vector of first order conditions
from the basic life-cycle model given by (5.5). A consumer maximising a lifetime
utility function of the form in (5.1) must satisfy these, and so these gives us a way
of telling whether the consumer’s observed choices are generated from utility max-
imising behaviour. If so, then we say the consumer’s choices can be rationalised by
the life-cycle model (or are ‘life-cycle consistent’).
Definition 1. We say that the life-cycle model rationalises some data (qt ,ρt) if ∃ a
real, concave, non-satiated, real-valued, differentiable function u(.) and a discount
rate β ∈ [0,1] such that β t−1u′(qt)≤ λtρt for all t.
To find a within-period utility function with the required properties, we need
a condition that can be taken to data. The definition of concavity means that the
utility function should satisfy the following
u(qs)≤ u(qt)+u′(qt)(qs−qt) (5.12)
=⇒ u(qs)≤ u(qt)+ λtβ t−1ρ
′
t (qs−qt) (5.13)
Furthermore, since u(.) is continuous, there would have to be real numbers us
and ut such that
us ≤ ut + λtβ t−1ρ
′
t (qs−qt) ∀s, t (5.14)
4One disadvantage of revealed preference methods is that is is difficult to condition on demo-
graphics or other factors which may affect spending patterns. These are relatively easier to incor-
porate into parametric approaches (which in this respect can be more flexible). In what follows
I examine results where we hold key variables fixed over the period we are applying the test to
attempt to control for these.
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Finally, we know from monotonicity that λt must be positive (and the restric-
tions on β imply that β t−1 must also be positive). This means that for a given β
we will have 2T unknowns u1..uT and λ1..λT and T (T − 1) inequalities that may
or may not be satisfied for a given set of quantities. By grid searching among pos-
sible values of β , we will be able to check if values of u1..uT and λ1..λT exist such
that this condition is satisfied for an individual over some period of time, and hence
whether their behaviour can be rationalised by the life-cycle model.
It turns out that (5.14) is equivalent to the most basic revealed preference re-
quirement - the generalised axiom of revealed preference or GARP - which states
that if any bundle i is revealed preferred to j (directly or indirectly), then i must be
unaffordable when j is chosen
xiRx j =⇒ p jx j ≤ p jxi ∀i, j (5.15)
This is due to Afriat’s theorem, which implies that if GARP holds for current
prices, then it will hold for a set of transformed prices (in our case prices trans-
formed by λtβ t−1 × 1(1+rt)(1+rt−1)...(1+r2)).
Proposition 3. The following two statements are equivalent. 1) The data (qt ,ρt)
are rationalised by the life-cycle model. 2) The data (qt ,ρt) satisfy GARP.
Proof. See Appendix to this chapter.
As we said GARP is the most basic revealed preference test. The reason that
the life-cycle model does not make any stronger predictions about behaviour is that
we are allowing for uncertainty and the possibility of the consumer replanning in
every period as they process new information. In an uncertain environment, the con-
sumer acts as though they face different lifetime constraints each period according
to the news they received. Without access to this news, we will not be able impose
any restrictions on the evolution of λt , and we are left with no more restrictions on
behaviour than the simple consistency requirements of GARP. This is not to say
however that a test of whether or not the consumer passes a test of GARP will ex-
haust the implications of the life-cycle model. In addition, in standard formulations
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of the life-cycle model innovations to λt will be martingale (Hall (1978)): such that
Et [λt+1] = λt . We will return to the importance of this below when we look for
nonrandom patterns in changes in the marginal utility of wealth across consumers.
In addition, we can employ a stricter test by imposing some restrictions on λt
for any given consumer. For instance we could impose the condition that λt must
be constant in condition (5.14). This would give us a condition of the form
us ≤ ut + λβ t−1ρ
′
t (qs−qt) ∀s, t (5.16)
which Browning (1989) calls cyclical monotonicity (CM). It turns out (in a result
due to Browning (1989)) that this is a test of the life-cycle model with the additional
assumption of perfect foresight. λt is constant as consumers are able to perfectly
smooth their marginal utilties. The definition of rationalisability with perfect fore-
sight is the same as definition 1 except that λ is not longer allowed to vary with time
(and so has no t subscript).
Definition 2. We say that the life-cycle model with perfect foresight rationalises
some data (qt ,ρt) if ∃ a real, concave, non-satiated, continuous, differentiable func-
tion u(.) and a discount rate β ∈ [0,1] such that β t−1u′(qt)≤ λρt .
Proposition 4. The following two statements are equivalent. 1) The data (qt ,ρt)
are rationalised by the life-cycle model under the assumption of perfect foresight.
2) The data (qt ,ρt) satisfy CM.
Proof. See Browning (1989).
Straightforwardly it can be seen that for any subset of periods (5.14) implies
(5.16) and hence that CM =⇒ GARP.
The assumption of perfect foresight may well seem unreasonably strong.
When we speak of perfect foresight however, we only mean over the periods when
we observe the consumer. More precisely we might call this accurate foresight,
since all it means is that the consumer is able to smooth their discounted marginal
utility of wealth for a few periods without their plans being upset by unpredicted
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shocks. For short time horizons, this need not be a (completely) unreasonable as-
sumption.
We can test GARP and CM if we have data on quantities and (discounted)
prices for a sufficient number of periods. Conducting GARP and CM individual by
individual for a dataset would tell us
1. What proportion of consumers’ behaviour can be rationalised by a stable util-
ity function of any form (GARP)?
2. What proportion of consumers’ behaviour can be rationalised by the life-cycle
model with perfect foresight (CM)?
A test could in principle including consumption of leisure as a commodity and the
wage as a price. It may not be practical to take such a test to data however, as it is
difficult to identify the price of leisure (the wage rate) in most household surveys.
Information on hourly wages is often not included and calculating wages by for
instance dividing earnings by hours may be misleading as wages can themselves
vary with hours. Instead we can try to learn as much as possible with the limited
information we have.
Without leisure, conditions (5.14) and (5.16) are necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for a version of the life-cycle model where preferences over leisure and
consumption are weakly separable (Varian (1988)).5 Since they are insufficient,
if the data pass these tests this does not necessarily vindicate the model, though a
failure can still be considered a violation. These are the first tests we will take to
our data.
Since tests of GARP will pass if the data passes tests of perfect foresight (CM),
these tests can have three possible outcomes: both GARP and perfect foresight can
pass, GARP can pass but prefect foresight fails, or both hypotheses fail.
The interpretation of a high proportion of passes for the perfect foresight test
is straightforward. We would say we have no reason to reject the hypothesis that
the life-cycle model with perfect foresight and separable preferences successfully
5These conditions are not sufficient as the consumer would also have to satisfy additional restric-
tions on their choices over the omitted good (in this case leisure).
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rationalise behaviour. Various explanations might account for a high proportion of
households who pass GARP but fail the perfect foresight test. The first is that simply
that there is some uncertainty leading to a failure of perfect foresight. This might
be because individuals experienced a wealth shock (or news shock) at retirement or
at some other point. If these shocks were coincident with the retirement decision
(such as unexpected job loss), then they would be consistent with the explanation
offered by Smith (2006) for the retirement consumption puzzle in the UK. One
way to investigate this would be to allow one single change in λt in the retirement
period (and surrounding periods) and to then repeat the test. A second explanation
is that preferences over consumption goods change at the point of retirement, due
to the fact that preferences between consumption and leisure are non-separable and
consumers now have more leisure time, but that there is not enough variation in
prices for this change to be detected as a violation by the GARP test. One way to
examine this hypothesis is to conduct separate tests of the perfect foresight case for
the periods before and after retirement. If it turns out that while there are many
failures over the whole period, there are a substantial number of passes for the two
sub-periods, we could interpret this as evidence for a dependence of preferences
over consumption goods on labour force participation.6
In the event that none of these explanations work, then we will have to consider
alternatives including more general uncertainty (multiple unexpected shocks), or
simple failures of the life-cycle model (behavioural biases, credit constraints and so
on). We discuss these possibilities in section 5.5.
A high proportion of of individuals who fail both GARP and perfect foresight
would suggest that consumption behaviour cannot be rationalised by a stable, time
separable subutility function. This would point to evidence of a dependence on
consumption preferences on labour force status, which we can further investigate
as discussed above. If tests carried out in individual sub-periods also failed then
we would have reason to question some of the fundamental assumptions of the life-
6This test is in the spirit of the test in Varian (1988) for cases where we do not observe prices
for one of our goods: that revealed preference conditions for the remaining goods should still hold
when consumption of the omitted good is constant.
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cycle model.
These tests require panel data with detailed information of on expenditures
and labour force status for a sufficient period of time. For this we make us of
the the Spanish Continuous Household Budget Survey (Encuesta Continua de Pre-
supuestos Familiares, ECPF), which we now describe.
5.3 Data and sample
The ECPF is a household budget survey conducted by the Spanish National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INE). The survey is a rotating quarterly panel, with individual
households followed for up to 8 quarters. The survey went through two different
incarnations ECPF-85, which ran from 1985-1997, and ECPF-97, which ran from
1997-2005. The latter retained many features of the old survey - including the panel
component - but differs substantially in the way information is collected. We only
make use of ECPF-85.
ECPF-85 covered roughly 3,200 households each quarter, and collected de-
tailed information on a broad range of different expenditures, demographic infor-
mation (including the labour force status of both husband and wife) and data on in-
come from a variety of sources (salary, self-employment, capital, pension, transfers
and other). Expenditure data is quarterly and was collected through a combination
of diary and recall questions.
We group expenditures into 10 non-durable commodity groups: food at home,
utilities, food out, adult clothing, child clothing, transport, communications, recre-
ation, personal care, household goods/services. This division is intended to separate
out expenditures which are likely to be substitutes or complements for leisure (such
as transport or adult clothing) from those which less likely to be (such as child cloth-
ing). We exclude medical goods as these are not pure consumption goods and were
subsidised for Spanish retirees during this period (Boldrin et al. (1997)).7 Including
them does not significantly affect the results.
7For instance public health care assistance was provided to those receiving non-contributory pen-
sions administered by the Instituto Nacional de Servicios Sociales. In the later years, most regional
government subsidised some medical costs for pensioners (as well as holidays and public transporta-
tion costs).
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Prices are drawn from the Spanish CPI. Where no price was available for a
subset of goods, a price was calculated using a stone price index. Prices are dis-
counted using interest rates on Spanish Treasury Bills taken from the International
Monetary Fund. They are converted to quarterly rates by taking them to the power
0.25 to match the period of expenditure.
Our sample consists of households where the principal earner in the first quar-
ter the household was surveyed retires and does not return to work in the period we
observe them (retirement is self-reported in the survey). We also restrict our sample
to cases where households are observed at least two quarters before and after the re-
tirement date. This gives us a sample of 312 households who we are able to follow
over the retirement threshold. Some descriptive statistics for these households are
presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max Obs
Periods in Survey 7.23 1.18 4 8 312
Age at retirement 60.02 6.6 31 84 312
# HH members 3.47 1.55 1 11 312
Spouse in HH 0.94 0.24 0 1 312
Spouse always employed 0.11 0.31 0 1 293
Spouse never employed 0.67 0.47 0 1 293
The average age of retirement is 60 which is quite far below the official re-
tirement age in this period of 65, though many pension schemes allowed retirement
before this (Boldrin et al. (1997)). One concern in the exercises that follow might
be that the labour supply of spouses may change as the principal earner retires. The
information on spouse’s employment in Table 5.1 suggests that this might not be too
much of a problem. In most (67%) of our households, spouses are out of the labour
force for the whole period where the household is observed, and an additional 11%
remain employed even as the head retires.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show what happens to income and expenditure in the pe-
riods leading up to and following the point of retirement. Both suggest that these
variables are relatively constant over the retirement period in accordance with the
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findings of Christensen (2008).
Figure 5.1: Total income over retirement
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Figure 5.2: Total non-durable expenditure over retirement
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As an additional indication of the impact of retirement on income and spend-
ing, we run two panel regressions of the logs of these variables on an individual
fixed effect and a retirement dummy with no additional controls. The results are
reported in Table 5.2. There is a small statistically significant 3% decline in log
expenditure and a statistically insignificant increase in log income (which becomes
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insignificant once household size is included as an additional control). Changing
family size is not something which our revealed preference tests can easily account
for, but it could plausibly explain apparent preference changes at the household
level. We will return to this issue in what follows.
Table 5.2: Regressions: income and expenditure at retirement
Log non-durable expenditure Log HH income
Retired Dummy -0.038* -0.030 0.018 0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021)
Household size 0.136** 0.081**
(0.020) (0.027)
# Obs 2256 2256 2254 2254
#Households 312 312 312 312
Notes: * indicates significant at the 5% level ** indicates significant at the 1% level. Re-
gressions are fixed-effects (within) models.
5.4 Empirical Results
We begin by testing the life-cycle model by implementing a test of GARP, for the
whole period when households are observed, followed by a test of the perfect fore-
sight hypothesis. We then go on to consider an intermediate case - allowing a single
revision to the discounted marginal utility of wealth - before carrying out a test
allowing for a change in preferences over consumption goods at the point of re-
tirement (non-separable preferences). Each of these tests is run on each household
separately and independently, and so each allows for complete heterogeneity in the
utility functions of each individual (both in terms of whether they pass or not and in
terms of the form of their preferences). In tests where a discount factor is involved,
we grid search for a solution over 100 possible values of β between 0 and 1.
5.4.1 GARP/Life-cycle model
As we said, this is equivalent to test of the life-cycle model allowing for uncertainty
in a very general way but where consumption and leisure are separable. The results
of this test are summarised in the top two branches of Figure 5.3.
96% (299) of households satisfy GARP over the whole period. These pass
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Figure 5.3: Results from different revealed preference tests
rates are similar to those found for working households in the ECPF by Beatty
and Crawford (2011). This means that we have no evidence for any change in
preferences over consumption goods over the period of retirement (consistent with
the findings of Christensen (2008) and Luengo-Prado and Sevilla (2013)). However,
the informational content of this result depends on the difficulty of passing GARP
if individual tastes were not stable over the period, as is clear if we formulate this
question in Bayesian terms. Let U be the probability that an individual acts as a
maximiser of a stable utility function and let G be the probability that the individual
passes a GARP test (or any other revealed preference test). Bayes theorem implies
that
P(U |G) = P(G|U)P(U)
P(G|U)P(U)+P(G|¬U)[1−P(U)] (5.17)
Since GARP is necessary and sufficient for utility maximising behaviour
P(G|U) = 1, so
P(U |G) = P(U)
P(U)+P(G|¬U)[1−P(U)] (5.18)
which depends inversely on P(G|¬U) - the probability that an individual passes
GARP over the period of retirement even if their preferences did change (or if they
do not in general act like utility maximisers). When P(G|¬U) = 1 then we will
have no reason to update our prior. Conversely, as P(G|¬U)→ 0, P(U |G)→ 1. As
this term gets smaller, the more confident we can be that a successful GARP test is
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evidence of utility maximising behaviour.
To compute P(G|¬U) we need to specify some alternative process that would
generate our data if GARP did not hold. Unfortunately, there are many forms of
irrational behaviour that could serve this purpose, and so we will have to select one
among the possible contenders to utility maximisation. Following Bronars (1987)
we will adopt the concept of irrational behaviour outlined in Becker (1962) - uni-
formly random choices across bundles on the consumer’s budget constraint. Under
this alternative, P(G|¬U) will be the probability of a consumer passing GARP if
they had chosen which bundle to consume by rolling a die (with one side for each
possible bundle). We calculate this by first observing how often a household passes
GARP when their budget shares are drawn randomly from a uniform distribution,
and then averaging these probabilities across individuals.8 In our case the proba-
bility of a pass was 98.2% across the sample. This is actually greater than the pass
rate of our data, and is of course very close to 100% (which would give us no rea-
son to update any of our priors at all).9 Thus, this exercise does essentially nothing
to make the hypothesis of “no taste change” any more likely. We consider further
testable implications of the life-cycle model in section 5.5 below.
5.4.2 Perfect foresight
A stricter test is whether or not the consumer passes a test of the life-cycle model
with perfect foresight. In this test we keep the discounted marginal utility of wealth
constant across periods. Passing GARP over the whole period is a necessary condi-
tion for passing this test. Since we conduct this test on all periods (before and after
retirement) this test also assumes no preference change at the point of retirement.
8To obtain these budget shares, we first draw fractions randomly from a Dirichlet distribution
and then divide them by their sum to obtain a set of budget shares that sum to one. This procedure
ensures that the resulting budget shares will be uniformly distributed. We then calculate quantities as
qit = w
i
t × xtpit where w
i
t is the budget share of good i in period t and xt is the individual’s expenditure
and then use these to rerun the GARP test.
9An alternative means of demonstrating the predictive power of GARP proposed by Selten (1991)
and axiomatised by Beatty and Crawford (2011) is the Selten score. This is simply the pass rate less
the Selten area. This gives a value which lies between -1 and 1. A score approaching 1 represents
an ideal case where the choices seen in the data all pass GARP but individuals choosing randomly
would hardly ever pass. A score approaching -1 would imply the converse: the actual choices seen
in the data fail GARP much more often than random choices. In our case the probability of a pass
was 98.2% across the sample, giving a selten score of 0.043.
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The number of passes is shown as the number of individuals under the “perfect fore-
sight” branch in Figure 5.3. Of those households who passed GARP only 3 (1% of
the sample) also pass the perfect foresight test.
5.4.3 Single change in λ
Now we allow for a single change to λt at the time of retirement. This is an inter-
mediate case between perfect foresight and GARP. This test allows for some uncer-
tainty in that we allow for shocks (both positive and negative) that are coincident
with the retirement decision such as job loss or health shocks. The results of this
test are shown in Figure 5.3 (with those passing this test falling under the “perfect
foresight” and “shock at retirement” branches). Only an additional 10 individuals
pass relative to the perfect foresight case when we allow a single adjustment to λt
in this way.
One concern may be that the decision to retire may not be exactly coincident
with any shocks the individual experiences. For instance, an individual might retire
only after a shock has been realised, or else might retire in anticipation of some
shock. To allow for this possibility we can simply take the whole period see if a
single revision to λ at any time can rationalise the data. For this exercise we need to
have sufficient periods before and after a supposed shock, so we restrict our sample
to those individuals observed for the maximum 8 periods. The results of the various
tests are shown in Table 5.3. Allowing for a single change at any date does not give
us any additional passes.
Table 5.3: Pass rates with single change to λ
No change to λ Single change in λ Single change in λ
(at retirement) (any date including retirement)
Passes 0 1 1
Total Obs 197 197 197
5.4.4 Allowing for non-separable preferences
Here we allow for preference change over consumption goods at retirement (due
to the change in labour force status) by carrying out the perfect foresight test in
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the periods before and then after retirement separately. The pass rate on our re-
vealed preference tests can only increase when we reduce the number of periods
we are testing (since this merely reduces the chances of encountering a violation).
Nonetheless, an substantial increase in the pass rate might still give us reason to
believe that a dependence on preferences over consumption goods on labour force
participation is a likely explanation for the consumption behaviour we see around
retirement. The results are shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Pass rates in periods before and after retirement
Passes Total
Before After Before and After
GARP 311 310 309 312
CM 135 120 32 312
309 out of 312 individuals pass GARP when we test separately before and after
retirement. Of these, just 32 - or 10% - pass the life-cycle model both in the periods
before and in the periods after retirement. Simple preference change does not do
well at explaining violations of the perfect foresight model.
What can we conclude from this battery of tests? Firstly, the restrictions im-
posed by GARP do not provide a very strong test of the life-cycle model. Secondly,
if preferences between consumption and leisure are separable then over this period
something appears to happen to the marginal utility of wealth: the vast majority
of households fail to pass tests of the perfect foresight model (where it is assumed
to be constant). Moreover this is more systematic than a simple one-off revision
whether at the time of retirement or any other time. Finally, a test of the perfect
foresight model allowing for separable preferences between consumption spending
and labour force participation also does poorly. In the next section we consider the
nature of violations from the perfect foresight case.
5.5 Violations
Violations from the perfect foresight case could be the result of a failure to cap-
ture other changing aspects of the consumer’s environment (durable expenditures,
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health, price changes that differ from CPI aggregates) or as a result of uncertainty.
As we noted previously, GARP does not exhaust the empirical implications of
the life-cycle model with uncertainty. To investigate the plausibility of this model
further we can consider deviations et from the perfect foresight case
us ≤ ut + (λ + et)β t−1 ρ
′
t(qs−qt) (5.19)
where (λ + et) > 0. Under the life-cycle model, these deviations should be
martingale, that is with Et [et+1] = et . We can now ask what the paths of {e1 . . .eT}
which rationalise our data look like. Multiple paths may rationalise the behaviour
of any given household, and the data cannot tell us which of these is right.10 We
will select the path which minimises the sum of squared deviations∑e′e, which will
in turn isolate a particular path for λt . This is the path with the smallest deviations
from the perfect foresight life-cycle model and so is as favourable as possible to the
maintained hypothesis of rational, forward-looking consumers.
These violations are terms in a utility function and so do not have a cardinal
interpretation. We cannot compare the size of violations across individuals, and
there is no sense in saying that one violation is for instance ‘twice as big’ as an-
other. However, the change in these terms from one period to another does have an
interpretation. A systematic tendency to get decreasing or increasing et’s over time
indicates that something systematic is happening to the discounted marginal utility
of wealth. Consumption would be increasing or decreasing faster than it ‘should’
do under the life-cycle model, and this would point to a rejection of this model.
Figure 5.4 compares λt to λ at the point of retirement for households who
we observe for all 8 quarters. It is clear that, in each period before retirement, a
majority households have λt’s which lie below those in the first period of retirement.
Moreover, in each period after retirement, a majority of households have λt’s which
exceed it. Moreover the percentage of households with lower λt than the retirement
date seems to monotonically increase with time. This points to a general tendency
10For instance, despite finding that the in cases where we minimise the sum of squared deviations,
et is increasing, 183 profiles can also be rationalised by monotonically decreasing ets (albeit with
low discount factors).
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for the marginal utility of wealth to be increasing over time when we minimise
deviations from the perfect foresight case. This would suggest that consumption
is falling faster than we might expect (or else deviations from the perfect foresight
model are larger than these minimal values).
Figure 5.4: Proportion λt higher than λretire
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Notes: Author’s calculations using ECPF. Dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
This may be a phenomenon related to retirement in particular or it may be a
more general phenomenon. Figure 5.5 plots the proportions of households with
marginal utilities of wealth below the marginal utility seen in the 4th quarter we ob-
serve them for working age households (where the head remains employed through-
out the 8 quarters we observe them and is aged 55-60). A very similar pattern is
evident, pointing towards a general problem with the life-cycle model (although the
extent of the increase is smaller).
The fact that it we also find increasing λ ’s for households who do not change
their labour supply suggests that it is not something which can be dismissed as being
due to non-separable preferences between consumption and labour force participa-
tion. As we saw from Table 5.1 the proportion of spouse’s who change their labour
supply in our retiring households is also low, making it unlikely that this explains
the result either. So what might explain these patterns? In the rest of this section we
will discuss some possibilities.
5.5. Violations 156
Figure 5.5: Proportion λt higher than λretire
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Notes: Author’s calculations using ECPF. Dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
5.5.1 Adverse shocks
Could a series of adverse shocks account for an increasing discounted marginal
utility of wealth? To see how uncertainty affects the λt we need to return to the first
order conditions for consumption commodities from the problem in (5.1).
Given the estimates of lifetime wealth in period t, the first order conditions for
consumption of the goods q in period t (ignoring non-negativity constraints) are
λt =
β t−1u′(qt)
ρt
= Et
[
β tu′(qt+1)
ρt+1
]
(5.20)
Now we know that based the assessment of lifetime wealth made in period t+1
λt+1 =
β tu′(qt+1)
ρt+1
(5.21)
Substituting (5.21) into (5.20) gives
λt = Et [λt+1] (5.22)
or the martingale result. Given some regularity conditions we can decompose
the value of λt into Et [λt+1] (which is λt+1 if expectations are rational) and an
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additive, mean-zero error
λt = λt+1+ εt (5.23)
Since the utility function is concave, a positive value of εt will mean that the
consumer has less wealth than they had expected in the second period: the marginal
utility of wealth increases when the consumer experiences a negative wealth shock,
and decreases when the consumer experiences a positive wealth shock.
Rational expectations imply that idiosyncratic shocks should be random, not
systematic across individuals, and so these would not account for the pattern of
violations that we saw in Figure 5.4. A systematic tendency across a fairly large
group of individuals could be the result of common, or aggregate shocks, such as
unanticipated decreases in pensioner benefits or productivity shocks. But this seems
an unlikely explanation for a pattern observed consistently for many individuals
over a period of 12 years (apparently including those of working age). One would
have to appeal to quite a long sequence of unanticipated, negative shocks to generate
this.
It should be noted that increasing the martingale predicts a constant mean value
of the discounted marginal utility of wealth, while in Figure 5.4 we saw evidence
of an increasing proportion of households who had λt greater than λ at the point of
retirement. This could be rationalised with the life-cycle model by a low probability
possibility of a large positive wealth shock leading households to spend more than
they otherwise would.
5.5.2 Changing household composition
One possibility suggested by the results in Table 5.4 is that the composition of
households is changing over time. The evidence for a ‘retirement consumption puz-
zle’ in this data disappeared once household size was controlled for. We can check
for this by looking at households where household size remains constant. Figure
5.6 is the same as Figure 5.4 except that we restrict the sample to households where
there is no change in household size. It shows much the same pattern, suggesting
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Figure 5.6: Proportion λt higher than λretire, no change in HH size
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Notes: Author’s calculations using ECPF. Dotted lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
that this is unlikely to explain the patterns we see.
5.5.3 Credit/saving constraints
The life-cycle model assumes perfect capital markets, which is what allows the
consumer to smooth their marginal utilities. If we relax this assumption, then the
λt need no longer be constant even in the perfect foresight case. To see how, we
can introduce a credit constraint into the problem in (5.1): consumption in period t
cannot exceed some limit bt . Abstracting from uncertainty (and dropping the non-
negativity constraints) this gives us the Lagrangian
L =∑β t−1u(qt)−λ (∑ρ ′t qt−W )−µt(ρ ′t qt−bt) (5.24)
where W is total lifetime wealth. This is associated with the first order condi-
tion
u′(qt) =
ρt(λ +µt)
β t−1
(5.25)
and hence the cyclical monotonicity condition
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ut ≤ us+ (λ +µt)β t−1 ρ
′
t (qs−qt) (5.26)
µt is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the credit constraint (or the marginal value
of relaxing it). When the constraint is binding µt > 0. For a saving constraint,
we would have µt < 0. A path of increasing λt could therefore be rationalised if
we thought consumers were unable to save in earlier periods. This would mean
that while consumers knew that their future resources were going to decrease, they
were not be able to smooth their consumption in they way they would like because
they were unable to save. This seems unlikely. Indeed, a fair number (54%) of
households saw their real incomes increase on average over the period of retirement.
5.5.4 Measurement error
A further possibility is that we have mismeasured the price data or interest rate we
use. It is not clear why random errors in prices should tend to generate a systematic
tendency for violations to increase in size over time. Proportional mismeasurements
in the interest error can to an extent be offset by adjustments in the discount factor
(data for which we have underestimated the interest rate by 20% can be rationalised
by a utility function where β is 20% higher). However, the extent to which this is
true is limited by the fact we have bounded β ∈ [0,1]. Allowing β outside of this
range allows greater to minimise violations over time and so could be consistent
with a flatter path.11
5.5.5 Time inconsistency
A final possibility is that consumers are non-rational. As we noted above this was
the preferred explanation of Bernheim et al. (2001) for the retirement consumption
puzzle. A tendency to consume too much at younger ages (due to for instance
hyperbolic preferences) would explain the patterns we see in the data,and would
help to explain why the same pattern is also observed among households who are
11Underestimating the interest rate may seem a curious explanation for why we should observe
the marginal utility of wealth increasing over time (since this should mean consumers are more
willing to save than we would otherwise thought). However, it arises as the feasible set of preference
parameters (including β ) rationalising given data is not convex.
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not retiring. Further tests of these models (such as those proposed in Blow et al.
(2017) using a revealed preference framework could lend further support to this
hypothesis.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out revealed preference tests for different models of con-
sumption behaviour over retirement that I then applied to a Spanish consumption
panel dataset. These tests reject the perfect foresight model both with separable
preferences and allowing for preference change. We do not reject a life-cycle model
allowing for uncertainty, but the the first order conditions of this model do not pro-
vide very strong restrictions on possible choices. In fact, they are no stronger than
those implied by the most basic revealed preference requirement: GARP. We then
go on to investigate the paths of deviations from a perfectly smoothed marginal util-
ity of wealth, in a case when these deviations have been minimised relative to the
perfect foresight case. I find that the smoothest possible paths of marginal utility
that rationalise the data, are associated with the marginal utility of wealth decreas-
ing systematically over the retirement period. I show that this particular result is
unlikely to be due to changing family composition, aggregate shocks over the pe-
riod we consider or credit constraints. Two possible explanations are deviations
from geometric discounting and mismeasurements in the interest rates facing con-
sumers.
Chapter 6
Consumption Spending, Housing
Investments and the Role of Leverage
Do house price booms induce households to borrow and re-leverage their balance
sheets? And can leverage make households more sensitive to future house price
shocks (whether good or bad)? It is now widely believed that increases in debt and
leverage that accompanied the international house price boom prior to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis both deepened and prolonged the length of the slump in consump-
tion spending that followed. As a result, recent years have seen policy-makers
showing increasing interest in macro-prudential measures that limit leverage growth
among households during boom periods, and relax them when economic conditions
weaken.
In this chapter, we use detailed household-level data to examine the borrow-
ing, spending and investment decisions of homeowners in response to house price
increases, as well as how these decisions differ according to households’ initial
leverage (defined as the value of their home relative to the size of their mortgage
debt). We start by documenting the extent to which households re-leverage (by
taking on mortgage debt as house prices increase) using panel data from both the
US and the UK. Household mortgage debt among existing home-owners, who do
not move home, increases by roughly 0.3 percentage points with each 1% increase
in home values in the US and by 0.2 percentage points in the UK. In this respect,
households increased the size of their balance sheets in the years prior to the finan-
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cial crisis in a similar way to investment banks (Adrian and Shin (2010)). Using a
plausibly exogenous source of variation in households’ leverage, we then go on to
consider whether leverage amplifies households’ spending responses to given house
price changes and whether this varies across different forms of spending. To do so
we link data on households balance sheets from a panel survey with spending data
in a household budget survey using two-sample IV methods (Angrist and Krueger
(1992)). We find strong evidence of large differences in the responses of residen-
tial investment by households according to their initial leverage. We estimate an
elasticity of residential investment spending to house price increases of 0.74 among
outright owners. The estimated elasticity is twice as large for those with a loan-
to-value ratio of 50% (in our empirical model the effects scales linearly with each
further doubling of households’ debt to equity ratios). We also show that households
that have greater initial leverage are more likely to make second home purchases in
response to rising local prices over longer time horizons. However, we do not find
evidence that more leveraged households disproportionately increase either their
total, nondurable or durable consumption spending as house prices rise.
The absence of differences in the consumption behaviour of more and less
leveraged households is puzzling in that the former group would be expected to
see a larger increase in their net housing wealth for a given price change. It is
however consistent with the view that house price increases have both positive and
negative effects on the real value of households’ lifetime wealth. In models with
infinitely lived agents, any positive endowment effect of increased house prices on
consumption is immediately offset by the negative effect of higher lifetime costs of
owner-occupation. This leads to the prediction that ‘housing wealth isn’t wealth’
and that the consumption effects of housing price changes should be small in ag-
gregate (Buiter (2010)). To account for the disproportionately large differences
we observe in responses of residential investment spending, we emphasise a novel
mechanism to account for households’ desire to re-leverage and make new invest-
ments in housing as prices increase. In particular, we highlight the importance of
housing’s dual role as a both source of immediate utility and as a source of invest-
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ment returns, and the fact that there is a direct link between leverage and the share
of housing in households’ portfolios. Borrowing, home improvements and other
forms of residential investment may be used to adjust this share.
This forms the basis of a ‘portfolio-rebalancing’ effect which we argue drives
the residential investment decisions we observe. Standard life-cycle models of
household portfolios (e.g. Merton (1969)) predict that households’ desired lever-
age will evolve smoothly over time. In such models, house price reductions tend
to leave households over-leveraged relative to their target leverage, inducing a de-
sire to reduce consumption spending and increase savings. This behaviour provides
a micro-foundation for ‘debt-overhang’ effects (Dynan (2012)) whereby price de-
clines induce a desire to deleverage and depress consumption spending. These ef-
fects have an important corollary that explains household decisions to re-leverage
during house price booms. In periods where house prices increase, consumers will
find themselves under-leveraged. This will have the effect of encouraging con-
sumers to borrow and invest in housing stock. Such portfolio adjustments increase
leverage and, by increasing the size of household balance sheets, return households
to their desired rate and variance of returns. Since portfolio shares are themselves
nonlinear functions of leverage, we would expect these effects to be greater for
households with higher loan-to-value ratios. More leveraged households will expe-
rience a larger reduction in the portfolio share of housing for a given price increase,
and so we would expect that their residential investment spending should respond
more strongly than other households’. This mechanism therefore accounts for our
empirical findings, and in particular the larger response in the residential investment
of more leveraged homeowners to house price increases.1
In principle household could alter the risk and return of their portfolios by ad-
justing holdings of other, financial assets (such as stocks). Housing wealth tends
to be the most important asset that households hold and is unique in having histor-
ically offered a mix of both high and relatively low variance returns (Jorda´ et al.
1Another way leverage may affect household investment decisions is that households at greater
risk of default may have reduced incentive to make investments in their property (Melzer (2017)).
This is likely to be less important in our context (the UK) where mortgages are typically non-
recourse.
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(2017)). It is therefore perhaps not surprising that households should see housing
investments as a key mechanism to adjust the riskiness of their wealth holdings.2
Our proposed mechanism also relies on the assumption that housing investments
increase the market value of homeowners’ properties in addition to any private con-
sumption benefits they provide. We argue that this is consistent with the available
evidence on such investments below.
Our conclusions and empirical findings differ from previous studies that have
both observed large differences in the borrowing and spending of households ac-
cording to their leverage (Disney et al. (2010b); Mian and Sufi (2011); Cloyne et
al. (Forthcoming); Cooper (2013); Aladangady (2017); Disney et al. (2010a)). An
important difference in our empirical approach is that we attempt to account for the
endogeneity of leverage. Households choose their leverage, and thus more lever-
aged households may respond differently to house price increases. In particular they
may have different house price expectations, different financial or liquid wealth and
live in differently sized homes. As a result they may be more responsive to house
price changes for reasons which are not causally related to the leverage of their
balance sheet. The instrument we use is a measure of credit conditions when house-
holds first moved into their current homes (the average loan-to-income ratio on new
house purchases). We show using evidence from the first sample in our two-stage
IV approach that this instrument is conditionally uncorrelated with a number of po-
tential confounding variables including gross house values, financial asset income,
and unsecured debt. By contrast, lagged leverage, which has been used as a source
of variation in a number of previous studies is however strongly correlated with all
of these factors. We find that this instrument works well for predicting leverage in
the UK, which is the source of our main empirical findings. In the US, however, we
find that re-leveraging in response to house price increases is so rapid that it is only
very weakly related to credit conditions at the time households last moved.
Relative to previous studies, we also put much less emphasis on credit con-
2Other studies suggest that households adjust their holdings of other risky assets in response to
house price increases - suggesting that housing and other risky assets are substitutes (Chetty et al.
(2017)).
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straints in explaining the different responses that we do observe between more and
less leveraged households. The existing literature currently appeals to credit con-
straints to explain the fact that spending responses are disproportionately greater
for households with the very highest leverage. The logic underpinning this con-
clusion is as follows. If shocks to housing wealth help to relieve credit constraints
(for example by providing households with additional collateral), then they will be
associated with high marginal propensities to consume. Under a credit collateral
explanation for house price effects, one would expect these effects to be strongest
at the very highest levels of leverage.3 Moreover, households at greater risk of fac-
ing a binding credit constraint would be expected to accumulate precautionary sav-
ings, which they would then decumulate faster in response to house price increases
(Berger et al. (2017)).
We do not believe that our findings are driven by a ‘collateral channel’ of this
kind. Our instrumental variable strategy captures differences in leverage across
households that result from past decisions (the timing of moves). This is unlikely
to pick up differences in the propensity to be credit constrained, and we find no
relationship between our instrument and measures of unsecured debt or other forms
of financial wealth. Moreover, we find no evidence that leverage increases non-
3This is typically what is found. For example, Disney et al. (2010a) find that savings respond
very little on average to house price shocks but that the response is five times greater for households
emerging from a situation of negative equity than for households with initially positive equity values.
Cooper (2013) finds that the spending of households with high debt service ratios, low liquid wealth
and high expected future income were the most sensitive to housing wealth changes. Since all these
characteristics are indicative of credit constraints, he argues that this is the most important channel at
work. Looking at the UK for the years 1995-2005, Disney et al. (2010b) also find that households’
propensity to remortgage in the face of price rises does not increase with household’s LTV ratios
but is higher for those with high LTV and high unsecured debt. In a related paper that using the US
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Disney and Gathergood (2011) again look at changes in
household indebtedness by initial LTV ratios (again allowing these to be interacted with levels of
unsecured debt). As before, households with high leverage - particularly those with high leverage
and high unsecured debt - were seen to be much more responsive. Mian and Sufi (2011) examine
the link between growth in debt and regional variation in home prices in the United States over
the period 2002-2006. They find that consumers with credit scores one standard deviation above
the 1997 mean have estimated responses that are twice as large as those with estimated responses
one standard deviation below the mean (with an elasticity of 0.75 compared to 0.35). They find no
evidence of house price effects for those in the top quartile of the credit score distribution. They also
find that responses are in general larger for younger households and find similar differences between
consumers with high and low credit utilisation rates. In line with the rest of the literature, they argue
that these differences most likely reflect the importance of credit constraints.
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durable or durable consumption responses to house prices, but rather that effects
are concentrated among residential investment spending. Such behaviour would be
difficult to explain through credit constraints alone. Finally, we do not see very
different effects in estimates for a younger sub-sample of households than we do in
our main sample.
We also do not believe that our results are driven by more traditional housing
wealth effects. In contrast to what we find for residential investment spending, we
see no differential effect of house price increases on spending on a basket of luxury
goods (food away from home and leisure services) by more leveraged households
relative to less leveraged households.
As well as explaining the lack of a consumption response, our proposed mech-
anism also accounts for the fact that households self-reported use of new mortgage
loans is disproportionately for spending on home improvements rather than tradi-
tional forms of consumption (see Brady et al. (2000) and also results for the UK
below). Our empirical analysis below confirms that this behaviour is evident in
survey data on spending as well as in qualitative survey evidence.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1 we set-
out a theoretical framework explain household’s choice of leverage, motivations
for re-leveraging and spending decisions. Section 6.2 describes the data we will
use. In Section 6.3 we provide evidence that households do indeed re-leverage by
increasing borrowing when house prices rise. In Section 6.4 we set out our empirical
approach to identify the role leverage plays in the home improvement spending of
existing homeowners, and present results on the impact of house prices on different
components of consumption spending. Section 6.5 presents results on purchases of
second homes by more and less leveraged households in response to local house
price increases. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.1 Life-cycle portfolio choice
Consider a household with two assets available to hold in its portfolio that max-
imises expected lifetime utility
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U = max
c,h
Et
[
T−t
∑
j=0
β ju
(
ct+ j,ht+ j
)]
where ct is consumption, ht is housing and β is the household’s discount factor.
Housing is a risky asset with price pt , and return:
r∗t =
pt
pt−1
−1. (6.1)
Households can also hold a risk-free asset (a bond) denoted bt with price 1 and
interest rate r. The household can short the bond (that is, take a loan) and there
are no credit constraints. The household cannot short housing. For simplicity we
assume that there are no adjustment costs associated with housing.
The leverage position of the household (the loan-to-value ratio) is:
Lt =
debt
house value
=
debt
gross housing wealth
=
−bt
ptht
(6.2)
and the portfolio share of housing is:
ωt =
gross housing wealth
net wealth
=
ptht
ptht +bt
=
1
(1−Lt) (6.3)
Notice here that leverage 0< Lt < 1 implies ωt > 1. For example, a household
with a 95% “mortgage” (L = 0.95) has a housing portfolio share of ωt = 20, while
for outright owners ωt = 1.
To show how leverage magnifies risk and return, denote the household’s net
wealth by xt , and labour income by yt . Then the intertemporal budget constrant is:
xt = (1+ r+ωt−1 (r∗t − r))∗ (xt−1− ct−1)+ yt (6.4)
or equivalently,
xt =
(
1+ r+
1
1−Lt−1 (r
∗
t − r)
)
∗ (xt−1− ct−1)+ yt (6.5)
Leveraged households have a greater increase in their wealth for a given house
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price shock, and these effects are highly nonlinear in leverage. At the same time,
since housing is a risk asset, high leverage also increases the variance of portfolio
returns.
To show how the consumption, saving and portfolio allocation decision of
households responds to these changes in wealth, we have to specify further details
household preferences, resources and markets.
Assume the household has no labour income (yt = 0). Further assume that
the household has CRRA preferences over consumption and that housing is just an
investment good (does not yield a flow of utility). This (combined with assumptions
on the stochastic process associated with house price movements) is essentially the
life-cyle portfolio choice model of Merton (1969), and the policy functions are well
known.4 There is a linear consumption function:
ct = αtxt (6.6)
and a constant target portfolio share for the risky asset:
ωt = ω∗ (6.7)
In the Merton model, the portfolio share of the risky asset depends only on
the consumer’s risk aversion and moments of the return distribution. As leverage is
just a transformation of the housing portfolio share, this implies there is a constant
target leverage that delivers the household’s desired combination of risk and return.
Now consider how this household responds to a positive house price shock:
xt−E[xt ] = ω∗ (r∗t −E [r∗])× (xt−1− ct−1) (6.8)
xt−E[xt ] = (pt−E [pt ])×ht−1. (6.9)
4The Merton model also assumes that returns are stationary and log-normally distributed.
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The shock is partly consumed:
ct−E[ct ] = αt (xt−E[xt ]) (6.10)
and partly saved (st) according to the consumption function:
st−E[st ] = (1−αt)(xt−E[xt ]) . (6.11)
Critically, the portfolio choice rule implies that this additional saving is leveraged
by ω∗:
pt×ht−E[pt×ht ] = ω∗ (1−αt)(xt−E[xt ]) . (6.12)
Using:
xt−E[xt ] = (pt−E [pt ])×ht−1 (6.13)
this implies extra active investment in housing of:
(pt×ht−E[pt×ht ])−(pt ∗ht−1−E[pt ]×ht−1)= (ω∗× (1−αt)−1)(pt−E[pt ])ht−1
(6.14)
The first term on the left hand side of equation (6.14) is the desired extra gross
housing wealth. The second term is the additional housing wealth that comes me-
chanically from the unexpected price increase. The difference between the two is
the additional active investment in housing (funded by debt) to return the hous-
ing portfolio share to ω∗. Thus, if there is an unexpected house price increase, a
leveraged household will invest more in housing and borrow to do so (even if the
household believes that housing returns are i.i.d). Conversely, an unexpected house
price fall increasing the leverage of the portfolio and the household will want to sell
housing and retire debt to return to ω∗.
For example, suppose that the household owns a £600,000 house with α =
0.05 and ω = 3 (so that the household has 33% equity in the home.) If the house
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value unexpectedly goes up by 5% (£30,000), the consumption function implies
that net wealth increases by £28,500 and the constant portfolio rule implies that
the household then desires gross housing wealth of £685,500 . As the house value
is now £630,000, the households makes new investment in housing of £55,500,
financed by new debt. Note that the extra investment spending (£55,500) is much
larger than the extra consumption spending (£1,500).
The implications of this model for housing investments are very stark. In prac-
tice a number of factors could moderate this mechanism. For example, if housing
provides a flow of utility, this is like a dividend, but if there is diminishing marginal
utility from housing (and extra housing cannot be rented efficiently), the total re-
turn to housing falls with housing wealth held, and this will temper some of the
re-leveraging motive described above. Transaction costs associated with residential
investment, credit constraints and the availability of other financial assets would
also slow the pace of at which households return releverage through housing invest-
ments.
Nevertheless, equations (6.11) and (6.12) suggest that the re-leveraging mech-
anism we describe will operate so long as the policy functions for consumption
and for the risky asset portfolio share are sufficiently flat in net wealth. A gently
sloped consumption function implies that a significant fraction of a wealth shock is
saved. A fairly flat portfolio rule implies that the household will not want to change
its portfolio shares dramatically in response to a wealth shock. A wide range of
life-cycle consumption and portfolio-choice models share these features.
In the remainder of this chapter, we investigate the empirical relevance of this
mechanism.
6.2 Data
To investigate re-leveraging and the relationship between leverage and household
spending, we draw on three datasets.
The first is the Living Costs and Food Survey and it’s previous incarnations the
Expenditure and Food Survey and Family Expenditure Survey (which we shall refer
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to collectively as the LCFS) (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs,
Office for National Statistics (2016)). The LCFS is a comprehensive, long-running
survey of consumer expenditures involving between 5,000-8,000 households per
year. Households are asked to record high-frequency expenditures in spending di-
aries over a two week period. Recall interviews are used to obtain spending on in-
formation on big ticket items (such as holidays or large durables) as well as standing
costs on items such energy and water, internet bills and magazine subscriptions. The
survey also collects information on incomes, demographic characteristics and, since
1992, on the value of households’ mortgages (but not on other aspects of household
balance sheets such as home values).
The second dataset we use is the British Household Panel Survey and its suc-
cessor Understanding Society (both of which we shall refer to as the BHPS) (Uni-
versity of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research (2010); University of
Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2016)). The BHPS is avail-
able in 18 waves from 1991 to 2008. Understanding Society began in 2009 and
incorporated the original BHPS sample members from 2010 onwards. Both sur-
veys include limited information on household spending on food and drink as well
as self-reported house values. The BHPS contains data on total mortgage debt from
1993 onwards, while Understanding Society dropped these variables in its second
wave in 2010. In the remaining years, we continue to observe whether households
own their homes outright, and details on the length and type of their mortgage if
they have one. We use these along with past information on mortgages values to
impute mortgages in years following 2010 (see Appendix D.1 for details). Loan-to-
value ratios are calculated by dividing the value of mortgages by the (self-reported)
value of homes. The BHPS and Understanding also contain information on whether
households own a second home.
The need to use two UK surveys comes from the fact that consumption spend-
ing is observed in the LCFS but leverage is not. At the same time the BHPS includes
information on leverage but not on consumer spending. Hence our need to use two-
sample methods that combine the information contained in both datasets, as we
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describe below.
The third dataset we use is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The
PSID is a US-based panel of households that includes information on home own-
ership, household balance sheets, income and spending decisions. Since 1997, the
survey has been biennial. The PSID has included questions on the value of house-
holds home equity and mortgages on an annual basis from 1999 onwards. Prior to
1999, these were only asked every 5 years. In terms of spending data, the survey
only consistently included spending on food and rental payments until 1999. In that
year, this was extended to cover other non-durable expenditures (including health,
utilities, education and childcare). Other expenditures such as clothing and enter-
tainment were added in 2005. Since 2001, households have been asked whether
they have undertaken home improvements worth $10,000 or more since January of
the year two years prior to the interview. If they answer in the affirmative, they are
then asked to give the exact amount spent.5
For house prices we use regional/state-level data on the prices of transacted
houses published by the Office for National Statistics (for the UK) and the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (for the US).
In all of what follows, we drop households where the head is aged under 25 or
over 65. To avoid problems of measurement error when estimating our first stage,
we also drop households who have a lagged housing portfolio share in the top 1%
of the distribution and those who have negative equity. We also drop households
resident in Northern Ireland from both the BHPS and the LCFS samples as these
were only introduced into the BHPS sample in later years. Finally, to avoid our
results being partially driven by households moving at times of high or low house
price growth, we drop households who have lived in their home for less than one
year.
Table 6.1 provides some descriptive statistics for our three samples. We re-
port these for 1993-2013 in the UK data, and for 2005-2013 for the PSID (i.e the
years when the most comprehensive spending data was available). The proportion
5We annualise this figure using individuals’ month of interview to determine the exact length of
the period covered by this question.
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of those owning their own homes and the average tenure among homeowners are
similar across the two UK surveys, at around 70% of households. Ownership rates
are somewhat lower in the PSID at around 55%. Focussing on home owners, the
average loan-to-value ratio in our BHPS sample is 0.34, while US households tend
to be more leveraged with an average loan-to-value ratio of 0.54. As we see be-
low this is partly accounted for by the fact the age gradient in leverage is less steep
in the United States, meaning that older households in the US tend to have higher
loan-to-value ratios than their UK counterparts.
Figures from the LCFS show that non-durables is the largest component of ex-
penditure (accounting for 76%). Residential investment spending, which includes
extensions, renovations, household repairs, large furniture, carpets, and large house-
hold appliances accounts for roughly 7% of total spending. The remainder is ac-
counted for by spending on non-residential durables.
The spending questions included PSID are as detailed as in the LCFS, and so
we are forced to define categories differently for the US. We measure residential
investment in the PSID as the sum of responses to the question “how much did
your family spend altogether on household furnishings and equipment, including
household textiles, furniture, floor coverings, major appliances, small appliances
and miscellaneous housewares?” and responses to questions regarding home im-
provement spending (which are censored from below at $10,000). Since we are
unable to exclude spending on small furnishings and smaller electrical appliances
from this value, this definition is somewhat broader than the one used in the UK. As
measured, it accounts for 6.9% of total spending. Non-residential durable spending
in the PSID is essentially restricted to cars. Relative to our definition for the LCFS,
it therefore excludes audio-visual equipment, as well appliances such as vacuum
cleaners and microwaves (which may be included as durable household furnish-
ings). This category accounts for 10.6% of expenditures. The remaining 82.5%
of measured spending (including clothing, utilities, entertainment, vacations, mo-
tor fuel, healthcare and child care) is classified as going on non-durables. In all of
these categories, non-responses to individual questions are treated as implying zero
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expenditures.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics, BHPS and LCFS and PSID
BHPS LCFS PSID
(1993-2013) (1993-2013) (2005-2013)
Age 44.5 44.2 45.3
% Own home 68.7% 70.3% 58.6%
Homeowners
Years at address 11.0 10.2 11.8
LTV ratio 0.34 - 0.44
ωt (housing share) 3.04 - 3.66
Total spend ($ ann.) - 43,764 65,242
Non-durable - 33,430 53,802
Durable - 6,068 6,917
Residential inv. - 4,266 4,524
% Res inv. > 0 - 79.6% 73.2%
Note: UK data is for the period 1993-2013. US data is for the period 2005-2013
when more comprehensive spending measures are available in the PSID. See text
for details of what is included in each spending category.
6.3 Household re-leveraging behaviour
We now turn to describing how the leverage of households in the UK and US has
evolved over time and, in particular, how it has responded to increases in house
prices in the two countries. We begin by describing aggregate trends in leverage and
house prices, before moving on to household-level panel regressions that capture
within household re-leveraging and de-leveraging behaviour over time.
Figure 6.2 shows how leverage evolves over time across four different 10-year
birth cohorts (born between the years 1940 and 1970). In both the UK and the US
there is a steady and reasonably smooth decline in leverage by age. In the UK there
are pronounced differences in leverage between cohorts at younger ages. However,
the different cohorts largely converge to similar leverage by around age 45. As we
discuss further below, the differences in initial leverage across UK cohorts are likely
to be explained by the differing credit conditions and house prices the different
cohorts were exposed to at the point they became home-owners. This is a source of
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variation in leverage which we exploit to identify the role of leverage in spending
decisions in what follows.
In the US, there is much less evidence of cohort effects, and the decline in
leverage by age is much less steep than in the UK.
Figure 6.1: LTV ratios by age and cohort
(a) UK (1993-2013)
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Note: Authors’ calculations using BHPS/Understanding Society and Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics.
Next we consider how leverage varies over the house price cycle. The two
panels of Figure 6.2 show how average real house price growth varied from year
to year in the UK and US, as well as changes in households’ average loan-to-value
ratios among both younger (aged 25-45) and older (45-65) households in the two
countries.
In the US, loan-to-value ratios among both younger and older households re-
mained strikingly stable throughout the period of house price growth that continued
until 2006. This peaked at a national rate of 7.6% in 2005, when loan-to-value ratios
were essentially unchanged from the previous year (at around 60% for those aged
25-45 and 40% for those aged 46-65). When real house prices started to decline
from 2007 onwards however, loan-to-value ratios rose rapidly. House prices fell by
2% in 2007 and between 7-8% in each of the years from 2008-2011. Over this pe-
riod, the average LTV among younger households increased from 62 to 71%, while
for older households it increased from 37 to 44%.
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Such declines did not occur in the UK, where the house price slump was mod-
est relative to both previous UK house price slumps and to the declines observed
in the US (Be´ne´trix et al. (2012)). We plot UK house price and loan-to-value data
from 1993-2013. For most of this period, UK house prices were increasing, with
annual falls only observed in 1994-1995 and 2007-2009. In the period in between
these years, house prices grew rapidly. Annual price increases peaked in 2003 at a
rate of almost 20%. There is more evidence of a fall in average loan-to-value ratios
as house prices rose in the UK than in the US. Loan-to-value ratios fell somewhat
in the period of greatest house price growth among the under 45s, falling from 62%
in 1995 to 43% in 2004 before climbing again as house price growth moderated
(the over 45s saw smaller changes in their average leverage). However, as we now
discuss, there is evidence that UK households were also engaging in re-leveraging
behaviour over this period, even if the scale was not as great as it was in the US.
Figure 6.2: LTV ratios and house price growth rates
(a) UK (1993-2013)
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(b) US (1999-2013)
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Note: House prices for the UK are national averages taken from the Office for National Statistics
HPI deflated using the UK CPI. House prices in the US are national averages taken from the Federal
Housing Finance Agency and are deflated with the US CPI. Loan-to-value ratios are taken calculated
for the UK using data from BHPS and Understanding Society and for the US using the PSID.
Panel (a) in Figure 6.3 shows that younger households in the UK did not pas-
sively allow leverage to fall as prices rose. Rather they responded by increasing the
amount of new borrowing. The proportion of home-owning households aged 25-45
observed taking out additional mortgage debt in the BHPS increased to exceed 10%
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in the period of most rapid house price growth. Panel (b) of Figure 6.3 shows that
this period of new borrowing also coincided with growth in the proportion of house-
holds with positive spending on housing extensions. This activity was also focused
on younger households. As we saw in Figure 6.2, older households responded much
less to these developments. The importance of extensions and other home improve-
ments as a reason for new borrowing is confirmed when we consider the uses for
which households report taking out additional mortgage debt. Households in the
BHPS are asked whether new loans were used for extensions, home improvements,
car purchases or other household spending (households may give more than one
answer). We class the first two of these responses as “residential investment’ and
second two as “consumption” and plot the proportions reporting each motive for
household heads aged 25-45, and 46-65 in panels a and b of in Figure 6.4. Both
younger and older households are roughly four times more likely to report taking
out a loan for residential investment than for consumption spending indicating that
this is a key reason for households to re-leverage.
Figure 6.3: New mortgage loans and housing extensions by homeowners in the UK, 1993-
2013
(a) Proportion taking out additional mortgages
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Note: British Household Panel Survey/Understanding Society and Living Costs and Food Survey.
Figure 6.5 shows trends the proportion of home-owners engaged in new mort-
gage borrowing alongside changes in the proportion of households undertaking
home improvement spending for the PSID (both since the previous wave - i.e in
6.3. Household re-leveraging behaviour 178
Figure 6.4: Purpose of new mortgage loans, 1993-2013
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(b) Aged 46-65
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Note: Authors’ calculations using British Household Panel Survey/Understanding Society.
the previous two years). As in the UK, younger households in particular were more
likely to take out new mortgage loans in periods of high house price growth. There
is also evidence of increases in home improvement spending when house prices
growth was highest in between the 2003 and 2007 waves of the survey. Unlike in
the UK, however, this is not clearly greater for younger households. While the PSID
does not include questions on the motives for additional mortgage borrowing as in
the BHPS, previous studies have pointed to home improvement spending as a key
motive for equity withdrawal (Cooper (2010)).
Taking these trends together, Figure 6.6 shows trends in average household
debt and equity (normalised by income) in the two countries. This illustrates the
increase in the size of household balance sheets over the period of the house price
boom, with increases in home equity (house values less mortgages) accompanied
by increases in household debt.6 The increases in home equity were much larger
in the UK both relative to income and to average mortgage debt than they were
in the US. In 2013, the average home equity to income ratio in the UK was five,
compared to three in 1993. In the US, the average home-equity to income ratio was
1.5 in 2013 (compared to around 1 in 1999). We also note how debt burdens in the
US decreased only slightly as home equity fell in the years following the financial
6Here home equity is calculated using data on the value of the primary residence.
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Figure 6.5: New mortgage loans and housing extensions by homeowners since previous
PSID wave, 1999-2013
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Note: Authors’ calculations using Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
crisis. This is suggestive of an asymmetry in the relative ease of re-leveraging in
response to house price increases and de-leveraging in response to house price falls.
Figure 6.6: Housing equity and debt (normalised by income)
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6.3.1 Panel regression
To more formally examine the extent to which households adjusted their leverage as
prices rose, we report in Table 6.2 results from regressing changes in log mortgage
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debt on changes in households’ log self-reported home values. That is, we run the
regression equation
∆ logMit = δ∆ logHValueit + εit (6.15)
on a sample of home-owners who are never observed with an LTV of zero.
Here Mit is each household’s total mortgage debt. Running this regression allows
us to directly examine within household responses to changes in house values over
time. We report results from both the BHPS and the PSID and since the PSID has
been biennial since 1999, in both surveys we consider changes over the previous
two years.
If mortgage debt did not adjust as house prices increased, leaving LTV ratios to
fall passively with house prices, then we would expect the coefficient on log house
values to equal 0.
Panel (a) of Table 6.2 presents these results for the US. Column (1) shows the
results for a simple OLS regression, initially focussing on the sub-sample of house-
holds who do not move from one wave to the next. The results indicate that each
10% increase in house prices appears associated with a 3.4% increase in mortgage
debt. Measurement error in self-reported house values has the potential to attenuate
this coefficient towards zero. Column (2) therefore shows results when we instru-
ment the change in house prices with state-level house price growth. The results are
very similar, suggesting that measurement error is not a significant problem. The
results also do not change much when we include a control for age to account for
life-cycle changes in leverage in Column (3). As a result we report only OLS re-
sults for the subsequent columns. In Columns (4) and (5) we look for evidence in
asymmetries of responses when households are re-leveraging versus de-leveraging
by splitting the sample according to whether real regional house prices rose or fell
relative to the previous wave. The coefficient on house price changes when prices
are rising is significantly greater than at times when house prices are falling. Our
results imply that a 10% increase in US house values was associated with a 3.8%
increse in mortgage debt, while a 10% fall in house prices is associated with only
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a 2.5% reduction in mortgage debt. In the remaining three columns we consider
how these results change when we include households who move address from one
wave to the next. We estimate that debt responses to house price changes are nearly
twice as large when movers are included. This holds true when we separately con-
sider responses to house price falls and house price increases in Columns (5) and
(6), indicating that up-sizing and down-sizing are important mechanisms by which
households adjust their leverage.
Panel (b) shows equivalent responses estimated from the BHPS from 1993-
2009. Here we do not include data from Understanding Society, so as to exclude
the changes in mortgage debt which we have imputed from 2011 onwards. In the
UK, debt responses to house price gains are not as large as they are in the US but
remain substantial. The results in Column (1) indicate that each 10% increase in
house prices is associated with a 2.0% increase in mortgage debt. As in the PSID,
these results do not change much when we instrument for changes in house value
(Column (2)) or include an age control (Column (3)). Unlike in the US, we do
not find clear evidence of asymmetric responses. The estimated effect of changes
in house values on mortgage debt is smaller in response to negative changes than
positive ones, but it is not possible to draw clear conclusions for this as, owing to the
limited number and duration of episodes of falling UK house prices over the period
we consider, the coefficient estimated in Column (4) is very imprecise. When we
include movers, the estimated responses of mortgage debt to house price changes
rises as it does in the US, though not quite to the same levels. In the sample which
includes movers, a 10% inrease in house prices is associated with a 4% increase in
debt compared to 6% in the US.
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Table 6.2: Changes in mortgage debt and changes in house prices over two-year periods
∆logDebt OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel a: US 1999-2013
∆ logHValue 0.344*** 0.326*** 0.323*** 0.253*** 0.380*** 0.602*** 0.539*** 0.647***
(0.058) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.097) (0.052) (0.038) (0.089)
R2 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.012 0.039 0.118 0.080 0.135
N 10,811 10,777 10,777 5,088 5,723 11,895 5,489 6,406
Clusters 3,358 3,350 3,350 2,430 2,620 3,477 2,534 2753
Panel b: UK 1993-2009
∆ logHValue 0.200*** 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.239 0.196*** 0.413*** 0.571*** 0.411***
(0.024) (0.037) (0.037) (0.154) (0.024) (0.035) (0.179) (0.036)
R2 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.012 0.052 0.055 0.052
N 12,928 12,860 12,860 541 12,387 14,131 586 13,545
Clusters 2,713 2,708 2,708 398 2,670 2,763 422 2,719
Controls
Age X
Restrictions
Non-movers X X X X X
House price growth< 0 X X
House price growth> 0 X X
Notes: * p< 0.10 , ** p< 0.05 , *** p< 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the individual
level. The log change in house values is instrumented with the log change in nominal house prices within each region.
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The results show evidence of re-leveraging behaviour in the face of price in-
creases, as we would expect in a model where consumers treated leverage as a
portfolio choice. We also find evidence that de-leveraging responses in the face of
price falls are slower than re-leveraging in response to house price gains.
A number of factors might explain why the re-leveraging responses we esti-
mates in the US appear so much larger than they do in the UK. One set of reasons
relates to the differing institutions in the two countries. In some US states, mort-
gage loans are non-recourse, meaning that lenders cannot pursue debts that are not
covered through sales of foreclosed properties. This may make borrowers more
comfortable with the risk of negative equity, since the costs of default in this sit-
uation are smaller. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) for instance find that the monthly
probability of default for borrowers in a state of negative equity is 32% higher in
states where the is no threat of recourse. In the UK, mortgage loans are recourse
loans. Secondly, in the US, mortgage interest is tax deductible, creating more of
an incentive to both pay-off mortgages less quickly and to increase mortgage debt
when prices rise. This was only true to a very limited extent in the UK during the
period we consider. Mortgages were only tax deductible up to a fixed nominal cap
of £30,000 (far below the average house price). From 1994 the size of the deduc-
tion was limited to 20% falling to 10% in 1995. The tax deduction was eliminated
in 1999. Using variability in the importance of tax deductibility in the UK over
time, Henderschott et al. (2003) find that it can have substantial effects on house-
holds’ initial loan-to-value ratios. It may also have similar effects on incentives to
re-leverage, and so partly explain some of the differences in behaviour we observe
between the US and the UK.
Another important factor is the pace of house price increases in the UK. This
would mean that UK households would need to make much larger adjustments to
their mortgage debt in order to maintain constant loan-to-value ratios. This may
have led to intolerably large increases in their loan-to-income ratios (lenders are
typically only willing to lend households 3-5 times the value of their incomes). Fig-
ure D.2 in Appendix D.3 shows that the propensity for households in both countries
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to increase their mortgage debt in response to house price increases first rises then
falls with their lagged loan-to-income ratios. It also shows that UK households were
much more likely to have higher loan-to-income ratios than their US counterparts,
suggesting that LTI constraints were more likely to prevent UK households from
borrowing against the full value of house price increases.
6.4 Spending on home improvements
The following two sections discuss homeowners residential investment responses to
increasing house prices. There are various ways a homeowner can invest in housing.
They may purchase other residences, up-size, or make investments in their existing
home through renovations and home improvements. In this section we discuss the
last of these responses.
In order to properly constitute ‘investment’ rather than pure consumption
spending, home improvements must increase the market value of the property and
not just the owner’s private valuation. This may be difficult however, as prospective
buyers of a property may not derive the same consumption benefit to any additions
or alterations in the same way as the current owner. For example, a housing ex-
tension built in a home’s backyard may increase the home’s value to the current
owner (who desires more floor space) but discourage buyers who value a garden.
Moreover, asymmetries of information may drive a wedge between the market and
private valuations of a particular improvement. Necessary structural repairs may
not increase the sale price of their home if buyers cannot verify that they have been
done or done to an acceptable standard.
However, there is evidence that a substantial share of the costs of home im-
provement spending is recouped through increased home values. Realtor magazine
conducts an annual survey of the costs and value added associated with different
home improvement projects in different US housing markets. Real estate agents
are asked to the expected value different projects are expected to add to a home’s
sale price, while professionals in the remodelling industry are asked to provide esti-
mates of their likely cost. Taken together these two estimates provide an estimate of
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the proportion of costs of different projects that homeowners can expect to recoup
through higher re-sale values. In 2016, the average value-cost ratio of investments
made on properties sold within a year was 64%. Investments in attic insulation
had the most cost effective effects on resale values, with 117% of costs recouped
through higher home values.7 Bathroom additions had the lowest returns with 56%
of costs being recouped.8
The fact that homeowners can expect to recoup a significant fraction of the
costs of home improvement means that investment motives are likely to play an
important role in households’ decisions to make such expenditures. Moreover, the
returns to investments in one’s own home appears to increase along with local home
values, suggesting that this is indeed a way that households can increase the im-
portance of housing in their overall portfolios. Gyourko and Saiz (2004) find that
home improvement spending responds strongly to the ratio of local house values to
construction costs, which is consistent with a rational investment motive for such
projects that responds to house price growth. Choi et al. (2014) investigate the im-
pact of local house price growth on the average ratio of costs recouped as measured
by the Realtor survey, controlling for other factors such as local unemployment and
income growth. They also find that the investment value of home improvement
projects is positively associated with local house price growth.
6.4.1 Empirical analysis
To test the specific hypothesis that more leveraged households will disproportion-
ately increase housing investment in response to house price increases, we estimate
the equation
7http://www.remodeling.hw.net/cost-vs-value/2016/
8Similar surveys exist in the UK, for example the insurance company GoCompare provides
a property investment calculator which provides estimates of the costs and returns associated
with different projects. This suggests greater returns to home improvement spending in the
UK, although the methodology behind the calculator has not been published. As in the US,
Energy-saving investments have the highest returns, while net bathrooms have negative returns
(https://www.gocompare.com/home-insurance/property-investment-calculator/).
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lnCt = β0+ γcrt +β1wt−1+β2
{
wt−1×
(
prt
prt−1
−1
)}
+Xβ3+ et (6.16)
One concern about directly estimating equation (6.16) is that leverage is po-
tentially endogenous. The conventional approach to estimating leverage effects is
to use individuals’ lagged leverage (uninstrumented). As we have seen however,
lagged leverage is itself a choice variable that will depend on households expecta-
tions of the risk and returns associated with housing investments at the time when
consumption and other spending decisions are made. As we document in what fol-
lows, lagged leverage is also correlated with gross house values and income from
non-housing assets. In order for our empirical application to identify the effects
of independently varying leverage, these other variables ought to be held constant.
For this reason we instrument leverage using housing market conditions at the time
individuals moved into their homes.
A second issue concerns data availability. Long-running surveys that contain
balance sheet data on wealth and leverage rarely contain comprehensive consump-
tion measures. A panel survey is required in order to know the consumer’s lagged
leverage position ωit−1.
Previous studies have addressed this problem by either using available proxies
for consumption (such as borrowing, (Mian and Sufi (2011))), subsets of consump-
tion that are observed (e.g. food spending as in Lehnert (2004)), or measures backed
out from the consumer’s budget constraint (using the difference between observed
income and wealth changes, as in Cooper (2013)). Each of these approaches has
drawbacks. Changes in particular categories of consumption, or variables related
to consumption need not give the full spending response to shocks.9 They also do
not allow us to investigate how the composition of spending varies as house prices
change, which is crucial for allowing us to test the importance of portfolio rebalanc-
ing motives for re-leveraging. In addition, the use of the budget constraint identity
9Credit card borrowing, which is used as proxy in Mian et al. (2013), may also be more cyclical
than other forms of spending. This point was made in Aladangady (2017).
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to impute consumption can in general lead to biased estimates of wealth effects in
the presence of measurement error (Browning et al. (2014)). If reported wealth in
the previous period is smaller than actual wealth, then leverage as observed by the
researcher in that period will be too high and consumption in the current period be
too large, biasing estimates upward.
For these reasons, in the UK we use a two-sample IV approach (Angrist and
Krueger (1992)) to combine spending data in the LCFS with data on leverage in
the BHPS. This approach allows us to simultaneously impute and instrument for
leverage in our (cross-sectional) UK expenditure dataset using balance sheet data
taken from the BHPS. The instrument we use is the credit conditions households
faced at the time they moved into their current residences. We discuss the strength
and validity of our instrument further below. We provide additional details on the
implementation of our approach in Appendix D.3.
In principle, in the US we could investigate these questions using the PSID,
which in its later years contains information on both spending and leverage. How-
ever, the number of waves in which it includes comprehensive consumption data is
relatively short (a problem that also applies to other panel surveys such as the HRS,
used by Christelis et al. (2015) to study questions around leverage). In addition,
as we saw in Figure 6.2 and in the analysis in Table 6.2, US households tend to
rapidly re-leverage in response to house price increases. As a result, the leverage of
US households is far less dependent on past circumstances than it is for UK house-
holds, and so our instrument has no power in the US. In what follows, we therefore
focus on UK results.
6.4.2 Instrument and identification
For our proposed method we require a source of variation in leverage that explains
why some households took out larger loans than others that is common to both the
BHPS and the LCFS. For this purpose we exploit variation in the average price
to income ratios for new loans at the time households moved into their current
residences (denoted P/Y−T ). This variable is often used as a measure of the cost
of credit (loan to income ratios for example included in the credit conditions index
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Figure 6.7: Credit conditions, 1969-2013
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Note: Data from Office for National Statistics.
of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006)). In our case it indicates the cost
of borrowing in the years house prices were made, and so the degree to which
households would have been able to leverage their housing purchases at the time
they moved.
The solid line in Figure 6.7 (Panel (a)) shows how this instrument varies over
time in the UK. There is a gradual upward trend in the price to income ratio sug-
gesting that credit has become looser over time. In 2013, average loans were almost
five times greater than the incomes of buyers. This compares to a ratio of 2.5 in
1969. This provides one source of identification. Importantly however, there is also
cyclical variation in this variable, with for example evidence of credit tightening
following the 2008 financial crisis. Movements in other measures of credit condi-
tions such as the average deposit on new homes (Figure 6.7, Panel (b)) show similar
patterns.
Our instrument is only available from 1969 onwards, and so in what follows we
drop households who moved into their homes before this. This constitutes roughly
0.5% of the total number of observations in our LCFS sample.
6.4.2.1 Instrument relevance and validity
For our instrument to be considered appropriate it must satisfy two requirements.
The first is that the instrument must be relevant (that it is indeed correlated with the
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endogenous variables it is replacing). Figure 6.8 shows how our instrument relates
to loan-to-value ratios for a given cohort (those born in the 1960s). This is the only
ten-year birth cohort that we observe for almost our entire sample period. We plot
loan-to-value ratios for households who moved into their homes in three different
years: 1989,1996, and 2004. These three years represent peaks and troughs in price-
to-income ratios on new housing purchases from Panel (a) in Figure 6.7. Price to
income ratios reached a temporary high of 3.7 in 1989 before falling to a low of
3.2 in 1996. Thereafter they increased to a peak of 5.2 in 2004. As Figure 6.8
shows, households that moved when price-to-income ratios were relatively high in
1989 tended to have higher leverage than those in the same cohort who moved in
in 1996. This is true not only at the point they moved in to their current homes but
also long-afterward. Loan-to-value ratios are also persistently higher for those who
moved in when credit conditions were even looser in 2004.
Figure 6.8: Loan-to-value ratios by age and year moved in (1960s cohort)
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Note: Authors’ calculations using British Household Panel Sur-
vey/Understanding Society.
This relevance of our instruments can be more formally tested by looking at
the results of first stage regressions. We do this in Table 6.3.
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We have two first stage regressions, one for leverage and one for leverage in-
teracted with house prises. In both cases, the F-statistics are greater than the value
of 10 suggested as a rule of thumb by Staiger and Stock (1997a) for IV estimated
using a single sample.10 Two sample IV methods may suffer less of a bias than
standard 2SLS estimators, as errors in the first stage estimation will be unrelated to
errors in the second stage equation. This is indeed the rationale for estimators that
run first and second stages in split samples (Angrist and Krueger (1995)). Nonethe-
less weak instruments may still result in coefficients being biased towards zero in
finite samples. The relatively strong first stage we obtain is therefore reassuring.
Kleibergen-Paap statistics for the first stage also heavily reject the hypothesis of
underidentification.11
Table 6.3: First stage results
ωit−1 ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1)
P/Y−T 0.391 -0.011
(0.043) (0.003)
P/Y−T × ( prtprt−1 −1) 0.451 0.670
(0.362) (0.050)
Shea partial R2 0.008 0.030
F-stat (p-value) 40.14 114.02
(<0.001) (<0.001)
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 72.46
(<0.001)
N 29,472
Clusters 7,797
The second requirement for a suitable instrument is that it is itself uncorrelated
with the error term.
10Later we will also report results for a younger sub-sample of households (those with heads
aged 25-45). In this sub-sample, we obtain an even stronger first stage (with F-stats for ωt−1 and
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) of 19.75 and 80.20 respectively).
11A further ‘first stage’ check we can conduct is to look for a positive association between our
instrument and total mortgage debt in the LCFS. This would us that the association between our
instrument and leverage is not limited to our first sample. Regressing mortgage debt on (P/Y−T ) and
our controls yields a positive coefficient with a t-statistic of 24.07.
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In our case, there may be concerns that those who move home in years with
higher price-income ratios will have spending patterns that are different to those
who moved in other years for reasons other than the degree of their leverage. The
most obvious challenge is that since price-income ratios have tended to increase
over time, those households with higher values of our instrument will tend to have
moved more recently. They may therefore be younger, or be more likely to furnish-
ing a new home. We address these concerns of this nature directly by including
a control for years households have spent in their current address (in addition to a
dummy variable for households having moved in in the last year to account for first
year ‘setting up’ expenses). By including a full set of cohort-region-year interac-
tions we also control for any region or cohort specific trends in income growth that
may be correlated with house price changes. These dummies can be thought of cap-
turing shocks that are potentially correlated with house price movements but differ
in their effects across young and old or across different regional labour markets.
One such shock is to future income expectations which would be expected to boost
the consumption of younger (and so more leveraged) cohorts by more. If effect such
as these are not controlled for they could lead to spuriously large estimates of house
price wealth effects for younger households (Attanasio et al. (2009)).
The use of our instrument in combination with these controls means we effec-
tively compare the spending responses of house price changes between two house-
holds in the same region and same cohort but who moved into their homes at differ-
ent times (when credit was either looser or tighter).12
Questions about endogeneity may remain however. For example, households
may have been more likely to move when house prices were high because greater
unobservable wealth made them less price sensitive. They may also have moved
into larger houses. This would create a spurious association between our instrument
and consumption. Households who moved at times when credit was loose may
12The inclusion of cohort-region-year fixed effects means that we will only identify the relative
effects of house price changes across different households within each region-cohort-year cell. Com-
mon effects of house prices changes affecting all households (and any general equilibrium effects
on either national or regional housing markets) will be absorbed by our fixed effects (Steinsson and
Nakamura (2018)).
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also be more likely to move in response to economic shocks and drop out of our
sample introducing a selection bias. The assumption that such omitted factors do
not induce a correlation between instruments and the error term is usually something
which cannot be verified. Omitted variables are typically omitted because they are
unobserved. However, when using a two sample approach, such tests are possible.
Some variables may be observed in the sample in which we run our first stage
regressions even if they are not present in our main sample.
To address additional endogeneity concerns we therefore look for an associa-
tion between our instruments and gross house values, asset incomes and the proba-
bility of being a mover in the BHPS and Understanding Society panels conditional
on our covariates. Table 6.4 reports results from regressions of these potential
sources of endogeneity on our instruments and our other covariates. The instru-
ments are both jointly and individually insignificant in all models suggesting that
they are plausibly orthogonal to these omitted variables. In addition to the results
shown in Table 6.4, we also regress unsecured debt to income ratios and an indica-
tor for whether households have positive debts on our instruments. Debts are only
observed in 3 of the 18 waves of the BHPS survey, and so these tests are necessarily
conducted on a much smaller sample. The instruments are again individually and
jointly insignificant in these regressions.
A further exercise we can do is test to how our instrument compares to the
use of households lagged LTV ratios to sort households according to their leverage.
This is the source of variation used in a number of previous studies (e.g. Disney et
al. (2010), Dynan (2012)). The results of this comparison are shown in the second
panel of Table 6.4. There is strong evidence that those with higher lagged leverage
have fewer financial assets and tend to live in less valuable homes.13
6.4.3 Results
Table 6.5 shows results for using our estimation equation (6.16) for different forms
of spending. These include total spending, non-durable spending (consumption),
13As an additional check we regress our instrument P/Y−T and lagged leverage on possible con-
founding variables simultaneously. We find again that these variables are not correlated with credit
conditions when consumers moved into their homes, but are related to households’ lagged leverage.
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Table 6.4: Exogeneity of instruments
Panel a Credit conditions
Dependent var. log(HValue) Invest inc. > 1000 Invest inc.= 0 Movert+1
P/Y−T 0.011 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.004)
P/Y−T × ( prtprt−1 −1) -0.048 -0.060 0.091 0.014
(0.106) (0.078) (0.123) (0.037)
F-test (p-values) 0.510 0.743 0.610 0.854
N 29,194 28,034 28,034 22,638
Clusters 7,681 7,642 7,642 6,327
Panel b Lagged leverage
LTVt−1 -0.199*** -0.168*** 0.335*** -0.0001
(0.0208) (0.014) (0.0221) (0.008)
LTVt−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) -0.646*** -0.133 0.158 0.050
(0.199) (0.138) (0.219) (0.0860)
F-test (p-values) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.841
N 29,194 28,034 28,034 22,638
Clusters 7,681 7,642 7,642 6,327
Notes: * p< 0.10 , ** p< 0.05 , *** p< 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls for educa-
tion, cohort-region-year dummies, sex, house type, number of rooms, number of adults, number of
children, years at address, and a dummy variable for having moved in in the previous year. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
durable spending (excluding residential investment), residential investment spend-
ing, spending on luxuries (food out and leisure services) and total spending less
residential investment. We log each of these spending variables with the excep-
tion of durable spending, residential investment and luxuries, which we transform
using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation as a significant fraction of
households record zero spending on these categories. This is defined as
IHS(y) = log(y+
√
(y2+1)) (6.17)
The IHS transformation approximates log values at high values of spending
but remains defined at zero.
The regressions suggest little difference in the responses of total spending to
leveraged house price gains. Our results imply that for a 10% increase in house
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prices, total spending would be just 0.50 % higher for outright owners and 1.00
% higher for those with a loan-to-value ratio of 50% (i.e ωit=2). The equivalent
non-durable consumption responses fall to -0.2% and -0.4% respectively. These
responses are small and not statistically significant, suggesting only limited housing
wealth effects on consumption in our sample. For durable goods, we observe a
negative response to house price increases, though our estimates are imprecise and
not significant.
Column (4) shows however that there is strong response for residential invest-
ment spending. We estimate that a 10% increase in house prices results in a 7.4%
increase in residential investment spending for outright owners, rising to 15% for
those with a loan-to-value ratio of 50%.
One possible explanation for the results we obtain in column (4) is that hous-
ing is a luxury good, and that consumer spending on such goods will rise with
increasing wealth independently of any investment motive. To examine this hy-
pothesis, column (5) presents results for the effects of leveraged housing returns on
a category of goods that are typically thought of as being luxuries. We do not find
evidence of strong spending responses for these goods, lending additional support
to our hypothesis that the increase in spending on residential investment reflects a
desire to rebalance consumers’ investment portfolios rather than pure consumption
motives.
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Table 6.5: Log spending responses
Total Non-durables Durables Res inv. Luxuries Total - Res
(IHS) (IHS) (IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωit−1 -0.020 -0.017 -0.041 -0.045 -0.049** -0.021*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.046) (0.048) (0.025) (0.012)
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) 0.051 -0.025 -0.192 0.741*** -0.088 -0.006
(0.072) (0.065) (0.265) (0.279) (0.142) (0.070)
R2 0.355 0.377 0.113 0.082 0.211 0.361
N 60,357 60,357 60,357 60,357 60,357 60,357
Notes: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls for education,
cohort-region-year dummies, sex, house type, number of rooms, number of adults, number of children, years
at address, and a dummy variable for having moved in in the previous year.
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Table 6.6: Log spending responses: Ages 25-45
Total Non-durables Durables Res inv. Luxuries Total - Res
(IHS) (IHS) (IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωit−1 -0.013 -0.003 0.002 -0.105*** -0.050** -0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.037) (0.041) (0.020) (0.009)
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) 0.056 -0.009 -0.453** 0.833*** -0.007 -0.003
(0.049) (0.044) (0.190) (0.208) (0.096) (0.047)
R2 0.319 0.324 0.106 0.092 0.184 0.314
N 29,557 29,557 29,557 29,557 29,557 29,557
Notes: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls for education,
cohort-region-year dummies, sex, house type, number of rooms, number of adults, number of children, years
at address, and a dummy variable for having moved in in the previous year.
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In Table 6.6 we separately consider results for a younger subsample of house-
holds (those with heads aged 25-45). The results are similar to those in Table 6.5.
As in the case of our full sample, there is no evidence of a differential response in
total spending between leveraged and non-leveraged households.
6.4.4 Robustness checks
In addition to these results, we carry out a range of robustness checks. For reasons
of space, we discuss the results of these briefly here, reporting the full set of results
in Appendix D.4.
1. Alternative definitions of residential investment. The definition of residen-
tial investment we use above is relatively broad compared to what would for
example be used in the national accounts. In particular, we include other fix-
tures and durable investments (such as for example, kitchen equipment) that
we consider likely to be capitalised into the value of the property but which
may be excluded in other definitions. In the Appendix, we also consider a nar-
row definition that is restricted to spending on changes to the structure of the
property as well as household repairs and maintenance.14 The results we ob-
tain are very similar to our main results. We also find a positive effect when
we use an indicator of whether households made investments in household
extensions as our dependent variable.
2. Alternative instruments. We also consider results using two alternative instru-
ments. The first is the Credit Conditions Index used in Fernandez-Corugedo
and Muellbauer (2006), and the second is the average house price in each
region at the time individuals moved into their current homes (as used as an
instrument for mortgage debt in Chetty et al. (2017)). The use of these alter-
native instruments do not give very different results.15
14This definition is more in the spirit of national accounts. For example in the US National Income
and Product Accounts, Private Fixed Investment includes “construction of new nonresidential and
residential buildings.”, “improvements (additions, alterations, and major structural replacements) to
nonresidential and residential buildings.” and “certain types of equipment (such as plumbing and
heating systems and elevators) that are considered an integral part of the structure.” (see Chapter 6
of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA))
15Differences in the total spending response of more and less leveraged households to house price
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3. Sample restrictions. We exclude households who moved within the previous
year from our analysis, but concerns may remain that our spending effects are
driven by more recent movers (who are likely to be the most leveraged, and
possibly at credit a constraint). We therefore consider results from an alter-
native sample where we exclude those who moved into their homes within
the previous five years. Within this subsample we find slightly larger effects
of house price changes on the investment spending of households who are
predicted to be the most leveraged.
6.5 Other property investments
Households may also invest in housing by purchasing additional properties or by
up-sizing their main residence. In this section we examine whether more leveraged
households are more likely to make such investments in response to house price
increases than other households, as our model would predict.
To do so we estimate the following equation using the BHPS
∆Yt,t+10 = Xδ0+δ1
(
prt+10
prt
−1
)
+δ2
[
ωit−1×
(
prt+10
prt
−1
)]
+ut (6.18)
where Y is some outcome of interest (second home ownership or the number of
rooms in the household’s main residence). We consider changes in these outcomes
over a period of 10 years. This is to account for the possibility that, as a result of
transaction and search costs, consumers may be slow to make new home purchases
in response to increases in their housing wealth.
changes are greater when we use regional house prices at the time households move into their current
residence as our instrument. However, the coefficient on the interaction between leverage and house
price changes is only significant at the 10% level (and partly driven by larger estimates of effects on
residential investment). Effects on nondurable and durable spending (examined separately) are not
significant.
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Table 6.7: Effects of leverage on second home ownership
∆secondhomet,t+10 OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)(
prt+10
prt
−1
)
-0.018 - - -
(0.047)
ωit−1×
(
prt+10
prt
−1
)
0.003* 0.003* 0.000 0.037**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
Region dummies N Y Y Y
Other controls N N Y Y
N 3,761 3,761 3,598 3,598
Clusters 1,465 1,465 1,393 1,393
Notes: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in
parentheses. Controls are year dummies, dummies for 10-year birth
cohorts, age, age squared, years at current address and a dummy for
having just moved in. Standard errors are clustered at the individual
level.
Table 6.7 shows results for the change in second home ownership. Column
(1) presents OLS results for the effect of regional house price changes and regional
house price changes interacted with leverage with no additional controls. This sug-
gests that more leveraged households are more likely to purchase a second home
following increases in local house prices than less leveraged households. Column
(2) reports results for a model where local house price increases are replaced by
region dummies. The estimates are very similar. In column (3) we include other
controls for year, 10-year birth cohort, a quadratic in age and the years the house-
hold head has been living at the current address. The latter control accounts for
the fact that households who have moved recently will likely be closer to their de-
sired leverage and so less likely to need to rebalance their portfolios. Once these
other factors have been accounted for, leveraged households do not appear any more
likely to make second home purchases than other households. However, this may
reflect the fact that more leveraged households are less wealthy than other house-
holds (as implied by the results in Table 6.4), rather than the effects of leverage
itself. To account for this possibility, as well as to address problems of potential
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measurement error in the leverage variable, we instrument leverage with the price
to income ratio at the time households moved into their current residence as we did
in Section 6.4. Once we do this we find that the second home purchases of more
leveraged households are indeed more responsive to house price increases than the
purchases of other households.
In Table 6.8 whether more leveraged households are more likely to up-size
(as measured by changes in the number of rooms in their primary residence). The
pattern of results is similar to that shown in Table 6.7. However, in this case the
results we obtain when we instrument are not statistically significant.
Table 6.8: Effects of leverage on home size
∆nroomst,t+10 OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)(
prt+10
prt
−1
)
-0.293** - - -
(0.144)
ωit−1×
(
prt+10
prt
−1
)
0.050*** 0.049*** 0.009 0.073
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.068)
Region dummies N Y Y Y
Other controls N N Y Y
N 4,834 4,834 4,625 4,625
Clusters 1,513 1,513 1,440 1,440
Notes: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Controls are year dummies, dummies for 10-year birth cohorts, age,
age squared, years at current address and a dummy for having just moved in.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have shown how households re-leveraging and investments in
housing can be driven by a desire to maintain the risk and return of their portfolios.
We set out an empirical approach which accounts for the endogeneity of house-
holds’ leverage, and that combines information from two samples in way which al-
lows us to see how house price changes affect different forms of household spending
(as opposed to looking at total spending or borrowing).
6.6. Conclusion 201
We show using panel data that homeowners re-leveraged as house prices rose
and that the self-reported use of new mortgage loans was for home improvements
and other residential investments rather than consumption. In addition we find that
households that were initially more leverged are more likely to both purchase other
residential properties and invest in their own homes in response to local house price
increases than other households. However, these households do not disproportion-
ately increase their consumption spending as house prices rise, as would be expected
if re-leveraging behaviour were driven by traditional housing wealth effects.
Our findings have relevance for the designers of macro-prudential policy inter-
ventions. Previous studies have examined the total spending or borrowing response
of households to house price shocks, and concluded that access to credit drives
differences in responses across more and less leveraged households. Our results
suggest that leverage has an important influence on the composition of household
spending response to house price shocks even when households are not at their
credit constraints. Our findings point to potentially important feedback mecha-
nisms. As house prices rise, households desire to re-leverage may lead to greater
demand for housing and further price increases - increasing households’ exposure
to future house price changes and amplifying housing booms.
Chapter 7
Aggregating Elasticities: Intensive and
Extensive Margins of Women’s Labour
Supply
The size of the elasticity of labour supply to changes in wages has been studied for
a long time. Recent debates have focused on the perceived discrepancy between
estimates coming from micro studies, which with a few exceptions, point to rela-
tively small values of such an elasticity, and the assumptions made in macro models,
which seem to need relatively large values. Keane and Rogerson (2015) and Keane
and Rogerson (2012) survey some of these issues and the papers by Blundell et al.
(2011), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) con-
tain some alternative views on the debate. To reconcile the micro evidence and
the assumptions made in macroeconomics, much attention has been given to the
distinction between the extensive and intensive margins of labour supply, see, in
particular, Chetty et al. (2011). Perhaps surprisingly, in this debate, aggregation
issues and the pervasive and complex heterogeneity that characterise labour sup-
ply behaviour have not been given much attention.1 This chapter aims to fill this
gap, while making some original methodological contributions and presenting new
empirical evidence.
1One exception is Keane and Wasi (2016) who show men’s labour supply responses vary sub-
stantially with age, education and the tax structure. Aggregation issues are also discussed in Erosa
et al. (2016).
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Preferences for consumption and leisure are likely to be affected in fundamen-
tal ways by family composition, fertility and wealth, as well as by unobserved taste
‘shocks’, and so heterogeneity in labour supply elasticities in these dimensions is
something to be expected. Labour supply elasticities will vary in the cross-section
and over the business cycle. The key issue, however, is how significant this hetero-
geneity is and whether it is important at the aggregate level: does it make any sense
to talk about the elasticity of labour supply as a structural parameter? Aggregation
issues are likely to be relevant both for the intensive and extensive margin, as we
show.
In this chapter, we address these issues focusing on women’s labour supply.
Our approach consists in taking a relatively standard life-cycle model of labour
supply to the data. Whilst the essence of the model is relatively simple, we stress
two elements that are important for our analysis and that make our contribution
novel. First, we consider all the relevant intertemporal and intratemporal margins
and choices simultaneously; in particular, consumption and saving as well as partic-
ipation and hours of work. This allows for interaction between different decisions.
Second, we specify a flexible utility function that allows for substantial heterogene-
ity, fits the data well and, at the same time, allows us to make precise quantitative
statements. These elements are important because they allow us to address directly
the interaction between extensive and intensive margins and to evaluate empirically
the importance of aggregation issues and to calculate both micro and macro elastic-
ities.
In evaluating aggregate labour supply elasticities, it is necessary to specify the
whole economic environment because, as noted by Chang and Kim (2006), the ag-
gregate response depends on the distribution of reservation wages. On the other
hand, an important methodological contribution of this chapter is to stress that key
components of the model can be estimated using weaker assumptions which closely
approximate the overall model structure. We separate our estimation into three steps
and specify what assumptions are needed at each step and what variation in the data
is used for identification. The first step identifies the within-period preferences over
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consumption and labour supply at the intensive margin. We use group level variabil-
ity driven by group or aggregate shocks such as policy reforms, similar to Blundell
et al. (1998). These estimates are used to compute within-period Marshallian and
Hicksian elasticities, which hold intertemporal allocations constant and are condi-
tional on participation. The second step estimates intertemporal preferences that
generate Frisch labour supply elasticities. We estimate these parameters by using
the Euler equation for consumption, using synthetic cohorts, similar to Blundell
et al. (1993) and Attanasio and Weber (1995), and without taking a stance on the
determinants of participation and a variety of other issues, such as retirement or
the cost of children. Finally, to characterise behaviour at the extensive margin, we
specify the model fully. In this step, we calibrate key parameters to a number of
life-cycle moments, and explicitly aggregate individual behaviour, similar in spirit
to Erosa et al. (2016). Labour supply responses to wages in a life-cycle model may
change beyond the static response if savings decisions are affected by wages. Our
life-cycle elasticities account for these effects and we discuss the circumstances in
which static elasticities provide a good approximation to the overall life-cycle re-
sponse.
We use a flexible specification for utility to allow for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in tastes at both intratemporal and intertemporal margins, and at the
same time allowing for possible non-separability of consumption and leisure. Our
specification of preferences is much more flexible than generally allowed for in
the literature and we show this is important. Classic papers in the micro literature
(such as Heckman and Macurdy (1980)) imply a strong relationship between the
Frisch intertemporal elasticity and the intratemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution
conditions, which, in turn, forces a strict relationship between within-period and
intertemporal conditions. Our approach avoids this restriction. In the macro liter-
ature, most papers impose additive separability between consumption and leisure,
and isoleastic, homothetic preferences that conform to the restrictions for balanced
growth, as in Erosa et al. (2016).2 Here, we show that the isoelastic specification for
2This assumption is predicated on the perceived need to work with models that match historical
trends showing steady secular increases in real wages with little change in aggregate hours. Brown-
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consumption and hours is strongly rejected by the data. The challenge, therefore, is
to work with specifications that allow much more heterogeneity and changes over
time.
Estimates of the size of the elasticity of labour supply for women vary consid-
erably. Our estimates, at the median, are not too different from some estimates in
the literature. In particular, on the intensive margin, we obtain a median static Mar-
shallian elasticity of 0.18, with the corresponding Hicksian elasticity considerably
larger at 0.54, indicating a sizeable income effect. For the same median household,
the Frisch elasticity for hours is 0.87. At the same time, we document considerable
variation in estimated elasticities in the cross-section: the Marshallian, for instance,
has an inter-decile range of -0.14 to 0.79. As we show, these static Marshallian
elasticities are smaller than the responses when we allow savings to adjust.
In comparing our estimates to the literature, we investigated what drives, in our
data, differences in results. A key factor is that the size of the estimates depends
on the specific estimator and normalisation used. When using standard IV or GMM
methods, we typically obtain very large estimates when we put wages on the left-
hand side of the MRS equation. Instead, we get much smaller estimates when put
consumption or hours worked on the left-hand side. In our baseline estimation, we
use methods robust to the normalization, using a method proposed by Fuller (1977),
which is a generalization of a LIML approach.
We use the fully specified model to run two experiments: in the first, we eval-
uate the labour supply response to temporary changes in wages; in the second, we
evaluate the response to a change in the entire life-cycle wage profile. The first
experiment captures the impact of a temporary tax cut, which has little effect on
the marginal utility of wealth, even if the cut is unanticipated. Without an exten-
sive margin, the response would be captured by the Frisch elasticity. Introducing
the extensive margin doubles the size of the response, and is particularly impor-
tant at younger ages when non-participation because of children is prevalent. The
second experiment captures the impact of a permanent tax cut which will change
ing et al. (1999) already noted that the fact that the historical trend for aggregate hours is roughly
constant hides a large decrease for men and an increase for women.
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the marginal utility of wealth. The response to the second experiment would be
approximated by the static Marshallian elasticity if there was no change in savings
behaviour. Allowing intertemporal allocations to adjust gives what we call life-cycle
Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities. These life-cycle elasticities are greater than
the static approximations because not all income is spent on non-durable consump-
tion in the period it is earned. However, these life-cycle elasticities are lower than
the Frisch responses to temporary changes.
Using the entire model, we can aggregate explicitly individual behaviour and
study aggregate elasticities that correspond to the concept used in the macro liter-
ature. We find an important role for the extensive margin in generating aggregate
movements in labour supply. Importantly in linking the micro and macro analysis
of labour supply, we show that what we call the ‘aggregate’ elasticity changes con-
siderably over the business cycle, and is typically larger in recessions. Moreover,
it gets larger in longer recessions. To the best of our knowledge, changes in the
elasticity over business cycles have never been discussed.
The closest macroeconomic paper to this chapter is Erosa et al. (2016), who
have similar aims of building aggregate elasticities from men’s labour supply be-
haviour over the life-cycle, and of distinguishing the intensive and extensive mar-
gins using a fully specified life-cycle model. The focus of this chapter is on
women’s labour supply responses. A second related paper is Guner et al. (2012),
who model heterogeneous married and single households with an extensive mar-
gin for women and an intensive margin for both men and women. Their focus is
on evaluating different reforms of the US tax system and they abstract from wage
uncertainty. Both papers operate with very specific preference specifications. We
discuss the extent to which our results differ from these papers in the conclusions.
Among papers using microeconometrics, this chapter builds on a long literature
starting from MaCurdy (1983) and Altonji (1986), and on Blundell et al. (1993),
who condition on the extensive margin, and estimate jointly the within period deci-
sion and the intertemporal decision.
Our exercise is not without important caveats. In much of our analysis, we
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do not consider the effect of tenure and experience on wages. Such effects can
obviously be important, as labour supply choices may change future wages and,
therefore, future labour supply behaviour, as stressed by Imai and Keane (2004).
Keane and Wasi (2016) model human capital and find that labour supply elastici-
ties are highly heterogenous and vary substantially with age, education and the tax
structure. In Appendix E.5, we extend our analysis to introduce returns to expe-
rience on the extensive margin. Introducing returns only on the extensive margin
means within-period allocations at the intensive margin are unaffected. By contrast,
if the return to experience operates on the number of hours (rather than only on
participation), we would need to change our analysis substantially.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1, we outline
the life-cycle framework. We show how the preference parameters can be mapped
into static, intertemporal and life-cycle elasticities, and discuss the meaning of the
different elasticities. In Section 7.2 we explain the three steps of our empirical
strategy to identify the preference parameters and opportunity set. Section 7.3 de-
scribes the data. Section 7.4 presents the parameter estimates. Section 7.5 contains
the key results of the chapter: the implications of our estimates for labour supply
elasticities, distinguishing between Marshallian, Hicksian and Frisch elasticities,
and distinguishing static from life-cycle responses. We also report responses on the
extensive margin, aggregate responses and, more generally, the aggregation issues
that are central to this chapter. Section 7.6 concludes. The Appendix to this chapter
provides supporting evidence.
7.1 A life-cycle model of women’s labour supply
To study both the intensive and the extensive margins of women’s labour supply, we
use a rich model of labour supply and saving choices embedded in a unitary house-
hold, life-cycle framework. Both the intensive and extensive margins are meaning-
ful because of fixed costs of going to work related to family composition and be-
cause of preference costs specifically related to participation. The intensive choice
is over the typical number of hours work per week, the extensive margin is over
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whether to work at all in each quarter. Changes at different margins interact and
heterogeneity in these responses is important to understand aggregate labour supply
responses to changes in wages.
We consider married couples, who maximise the lifetime expected utility of
the household, h, and choose consumption and women’s labour supply within each
period.
max
c,l
Et
T
∑
j=0
β ju
(
ch,t+ j, lh,t+ j,Ph,t+ j;zh,t+ j,χh,t+ j,ζh,t+ j
)
(7.1)
where c is consumption, l is hours of leisure for women, and P is an indicator of the
woman’s labour force participation which can affect utility over and above the effect
of hours worked. zh,t is a vector of demographic variables (which include education,
age and family composition), χh,t and ζh,t represent taste shifters. We assume that
demographics, zh,t , are observable, whereas χh,t and ζh,t are unobservable to us, but
are known to the individual. Leisure for men does not enter the utility function.
The period utility function is given by:
u
(
ch,t , lh,t ,Ph,t
)
=
M1−γh,t
1− γ exp(ϕPh,t +pizh,t +ζh,t) (7.2)
The preference aggregator for hours of lesuire and consumption, Mh,t is:
Mh,t
(
ch,t , lh,t ;zh,t ,χh,t
)
=
(
(c1−φh,t −1)
1−φ +
(
αh,t(zh,t ,χh,t)
) (l1−θh,t −1)
1−θ
)
(7.3)
The function αh,t that determines the weight on leisure as a function of demograph-
ics is specified as:
αh,t = exp(ψ0+ψzzh,t +χh,t) (7.4)
The unknown parameters governing within period utility over consumption
and leisure are φ , θ , ψ0 and ψz, with additional parameters governing the full util-
ity specification γ , ϕ and pi . Our specification allows for non-separability between
consumption and leisure both at the intensive and extensive margin. The taste shifter
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χh,t affects within period utility over consumption and leisure, and the taste shifter
ζh,t affects intertemporal choices. These are specific to the cohort-education group,
known to the individual and may be correlated. Non-separability between con-
sumption and leisure depends on the value of γ and so cannot be identified from
within-period choices alone.
The general specification of utility allows substantial heterogeneity across in-
dividuals in intratemporal and intertemporal preferences, across the intensive and
extensive margins, and does not impose that the elasticities of intertemporal sub-
stitution for leisure and consumption are constant. Heterogeneity arises partly be-
cause elasticities will differ by observable characteristics, z, such as education and
the presence of children, and partly because elasticities differ at different levels of
consumption and hours of work. Our parametric specification gives a log linear
Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) and guarantees integrability. Further, our ap-
proach is more flexible than alternatives which have less scope for heterogeneity at
the intensive margin, and so heterogeneity has to come through the extensive margin
and the distribution of reservation wages.
Maximisation is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
Ah,t+1 = (1+ rt+1)
(
Ah,t +
(
w fh,t
(
L− lh,t
)−F (ah,t))Ph,t + ymh,t− ch,t) (7.5)
where Ah,t is the beginning of period asset holding, rt is the risk-free interest rate,
F the fixed cost of work, dependent on the age of the youngest child ah,t , and L is
maximum hours available. Wages for the woman are given by w fh,t , and earnings
for the man by ymh,t .
There are no explicit borrowing constraints but households cannot go bankrupt.
Therefore, in each period, households are able to borrow against the minimum in-
come they can guarantee for the rest of their lives. This minimum income is a posi-
tive amount because we bound men’s income away from zero. Households have no
insurance markets to smooth aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks.
We assume that the cost of work has a fixed component and a component that
depends on the child care cost needed for the youngest child, whose age is ah,t .
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Denoting with G(ah,t) child care services and p their price, we have:
F(ah,t) = pG(ah,t)+ F¯ (7.6)
Women differ in their age at childbirth, but this is assumed to be deterministic and
fully anticipated.3 The fixed cost of work is deterministic and known. The presence
of fixed costs and discrete utility costs of participating mean some women decide
not to work at all, especially at low levels of productivity. If a woman does not
work, she does so by choice, given the offered wage, demographics, taste shifters
and unearned income. By the same token, it is unlikely that if a woman does work,
that she will work only very few hours.
Women’s wages are given by the following process:
lnw fh,t = lnw
f
h,0+ lne
f
h,t + v
f
h,t (7.7)
where e fh,t is the level of human capital at the start of the period. We assume that
wage rates do not depend on the number of hours worked in that period, ruling
out part-time penalties. This assumption, for women, is consistent with what we
observe in our data and with other US-based studies (Hirsch (2005); Aaronson and
French (2004)).
In our baseline specification, human capital does not depend on the history of
labour supply and is assumed to evolve exogenously according to:
lne ft = ι
f
1 t+ ι
f
2 t
2 (7.8)
Equation (7.8) implies that decisions on current labour supply do not have a
direct effect on continuation values.4 Therefore, the only linkage across periods
is through the decision about total within-period spending. This assumption, com-
3In reality, there is of course some degree of uncertainty in the realisation of households fertility
decisions. We do not consider fertility as a stochastic outcome, as that would increase the numerical
complexity of the problem substantively.
4In Appendix E.5, we relax the assumption that there are no returns to experience. We distinguish
the cases where returns to experience depend on participation and where returns depend on hours
worked. The first two steps of our estimation approach go through in former case but not in the latter.
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bined with the intertemporally additive structure of preferences, implies that stan-
dard two-stage budgeting holds so that we can focus on the within-period problem
without considering explicitly the intertemporal allocation.
Men always work and their earnings are given by:
lnymh,t = lny
m
h,0+ ι
m
1 t+ ι
m
2 t
2+ vmh,t (7.9)
There are initial distributions of wages for women, w fh,0, and earnings for men
ymh,0. Both women’s wages and men’s earnings are subject to permanent shocks that
are positively correlated, as in MaCurdy (1983) and Abowd and Card (1989):
vh,t = vh,t−1+ξh,t (7.10)
ξh,t = (ξ
f
h,t ,ξ
m
h,t)∼ N
(
µξ ,σ2ξ
)
(7.11)
µξ = (−
σ2ξ f
2
,−
σ2ξm
2
) and σ2ξ =
 σ2ξ f ρξ f ,ξm
ρξ f ,ξm σ2ξm

One period in the model is one quarter. Households choose typical hours of
work each week (the intensive margin) and this is kept constant across weeks within
the quarter, to give within-period hours of work. The extensive margin is the deci-
sion whether or not to work that quarter. We do not allow individuals to choose how
many weeks to work in a quarter.5 We provide empirical support for this approach
in Section 7.3.2.
Within the dynamic problem just described, households make decisions taking
the stochastic processes as given. When considering aggregation, we need to take
a stand on the degree of correlations in the shocks different households receive.
We assume that households are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks,
by allowing the shocks that affect individual households at a point in time to be
correlated. However, from an individual perspective, households do not distinguish
5This restriction is driven by data limitations. In our data, we observe typical hours per week,
whether an individual is working at that point in time, and the number of weeks per year but we do
not observe the number of weeks per quarter that an individual works. We also cannot distinguish
the number of days per week, from the number of hours per day, as in Castex and Dechter (2016).
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aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and condition their future expectations only on
their own observed wage realisations. Our framework is not a general equilibrium
one: we do not construct the equilibrium level of wages (and interest rates). Rather,
we study women’s aggregate labour supply and its elasticity to wages by simulating
a large number of households and aggregating explicitly their behaviour.
7.1.1 Marginal Rate of Substitution, Marshallian and Hicksian
Elasticities
We use a two-stage budgeting approach and consider the allocation of resources
between consumption and hours of leisure within each period. We define within-
period resources that are not earned by women as:
yh,t =
(
Ah,t + ymh,t−F
(
ah,t
)
Ph,t
)
− Ah,t+1
1+ rt+1
(7.12)
As in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), yh,t accounts for resources saved into the next
period. When taken to the data, this measure of unearned resources implicitly also
includes (with a negative sign) durable and other spending not included in consump-
tion ct , giving the within period budget constraint:
ch,t +wh,t lh,t = yh,t +w
f
h,tL (7.13)
For an interior solution with a strictly positive number of hours of work,
the first order condition for within-period optimality implies that the ratio of the
marginal utility of leisure to that of consumption, that is the Marginal Rate of Sub-
stitution, equals the after tax real wage:
wh,t =
ulh,t
uch,t
= αh,t
l−θh,t
c−φh,t
(7.14)
These equations can be used to compute Marshallian and Hicksian labour sup-
ply elasticities. The Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities are fundamentally static
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concepts, as both hold constant the intertemporal allocation of resources.6 The Mar-
shallian response captures the change in behaviour due to a change in the price of
leisure and the related change in resources available to spend. This latter income
effect arises even if the intertemporal allocation of resources yh,t is held constant,
because total resources within the period change with the wage.
In the full dynamic model, when the realised wage is permanently higher than
expected, lifetime resources increase, and these extra resources are allocated across
periods. The static Marshallian elasticity is a good approximation to the full re-
sponse if extra resources are spent on non-durable consumption in the period they
are earned. To the extent that resources are reallocated, the static Marshallian elas-
ticity only captures part of the labour supply response. If within period spending
is homothetic, and wages have gone up by the same amount in every period, then
there may be little change in saving patterns following the wage increase. In this
case, the Marshallian elasticity gives a good approximation of the complete life-
cycle response. On the other hand, if all extra income from the wage increase is
saved to spend in retirement, then there would be no within period income effect
and the response will be closer to a Hicksian compensated response. More gen-
erally, how well the static Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities approximate the
complete life-cycle responses to compensated and uncompensated wage changes is
an open question. In Section 7.5, we use the full structural model to evaluate how
closely the static elasticities approximate the full life-cycle ones.
We differentiate the within period budget constraint (7.13) and the MRS equa-
tion (7.14) with respect to wages to get an expression for Marshallian elasticities
for hours of work and consumption (see Appendix E for details on the derivations):
6Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Keane (2011) discuss how the static concepts of Marshallian
and Hicksian elasticities can be put within the framework of a dynamic life-cycle model through
two-stage budgeting, as developed by Gorman (1959) and applied to labour supply by MaCurdy
(1981), MaCurdy (1983) and Blundell and Walker (1986).
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εMh =
∂ lnh
∂ lnw
=−
(
φw(L− l)− c
θc+φwl
)
l
L− l (7.15)
εMc =
∂ lnc
∂ lnw
=
θw(L− l)+wl
θc+φwl
If preferences were Cobb-Douglas, θ and φ would both equal 1; and the Marshal-
lian wage elasticities for consumption and for hours of work would be equal to 1
and 0, respectively, if there were no unearned income or savings. For balanced
growth (in women’s labour supply) we would require φ = 1. If preferences were a
standard CES, θ = φ . If this value were greater than 1, εMc < 1, and εMh < 0. In Sec-
tion 7.5, we show how much heterogeneity is introduced through our more general
specification in equations (7.15) and through allowing for unearned income.
The static Hicksian response nets off the increase in within-period resources
due to the wage increase, again holding constant the intertermporal allocation, yh,t .
We calculate the Hicksian response from the Marshallian elasticities by using the
Slustky equation and income elasticities, as would be done in a static labour supply
model:
εHh =
(
εMl −
∂ ln l
∂ ln(c+wl)
w(L− l)
(c+wl)
) −l
L− l =
−wl2
(θc+φwl)(L− l) (7.16)
εHc = ε
M
c +
∂ lnc
∂ ln(c+wl)
wl
(c+wl)
=
−c
θc+φwl
The Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities are the relevant concepts to think
about the labour supply responses to permanent changes in wages or taxes. How-
ever, as we discuss in Section 7.5, estimates based on the within period problem
might miss potential intertemporal reallocations that might occur in response to
wage changes.
Two additional points are worth noting. First, despite their simplicity, the Mar-
shallian and Hicksian elasticities are non-linear in c and l: they have the potential
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of varying greatly across consumers and not aggregating in a straightforward way.
Second, for the specification we use, the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities de-
pend only on φ and θ (and on the values of earnings, leisure and consumption). In
particular, they do not depend on intertemporal parameters or on whether the utility
function is separable in consumption and leisure, which depends on γ .
7.1.2 Frisch Elasticities
A change in the structure of wages (possibly induced by changes in taxes) may
induce a reallocation of resources over time through changes to the time path of
hours of work or of the marginal utility of wealth, or both. The Frisch elasticity
captures the change over time in hours worked in response to the anticipated evo-
lution of wages, with the marginal utility of wealth unchanged, as the wage change
conveys no new information.7 The Frisch elasticity is therefore the right concept to
think about the implications of changes in wages over the business cycle or about
temporary changes to taxation.
The expression for the Frisch elasticity for hours of work, derived in Appendix
E, is given by:8
εFh =−
ucucc
uccull−u2cl
w
h
(7.17)
As is well known, Frisch intertemporal elasticities must be at least as large as Hicks
elasticities. Thus, the static elasticities discussed above provide a bound on the
intertemporal elasticity, which is particularly useful if data are limited or direct
estimation of Frisch elasticities difficult.9
In addition to changes in hours, anticipated changes in wages might also
change participation. While, an elasticity is easily defined when thinking of the
intensive margin, the same concept is somewhat vaguer at the extensive margin,
7When wages change stochastically, the response of hours worked is affected by the change in the
marginal utility of wealth due to a particular wage realisation, whose size depends on how permanent
the wage shock is. If the wage shock is temporary, lifetime wealth and the marginal utility of wealth
will be approximately unchanged.
8Analogous expressions for the consumption Frisch wage elasticities, as well as the interest rate
elasticities can be found in Appendix E.
9In the context of quasi-linear utility as used by Chetty (2012), the Frisch elasticity equals the
Hicks elasticity (and the Marshallian) because there are no wealth effects on hours of work.
7.2. Empirical strategy 216
especially in the case of the Frisch elasticity, which keeps the marginal utility of
wealth constant. We define the extensive-margin Frisch elasticity as the impact of a
change in wages on the fraction of individuals that participate, given the distribution
of state variables. The extensive margin brings to the forefront aggregation issues:
aggregate participation responses to an aggregate shock are bound to depend on the
distribution of state variables in the cross-section.
7.2 Empirical strategy
In this section, we discuss our empirical approach, identification assumptions, and
the variability we use in the data. We proceed in three steps, with each successive
step identifying a set of structural parameters. In the first step, we consider only
the static first-order (MRS) condition that determines within-period optimal allo-
cations, conditional on participation. This first set of parameters can be identified
while being agnostic about intertemporal conditions and on life-cycle prospects. In
the second step, we identify the parameters that govern the intertemporal allocation
of resources using the Euler equation for consumption, making use of additional
assumptions. However, we can still identify these parameters without specifying
the entire life-cycle environment faced by households. For instance, we can be
silent about pension arrangements or the specifics of the wage and earning pro-
cesses. When estimating the parameters that determine the MRS or those that enter
the Euler equation we use an estimator proposed by Fuller (1977). This choice
of estimator turns out to matter for the results we obtain and has advantages over
standard methods, as we discuss in Appendix E.1. Finally, in the third step, we
characterise behaviour at the extensive margin. This step requires solving the entire
model and, therefore, specifying completely the environment in which households
operate. We identify the final set of parameters by calibration, matching a set of
life-cycle statistics.
7.2.1 Intratemporal margins
In the first step, we estimate the parameters of the within-period utility function:
θ ,φ and α . Taking logs of the MRS equation (7.14), and noticing from equation
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(7.4) that logαh,t = ψ0+ψzzh,t +χh,t , we obtain:
lnwh,t = φ lnch,t−θ ln lh,t +ψzzh,t +ψ0+χh,t (7.18)
where the vector zh,t includes observable demographic variables.
The econometric estimation of this MRS equation poses two problems. First,
the subset of households in which the woman works and the MRS condition holds
as an equality is not random. For this selected group, the unobserved heterogeneity
term χh,t would not average out to zero and might be correlated with the variables
that enter equation (7.18). Second, even in the absence of participation issues, in-
dividual wages (and consumption and leisure) are likely to correlate with χh,t , so
that the OLS estimation of equation (7.18) would result in biased estimates of the
structural parameters φ and θ . We discuss these two issues in turn.
For participation, we specify a reduced form equation for the extensive mar-
gin. Given this participation equation, we use a Heckman-type selection correction
approach to estimate the MRS equation (7.18) only on the households in which the
woman works. In particular, we augment the MRS equation with a polynomial in
the estimated residuals of the participation equation.10 Identification requires that
some variables that enter the participation equation do not enter the MRS specifi-
cation: these variables are men’s earnings and employment status, and we assume
these are uncorrelated with χh,t .
The fully-specified participation decision depends on a large set of state vari-
ables, some of which are not observable. In our ‘reduced form’, participation de-
pends only on a subset of these variables. Therefore, our reduced form participation
equation is not fully consistent with the complete model we use to characterise
participation and, at best, could be considered an approximation of the ‘true’ par-
ticipation equation. In Appendix E.6, we investigate how well this approximation
10One issue to worry about is the intrinsic non-linearity of the participation equation. The omis-
sion of some state variables could change the properties of the residuals of such a non-linear equa-
tion and, therefore, the shape of the appropriate control function to enter the MRS equation. For
this reason, we use a polynomial to model the dependence between the residuals of the participation
equation and those of the MRS equation. We assume that χh,t = β0 + β1eh,t + β2e2h,t + β3e
3
h,t and
then compute E[esh,t |eh,t > −ΠZh,t ],s = 1,2,3 where eh,t is the normally distributed residual from
the participation equation and Zh,t are the determinants of participation.
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to the full model performs: we estimate MRS parameters using our reduced form
empirical strategy on simulated data from the full model. We are able to recover the
true parameter estimates and our conclusion is that our reduced form provides an
accurate approximation in this context.
The second issue in the estimation of equation (7.18) is that consumption and
hours, as well as our measures of individual wages, obtained dividing earnings by
hours, might be correlated with the residual term χh,t , either because of the possible
correlation between tastes for leisure and heterogeneity in productivity or because
of measurement error in hours or earnings. To avoid these problems, following the
literature on labour supply (such as Blundell et al. (1998)), we do not use variation
in individual wages to identify the parameters of our equation. Instead, we exploit
variation induced by changes in taxation and/or aggregate demand for labour and
use changes in cohort-education groups’ average wages over time.11 The Monte
Carlo evidence on our MRS estimation in Appendix E.6 shows that both this endo-
geneity issue and the selection issue have to be taken into account in our context to
obtain sensible estimates.
We use as instruments the interaction of ten-year birth cohort and education
dummies with a quintic time trend. Our use of a quintic time trend rather than
fully interacted time dummies helps smooth intertemporal movements in wages,
consumption and hours for each of our cohort-education groups.12
In our estimating equation, we allow many variables to shift the taste for leisure
through an effect on the term αh,t in the CES utility function. The z vector includes:
11Various papers have used variation across education groups; for example MaCurdy (1983) and
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) both use age-education interactions as instruments for wages and hours
in their MRS/labour supply conditions. Similarly, Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) use education inter-
acted with a quadratic time trend. One concern with this approach is that individuals with different
levels of education might have different preferences for leisure and consumption. Moreover, the
composition of education groups has changed substantially over time, particularly for women. In
1980, 19.4% of married women had not attained a high school diploma, and only 18.4% had ob-
tained a college degree in our data. By 2012, these proportions had changed to 9.7% and 36.5%
respectively. These compositional changes may lead to changes in the mix of ability and preferences
of workers within each education group over time - making education an invalid instrument.
12Using fully interacted cohort-education and year dummies would be equivalent to taking av-
erages within cells defined by year, education and cohort groups, to use group level rather than
individual level variability. Given our sample size, this would result in averages over relatively
small cells and, therefore, in very noisy estimates. Using very finely defined and small groups can
introduce the very biases grouping is meant to avoid.
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log family size, woman’s race, a quartic in woman age, an indicator for the pres-
ence of any child, the numbers of children aged 0-2, 3-15, and 16-17, the number
of individuals in the household 65 or older, region and season dummies, and, most
importantly, cohort-education dummies. A corollary of putting variables such as
cohort and education dummies in the vector z is that we do not exploit the varia-
tion in wages (and leisure and consumption) over these dimensions to identify the
structural parameters φ and θ . In our estimation, we also control for year dummies,
therefore removing year to year fluctuations from the variability we use to identify
the parameters of interest. The inclusion of year dummies, as in Blundell et al.
(1998), is needed because aggregate fluctuations change the selection rule year to
year in ways that are not fully captured by the selection model we use.13
7.2.2 Euler equation estimation
The second step of our approach estimates the preference parameters that govern
the intertemporal substitutability and non-separability between consumption and
leisure, γ , and the non-separability with participation, ϕ . While in principle we
could use either the Euler equation for hours or that for consumption, only one is
relevant when coupled with the intratemporal condition (7.14). If we were to use
the Euler equation for labour supply, we would need to consider corner solutions at
different points in time (and the dynamic selection problems these involve). Instead,
we focus on the Euler equation for consumption, as in Blundell et al. (1993). In the
absence of binding borrowing constraints, the following intertemporal condition
holds:
E
[
β (1+ rt+1)
uch,t+1 (·)
uch,t (·)
∣∣∣∣∣ Ih,t
]
= 1 (7.19)
The term Ih,t denotes the information available to the household at time t.
A natural approach to the estimation of equation (7.19) is non-linear GMM.
However, as discussed in Attanasio and Low (2004), the small sample properties
of non-linear GMM estimators can be poor in contexts similar to ours. Moreover,
given the specification of the utility function and nature of the data, we can only
13We have also run specifications where we do not control for time dummies in the MRS and
checked that our results are not affected much by the introduction of the time dummies.
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estimate its log-linearised version.
The evolution of the marginal utility of consumption can then be written as:
β (1+ rt+1)uch,t+1 (·) = uch,t (·)εh,t+1 (7.20)
where εh,t+1, whose conditional expectation is 1, is the innovation to the expected
discounted marginal utility of consumption. Equation (7.20) uses the variability in
rt to identify the parameters of uc(.). Taking the log of equation (7.20), given utility
is given by equation (7.2):
ηh,t+1 = κh,t+lnβ+ln(1+rt+1)−φ∆ lnch,t+1−γ∆ ln(Mh,t+1)+ϕ∆Ph,t+1+pi∆zh,t+1
(7.21)
where ηh,t+1 ≡ lnεh,t+1−E
[
lnεh,t+1
∣∣Ih,t ]+∆ζh,t+1 and κh,t ≡ E [lnεh,t+1 ∣∣Ih,t ].
The identification and estimation of the parameters of this equation depends,
obviously, on the nature of the ‘residual’ term ηh,t+1, which contains expectations
errors (εh,t+1), higher order moments and taste shifters unobservable to the econo-
metrician (ζh,t+1). Aggregate shocks mean expectation errors may be correlated
in the cross-section, and average to zero only in the time dimension. Consistency
then requires time series variation, as discussed in Attanasio and Low (2004). We
construct a long time dimension using a synthetic cohort approach (see Browning
et al. (1985)), defining groups using married couples in ten year birth-cohorts. We
assume that the lagged variables used as instruments are uncorrelated with the inno-
vations to the taste shifters ∆ζh,t+1. This is trivially true if taste shifters are constant
over time or if they are random walks. We maintain one of these two assumptions,
a hypothesis that we test in part by checking over-identifying restrictions.
We aggregate equation (7.21) to be estimated across group g households. For
this approach to work, it is necessary that the equation to be estimated is linear
in parameters, which would be the case if Mh,t were observable. However, Mh,t
is a non-linear function of data and unobserved parameters, so that, in principle it
cannot be aggregated within groups to obtain Mg,t . On the other hand, the param-
eters that determine Mh,t can be consistently estimated using the MRS conditions
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as discussed in Section 7.2.1.14 These estimates can be used to construct consistent
estimates of Mh,t , which can be aggregated across households to give Mg,t . This
gives an equation analogous to equation 7.21, but where variables are group aver-
ages and where all variables on the right hand side are now observable. We use this
procedure to recover the intertemporal preference parameter γ and the participation
preference parameter ϕ . We cannot identify any additional effect of participation
that is separable in the utility function. Nor, at this stage, do we know the fixed costs
of work and so we cannot identify the extensive margin response to wage changes.
Using group averages on repeated cross-sections introduces a number of other
econometric problems, linked to the presence of estimation errors in small samples.
These issues, as discussed in Deaton (1985), have implications for the choice of
instruments and computation of standard errors. Further details of this procedure
are discussed in Appendix E.1.
In principle, the first two steps of our estimation could be followed without
making parametric assumptions about the utility function and, instead, estimating
leisure and consumption demands directly. However, such an approach would re-
quire that the demand functions satisfy integrability conditions. Furthermore, the
actual underlying utility function would still need to be recovered to study partici-
pation and the extensive margins.
7.2.3 Extensive margins
The last step of our approach obtains estimates of the remaining model parameters,
including the fixed costs of work and childcare costs, which drive the extensive
margin decision. When considering the extensive margin, it is necessary to solve
explicitly the whole dynamic problem. This involves making assumptions on the
entire economic environment faced by households over the life-cycle, including
both present and future conditions. We solve the model numerically and use the
solution to estimate and calibrate the model parameters. To reduce the numerical
burden, when simulating the model, we assume a fixed interest rate. As the MRS
14Mh,t includes χh,t which is unobserved. However, since it is the residual from the MRS equation,
it can be included in the calculation of αh,t that is needed to calculate Mh,t .
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conditions do not change, this assumption will not change within period elasticities,
but the life-cycle solution of the model and life-cycle elasticities will be affected to
the extent that uncertainty about interest rates affects saving. We provide the value
functions of the household’s problem and details about the numerical solution in
Appendix E.1.
We take as given the estimates of the parameters we obtained from the MRS
and the Euler Equation, and obtain some parameters from the literature and from di-
rect regressions. We estimate the remaining parameters so that data generated from
simulations match key life-cycle aspects of the extensive margin: the participa-
tion rate, the participation rate of mothers and average wage growth of participants
(which is endogenous because of selection). Finally, we simulate the model for a
large number of individuals to study the properties of individual and ‘aggregate’
labour supply.
We then assess the model’s goodness of fit by exploring the life-cycle profiles
of several variables as well as participation rates conditioning on individual charac-
teristics and the distribution of hours worked and wages.
7.3 Data and descriptive statistics
We take our data from the Consume Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the years 1980-
2012. In the CEX, households are interviewed up to four times, answering detailed
recall questions on expenditures as well as on the demographics, incomes and labour
supply of household members.
We calculate gross hourly wages for individuals using information on the value
of each individual’s last pay cheque, the number of weeks it covered and the typ-
ical number of hours worked per week. Net wages are then calculated by sub-
tracting marginal federal income tax rates generated using the NBER TAXSIM
model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993).15 We deflate all expenditures, wages and in-
comes using the Consumer Price Index. Weekly leisure is calculated by subtracting
weekly hours worked from the maximum number an individual has to divide be-
15We are grateful to Lorenz Kueng for making his mapping of the CEX to TAXSIM publically
available.
7.3. Data and descriptive statistics 223
tween leisure and labour supply per week (which we set to 100). Participation is
defined by employment status at the time of the interview. Consumption covers
non-durable goods excluding medical and education spending. We divide quarterly
consumption spending by 13 to put it in weekly terms.
Our sample consists of couples with women aged between 25 and 60 and men
aged between 25 and 65. We drop those in rural areas; those in the top 1% of the
consumption and net wages distribution; those earning less than three-quarters of
the national minimum wage in any given year; and those who are employed but
who report working less than 5 hours a week. Since labour supply and income
questions are (almost always) only asked in the first and last interviews, we drop
responses from interviews apart from these two. Our sampling choices leaves just
under 79,000 households (50,895 where the woman is working). Appendix E.2
presents descriptive statistics on individual characteristics over time.
7.3.1 Cohort averages
We separate households into birth cohorts and examine the evolution of wages and
hours by education within each cohort group. In Figure 7.1, we report patterns for
the cohorts born in the 40’s, 50’s and 60s and for females with high school or less
and with more than high school.16
Within the 1950s cohort, the net wages of those with more than high school
education increased from an average of $16.90 per hour in 1980 to $21.40 in 2012
(an increase of 27%), while the wages of those with less than high school education
only increased by 19% from $13.40 to $16.00. Despite this, the bottom row of
Figure 7.1 shows average weekly hours of less educated worked actually increased
by more than those from the more educated group (increasing from 36.8 hours per
week to 38.2 compared to an increase from 37.4 to 38.5 for those with more than
high school education).
16The advantage of considering the variability over time of a given cohort, is that composition is
unlikely to change, as it is rare for workers to increase their educational qualifications after age 25.
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Figure 7.1: Wages and hours by education group and cohort
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7.3.2 Individual Variation in hours and wages
In addition to changes in average hours and wages over our sample period, there are
two important issues at the individual level: what is the relative importance of the
intensive and extensive margins in the raw data and what fraction of individuals are
experiencing changes in hours or wages over time.
The individual extensive margin decision is whether to incur a fixed cost
F(ah,t) and participate in the current quarter. We measure this by the stated cur-
rent employment status. The intensive margin decision is over how many hours
to work per week (when working). An additional labour supply response may be
through changing weeks worked per quarter. However, we are not able to estimate
this margin of adjustment because the CEX asks current workers about the number
of weeks they worked over the previous year rather than the previous quarter.
Whether ignoring the margin of the number of weeks worked within a quarter
matters, depends on how much of the variance of workers’ quarterly hours is driven
by differences in weeks worked within a quarter rather than hours per week. Table
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7.1 decomposes the variance of log annual hours into variation in log annual weeks,
variation in log workers’ typical weekly hours, and their covariance. The first panel
shows this breakdown for the entire sample of workers. The variance in annual
weeks worked is around two thirds of the total variance in hours worked. Much
of this is likely to be workers not participating for entire quarters: our extensive
margin. In the second panel, we restrict the sample to workers who work for more
than 39 weeks (and thus could not have been unemployed for a complete quarter).
These workers account for 84% of the total and for them, almost all of the variance
in annual hours is a result of differences in hours worked per week, with differences
in weeks worked making a negligible contribution. In the third panel, we restrict
our sample further to those working exactly 52 weeks per year and notice that even
among workers who do not differ in the number of weeks worked, the variance in
log hours per week remains substantial (at 0.08).
These results suggest that hours worked per week is the key margin by which
workers adjust their quarterly hours. We thus use this measure when estimating
our MRS and Euler equations. In Appendix E.4, we check the robustness of this
strategy by showing that our estimates and results are little affected by replacing
our current measure with a measure of annual hours worked.
A further question is whether individual workers are able to adjust their weekly
hours in response to wage changes, or whether there are market frictions that prevent
this. Table 7.2 shows the proportion of workers who changed their typical hours
from the first to the last CEX interview (a period of nine months). While it is true
that most women do not change their hours within this period, a substantial fraction
(46%) do. Around a quarter of workers change their weekly hours by 1-5 hours,
and 2% change their hours by more than 20 hours.
7.4 Results: Parameter Estimates and Calibration
In this section, we report estimates of the structural parameters of our model. In
subsections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 we report the estimation results obtained using the MRS
conditions and the Euler equation. In subsection 7.4.3, we report the calibration of
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Table 7.1: Variances of labour supply measures, 2012
Less than High Some Degree or All
high school school college higher
All workers
Variance (ln hours per week) 0.148 0.117 0.128 0.126 0.126
Variance (ln weeks per year) 0.550 0.271 0.231 0.482 0.367
Covariance (ln hours, ln weeks) 0.031 0.046 0.010 0.028 0.027
Variance (ln annual hours) 0.761 0.479 0.380 0.665 0.546
Working at least 39 weeks
(84% of workers)
Variance (ln hours per week) 0.061 0.040 0.086 0.110 0.086
Variance (ln weeks per year) 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004
Covariance (ln hours, ln weeks) -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
Variance (ln annual hours) 0.059 0.045 0.094 0.115 0.092
Working 52 weeks
(69% of workers)
Variance (ln hours per week) 0.064 0.031 0.068 0.117 0.080
Table 7.2: Changes in weekly hours among the employed
Change in Weekly Hours No change 1-5 hrs 6-10 hrs 11-20 hrs >20 hrs
All Workers 53.8% 25.2% 11.9% 6.9% 2.2%
Extent of Change in wages:
< 5% wage change 74.9% 17.5% 4.7% 2.3% 0.71%
> 5% wage change 47.5% 27.5% 14.0% 8.2% 2.7 %
Notes: Changes in hours are measured between the 2nd and 5th interviews for individuals who are
employed at each interview.
the remaining parameters that govern choices at the extensive margin. In the last
subsection, we show how well the complete model fits a number of features of the
data that were not used explicitly to obtain the parameter estimates.
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7.4.1 MRS estimates
In Table 7.3, we report the estimates of key parameters for the MRS equation and
tests on the quality of our instruments, with results for the participation model re-
ported in Appendix E.3. We estimate values for θ and φ at 1.75 and 0.76 respec-
tively: there is much more curvature in utility on leisure than on consumption. We
test the restrictions implied by Cobb-Douglas and standard CES specifications using
a wild-cluster residual bootstrap. The Cobb-Douglas specification for preferences,
φ = θ = 1, is rejected at the 5% level (p-value 0.01), while the standard CES spec-
ification, φ = θ , is rejected with a p-value of 0.06.
Table 7.3 also reports the coefficients, ψ , on demographic variables in zh,t . A
larger (positive) value for ψ means, other things equal, a higher marginal utility of
leisure and so women will supply fewer hours of work in the market. The positive
and significant coefficient on the dummy for having children indicates that the pres-
ence of children tends to reduce hours worked, but the effect of children depends on
their age. The coefficient on the number of children aged 0-2 is positive and highly
significant, on children aged 3-15 the coefficient is positive, but smaller; for older
children, the coefficient is negative.
We include three Heckman selection terms corresponding to the first, second
and third moments of the truncated normal distribution (as described in footnote 10).
We test the joint significance of these in both our first and second stage regressions.
These terms are highly significant in each of the first stages, where we are predicting
individual consumption, hours and wages. On the other hand, the selection terms
are insignificant in the second stage of the MRS. The Cragg-Donald statistic for
weak instruments in our MRS equation takes a value of 2.00 for 138 instruments,
well above the relevant Stock and Yogo (2005) critical level of 1.69, and therefore
suggesting that weak instruments are not a problem.17 The Sargan test does not
reject the null of no violation of the overidentifying restrictions.
17The value of 1.69 is given for two endogenous variables and 100 instruments, and given that the
critical values for a maximum 5% relative bias for the Fuller estimator are decreasing in the number
of instruments, the use of this test statistic is conservative.
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Table 7.3: Estimation of MRS equation
Parameter Estimate (Standard Error) [95% C.I]
θ 1.75** (1.230) [0.34,5.12]
φ 0.76*** (0.103) [0.55,0.95]
Ψ
ln( f amsize) -0.32*** (0.037) [-0.38,-0.23]
Has kids 0.07*** (0.021) [0.04, 0.10]
No. of kids 0-2 0.15*** (0.030) [0.10, 0.22]
No. of kids 3-15 0.06*** (0.017) [0.04, 0.10]
No. of kids 16-17 -0.02** (0.011) [-0.05,0.00]
Joint tests of selection terms (p-value)
First stage: ln wage 166.47 (< 0.001)
First stage: ln consumption 311.75 (< 0.001)
First stage: ln leisure 40.83 (< 0.001)
Main equation 0.72 (0.87)
Cragg-Donald statistic 2.00
Sargan statistic (p-value) 127.8 (0.66)
Notes: N = 50,895. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional controls: number of elderly
(aged over 65) in the household, a quadratic in age, race, region, season, cohort-education in-
teractions and year dummies. Consumption and leisure are instrumented with the interaction of
cohort and education groups and a fifth-order polynomial time trend. Confidence intervals are
bootstrapped with 1000 replications allowing for clustering at the individual level.
7.4.2 Euler equation estimates
Table 7.4 reports estimates of the Euler equation (7.21) using group averages. We
estimate γ to be 2.07, significantly different from zero at the 10% level, providing
evidence that preferences are non-separable and that consumption and leisure are
substitutes (γ = 0 would imply additively separable preferences over consumption
and leisure). Since φ , θ and γ are all positive, the concavity requirements of the
utility function are satisfied. The coefficients on the control variables included in
the vector zt are not significant, implying demographics have no role over and above
their impact on the relative weight on leisure within-period. The specification in
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Table 7.4 imposes that ϕ , the parameter on participation in equation (7.2), is zero.
When we include this term (instrumented with its own lags), the coefficient estimate
is negative but not significantly different from zero.
Table 7.4: Estimation of Euler equation
Parameter Estimate (Standard Error) [95% C.I]
hline γ 2.07* (0.656) [-0.11,2.60]
κ¯+ ln(β ) 0.03 (0.040) [-0.08, 0.10]
pi
ln( f amsize) -0.47 (0.244) [-0.69, 0.31]
Has kids 0.05 (0.069) [-0.09, 0.19]
No. of kids aged 0-2 0.22 (0.099) [-0.05, 0.35]
No. of kids aged 3-15 0.03 (0.038) [-0.06, 0.09]
No. of kids aged 16-17 0.03 (0.071) [-0.11, 0.18]
First Stage F-stats (p-values)
−φ(∆ lncg,t + ln(1+ rt+1) 7.95 (<0.001)
∆ lnMg,t 2.08 (0.08)
Sargan statistic (p-value) 5.70 (0.13)
Notes: N = 1,519. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional controls: season dummies, a quartic in
age, the change in the proportion of households in each of four education groups, the change in proportion
who are white, and the change in the average number of elderly individuals per household. Instruments
are second, third and fourth lags of lnMg,t , as well as the lagged real interest rate. Confidence intervals are
bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
Our instruments are second, third and fourth lags of lnMg,t and the lagged real
interest rate (defined as the 3 month Treasury Bill rate minus the inflation rate),
and we have two endogenous variables φ(∆ lncg,t + ln(1+ rt+1)) and ∆ lnMg,t . We
place the second of these on the left-hand side of the equation. With only one
left-hand side endogenous variable, the Cragg-Donald test for weak instruments
is equivalent to a standard F-test of the instruments’ joint significance in the first
stage regression. The critical values of these F-tests suggest that the instruments are
highly correlated with the dependent variable (with an F-statistic of 7.95), but less
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strongly correlated with our choice of left-hand side variable (with an F-statistic of
2.08). The relevant Stock and Yogo test statistic for having less than a 5% relative
bias in our parameter estimates when there are four instruments and one left-hand
side endogenous variable is 7.63. When we carry out a Sargan test for the Euler
equation, we fail to reject the null of over-identification (p-value 0.13) as we do for
the MRS.
7.4.3 Calibration of the remaining parameters
There are three sets of parameters used in the calibration of the full model: those es-
timated via the MRS conditions and the Euler equation, those coming from external
sources and those that we calibrate using simulations of the full model.
We focus on the cohort of women born in the 1950s, using moments from
women age 25-55. We assume that χ and ζ are homogeneous within a cohort.
Attanasio et al. (2008) show that women’s labour supply behaviour differs sub-
stantially across cohorts. The main cause in that paper is differences in costs of
childcare, but there are also differences in wage processes across cohorts. These
differences will lead to different responses across cohorts on the extensive margin
and could also lead to differences in the intensive margin because of different levels
of consumption and leisure.
Within the 1950s cohort, we assume there are nine different groups of women:
one group of women who remain childless for the whole of their lifetime, and eight
groups of women who differ by maternity experience. These women exogenously
receive two kids but differ in the age at which the first child arrives. To determine
when these children are born, we draw on Rendall et al. (2010) who use population
and survey data sources to calculate the distribution of maternity age at arrival of
the first child for different cohorts of women in various countries.18 We assume that
the second child arrives 2 years after the first.
External Parameters. The complete set of external parameters is reported in Table
19 in Appendix E.3. We fix the annualized interest rate to equal the average real
18Consistent with the distribution for the 1950s cohort, we assume 16% of women are childless,
27% have their first child at the age of 19, 12% at the age of 22, 11% at the age of 24, 5% at the ages
of 26, 28, 30 and 32 and, finally, 14% at the age of 34.
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Table 7.5: Calibrated parameters and targets
Parameters Value
Constant term weight of leisure ψ0 4.20
Childcare Cost p 967
Fixed Cost of Working F¯ 468
Offered Wage Gender Gap at age 22 y f0/y
m
0 0.72
Std Dev. of Permanent Shock (Women) σξ f 0.063
Std Dev. of Initial Wage (Women) σξ f0
0.50
Exogenous growth in offered wage ι f1 0.052
Exogenous growth in offered wage ι f2 -
0.0006
Discount Factor (annualized) β 0.99
Targets Data Model
Weekly hours worked 37.2 37.2
Participation Rate 0.684 0.679
Participation Rate of Mothers 0-2 0.538 0.546
Observed Wage Gender Gap 0.720 0.727
Observed Var. Wage Growth (Women) 0.004 0.004
Observed Initial Var. of Wages (Women) 0.14 0.15
Wage Growth (if younger than 40) 0.012 0.010
Wage Growth (if older than 40) 0.001 0.004
Median wealth to income ratio 1.84 1.80
Notes: Statistics for women born in the 1950s and aged 25 to 55. Wage
growth is annual.
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return on three monthly T-bill at 0.015. The deterministic component of the male
earnings process is estimated from the CEX: we take the two parameters of a regres-
sion of husband log earnings on age and age squared. The standard deviation of the
innovation for husband’s earnings, σξm , is set to be 0.077, consistent with Huggett
et al. (2011). Further, we estimate an initial standard deviation of husband earn-
ings σξm0 of 0.54. There is limited evidence on the variability of women’s wages
and/or earnings, and further since this statistic is highly affected by non-random
self-selection into the labour market, we calibrate the parameters that characterise
the women’s wage process within the model as explained below. Finally, we assume
that the correlation coefficient between the two shocks (for husband and wife) ρ is
equal to 0.25 as estimated by Hyslop (2001).
As in Attanasio et al. (2008), there are two components to child care costs: the
function G(ah,t) and the price p. We estimate the function G(ah,t) directly from
data. For households where the mother is working, we regress total childcare ex-
penditure on the age of the youngest child, the age of the oldest child, the number of
children and a dummy equal to one if the youngest child is 0. The shape G(ah,t) can
be derived from the coefficients of this regression function, using the assumption
that in our model all women have two children at an interval of two years.19
Finally, we assume individuals in this cohort live for 50 years from age 22,
with the last 10 in retirement, and that the household receives a pension equal to
70% of the husband’s earnings in the final working period.
Calibrated parameters. There are nine parameters that we calibrate within
our decision model: the fixed cost of working, F¯ ; the price of child care, p; the
wage gender gap in offered wages, expressed as y f0/y
m
0 ; the standard deviation of
the permanent shock to women, σξ f ; the standard deviation of the initial wage for
women, σξ f0
; two parameters that determine exogenous wage growth, ι f1 and ι
f
2 ;
and the base weighting on leisure in the CES utility function, ψ0, which, together
19Our estimate of G
(
ah,t
)
combines the cost of the first born child along with any subsequent
costs associated with additional children who are born later. In this way, any economies of scale in
child costs will be captured by G
(
ah,t
)
, but we do not identify separately the marginal cost of extra
children.
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with demographics z and the estimates of ψz, determine the total weight on leisure
in the utility function. Finally, we calibrate the discount rate β .
The calibration targets are the participation rate of all women, the participation
rate of mothers, average hours worked, the observed wage gender gap, the observed
variance of wage growth, the observed initial variance in wages and the observed
wage growth at two different stages of the life-cycle. Finally, we target the median
wealth to median household income ratio as in Low (2005).
In Table 7.5, we report the calibrated parameters, and the targeted moments
in the data and in the simulations. The monetary fixed cost of working is about
6% of median earnings of women aged 25 to 55. The additional monetary fixed
childcare cost is up to 13% of median earnings for a child age 0-2. The wage
ratio between women and men at age 22 is calibrated to be 0.72. This is needed to
match the average observed ratio over the lifetime of 0.72. In addition to the initial
wage gender gap, there is a further, exogenous wage gap that opens up through
differential wage growth for men and women over the life-cycle. Exogenous wage
growth implies that men’s wages are on average 77% higher by the age of 45 than
at the moment of entering the labour market. By contrast, for women the figure is
only 31%. We calibrate the standard deviation of wage innovations for women to
be 0.063 and the standard deviation of the initial wages to 0.50.
7.4.4 Goodness of fit
Our next step is to show whether the model can account for some observed features
of women’s labour supply behaviour that were not explicitly targeted in the calibra-
tion. The calibration focused on averages taken over the life-cycle. Our focus here
is on life-cycle paths and on the distribution of hours and wages.
Figure 7.2 shows the life-cycle paths of women’s labour supply in the model
and in the data, which match well at both the extensive and intensive margins. Table
7 reports additional moments on heterogeneity. The model matches the participation
of different demographic groups, such as women who have no dependent children,
and mothers of children aged 3 to 17. Goldin and Mitchell (2017) show that, for
women born in 1957-58, the fraction who had worked more than 80% of the years
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Figure 7.2: Life-cycle profiles: baseline model (solid line) versus data (dashed line)
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Table 7.6: Statistics on hetereogeneity
Data Model
Participation Rate: Mothers with Children Aged 3-17 0.682 0.688
Participation Rate: Women without Dependent Children 0.755 0.692
Average Hours Worked 10th Percentile 20 25
Average Hours Worked 25th Percentile 35 31
Average Hours Worked 50th Percentile 40 38
Average Hours Worked 75th Percentile 40 44
Average Hours Worked 90th Percentile 48 48
Wage 10th Percentile 8.16 8.11
Wage 50th Percentile 15.05 16.20
Wage 90th Percentile 29.23 31.12
Correlation of wages and hours 0.33 0.54
Notes: Women without dependent children are women who have never had children
and those whose children are over 17.
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between age 25 and 54 was 0.53, while the fraction who had worked less than 20%
was 0.09. In our benchmark economy the comparable fractions are 0.57 and 0.21.
The distribution of observed wages in the model is similar to that in the data, as
is the distribution of hours worked, although the fraction of women working an
average of 40 hours a week is higher in the data than in the model. Observed wages
and the variance of wages are increasing with age in our simulations, consistent
with the data. The correlation of wages and hours worked for those employed is
0.33 in the data, compared to 0.54 in the simulations.
Finally, as discussed in Subsection 7.2.1 and in Appendix E.6, using the ap-
proximate selection correction to estimate the MRS equation could introduce a bias.
To assess the importance of this bias, we take simulated data generated from the
complete life-cycle model with taste heterogeneity and estimate the MRS equa-
tion using our reduced form procedure which approximates the full model. The
estimates of the MRS parameters θ and φ used to generate the simulated data are
almost identical to those we recover using our reduced form estimation. Given the
complexity of the model and of the full-selection process, this is an important vali-
dation of the approximation used in the reduced form selection model.
7.5 Labour supply elasticities
This section provides the key results of the chapter. We use the estimates of the
model to show implications for various wage elasticities. We start with the static
Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities obtained from the MRS parameters. We then
move to the Frisch elasticities at the intensive margin using estimates from the Euler
equation. Finally, we simulate the full model to obtain elasticities at the extensive
margin and the aggregate response of labour supply to changes in wages. When
using the full model, first we analyse responses to transitory changes to wages,
which do not have wealth effects and so are analogous to the Frisch elasticities; and
second, we analyse the effect of shifts in the entire wage profile allowing savings
and wealth to change, generating life-cycle Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities.
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7.5.1 Marshallian and Hicksian hours elasticities
The first two columns in Table 7.7 show how the MRS parameters translate into
within-period Marshallian and Hicksian wage elasticities separately for hours of
work and for consumption. These elasticities vary according to family character-
istics, wages and the levels of consumption and leisure. We report elasticities at
different points of the distribution of Marshallian elasticities to highlight the het-
erogeneity across individuals.
The median Marshallian hours elasticity is estimated to be 0.18, implying an
upward sloping labour supply function. Hicksian elasticities are greater than Mar-
shallian elasticities: for the household with the median Marshallian elasticity, the
Hicksian hours elasticity is three times larger at 0.54, indicating large income ef-
fects.
The Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities show substantial heterogeneity. The
90-10 range of the Marshallian hours elasticity is 0.93 (from -0.14 to 0.79) while
for the Hicksian one it is 0.78 (from 0.38 to 1.16). Differences in hours worked are
an important source of variation in both the Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities.
Figure 7.3 plots average elasticities by wages and by hours worked. Those work-
ing the fewest hours and those with the lowest wages have the largest proportional
response to a wage increase.
Our median estimates of the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities are quite
small (see Keane (2011) for a survey), and are similar to estimates in the literature
obtained using a similar methodology to ours. Blundell et al. (1998) estimate values
of the Marshallian elasticity ranging from 0.13 to 0.37 and of the Hicksian from 0.14
to 0.44 (depending on the age of the youngest child). The meta-study by Chetty
et al. (2011) reports an average Hicksian elasticity (for men and women) of 0.33.
Some results in the literature, however, report much larger estimates. MaCurdy
(1983), for instance, estimates elasticities ranging from 0.74 to 1.43 (for men).
Different studies take different approaches and use different sources of varia-
tion to estimate elasticities. We investigated extensively the main reasons for dif-
ferent estimates of labour supply elasticities. Our hypotheses ranged from the type
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Table 7.7: Elasticities at percentiles of Marshallian distribution
Wage Interest rate
Marshallian Hicksian Frisch Frisch
Hours worked Hours worked
10th −0.14
[−0.31,0.00]
0.38
[0.21,0.62]
0.80
[0.25,1.85]
0.78
[0.25,1.61]
25th 0.01
[−0.11,0.13]
0.44
[0.22,0.79]
0.80
[0.24,1.99]
0.76
[0.24,1.68]
50th 0.18
[0.05,0.38]
0.54
[0.24,1.07]
0.87
[0.26,2.29]
0.81
[0.24,1.90]
75th 0.39
[0.16,0.86]
0.69
[0.28,1.49]
1.00
[0.31,2.85]
0.93
[0.31,2.34]
90th 0.79
[0.36,1.65]
1.16
[0.51,2.30]
1.92
[0.57,4.96]
1.82
[0.57,4.07]
Consumption Consumption
25th 0.82
[[0.68,1.08]
0.43
[0.18,0.87]
0.04
[−0.02,0.50]
−1.17
[−1.83,−0.56]
50th 1.05
[0.94,1.23]
0.52
[0.24,0.98]
0.05
[−0.02,0.57]
−1.19
[−1.84,−0.52]
75th 1.30
[1.14,1.46]
0.61
[0.31,1.06]
0.05
[−0.02,0.63]
−1.20
[−1.84,−0.50]
Notes: Elasticities are calculated as averages within five percentage point
bands around the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the Marshal-
lian distribution. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Confidence
intervals are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
of specification used,20 to the type of variation in wages that is used to identify
the elasticity (that is what type of instruments are used), to sample selection rules.
To estimate equilibrium conditions such as the MRS equation, researchers often
use methods, such as 2SLS and GMM, that are sensitive to the normalization used.
Therefore, we also investigated whether the results we obtain depend on which vari-
able is used as a dependent variable. It turns out that the normalization used drives
the result in a fundamental fashion, while results are robust to the other hypotheses
considered. In particular, we find that IV or GMM estimates obtained using wages
20That is whether one uses consumption to proxy for the marginal utility of wealth or other indi-
cators.
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Figure 7.3: Intensive elasticities
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Note: Lines show the distributions of Marshallian, Hicksian and intensive Frisch elastici-
ties smoothed using a local polynomial.
as the left hand side variable (as in MaCurdy (1983)) result in very large elasticities
while putting hours of leisure on the left hand side (similar to Blundell et al. (1998),
who use hours worked) yields much smaller elasticities. As noted above, we use
the Fuller estimator, which is less sensitive to the normalisation of the estimating
equation than alternative methods. In Appendix E.3, we report results from GMM
estimation with different normalisations.
7.5.2 Frisch hours elasticity
We compute Frisch elasticities with respect to wages at the intensive margin using
equation (7.17) and estimates of the Euler equation parameters reported in Section
7.4.2. We report these elasticities in the third column of Table 7.7 and plot them
alongside Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities in Figure 7.3.
The Frisch elasticity for hours of work is larger than the Hicksian elasticity, as
theory would predict. The elasticity also varies in the cross-section rising from 0.8
at the 10th percentile of the Marshallian elasticity to 1.92 at the 90th percentile. The
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median value is 0.87. It is quite common to find large estimates of the Frisch hours
elasticity among married women, and our findings are broadly in line with those of
previous studies. Blundell et al. (2016a) find a Frisch elasticity for married women
of 0.96; Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) estimate a Frisch elasticity of 0.67. Part of the
heterogeneity we observe in the Frisch elasticities is due to differences across the
life-cycle and in demographics, but, once again, much of it is also due to differences
in the level of hours of work. As with the Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities,
Figure 7.3 shows that Frisch hours elasticities are largest for those working the
fewest hours.
The elasticity of consumption with respect to anticipated wage changes is small
but positive (owing to the fact consumption and leisure are substitutes). The Frisch
elasticity of consumption with respect to the interest rate at the median level of
consumption is -1.19.
We compare these results with those obtained when we impose additive sep-
arability for preferences over consumption and leisure, as well as when we use a
standard CES utility specification in Appendix E.4. This exercise highlights the im-
portance of adopting a flexible utility specification. A standard CES specification,
which is shown to be rejected by the estimation in Section 7.4.1, leads to similar
estimates of Marshallian hours elasticities, but much larger Hicksian and Frisch
elasticities. The median Frisch hours elasticity estimated using the more restrictive
standard CES specification is 1.33, which is roughly 50% larger than our baseline
result. The corollary of this result is that the Frisch elasticity of consumption with
respect to the interest rate is much lower: imposing a standard CES forces consump-
tion and leisure to have the same substitution parameters, making consumption less
elastic and hours of work more elastic than in our baseline. In addition, the stan-
dard CES utility implies much greater non-separability between consumption and
leisure: implying a Frisch wage elasticity of consumption of 0.4 compared to 0.05
under our more general utility specification. On the other hand, when we impose
additive separability with our general CES specification, the Frisch hours elasticity
is very similar to the one we estimate allowing for non-separability.
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7.5.3 The extensive margin, aggregate elasticities and life-cycle
responses
This section discusses labour supply responses at the extensive margin, life-cycle
responses and aggregation issues at different margins and across households. We
define the extensive margin elasticity as referring to the change in the percentage
of women participating as the wage changes. We also calculate how total hours
worked by women change as a result of both the extensive and intensive margin
responses. This is what we call the “aggregate response” to a wage change. We
also calculate aggregate changes in efficiency units, because women with different
levels of productivity may respond differently, as suggested by Figure 7.3.
We explore responses to two different types of wage changes. First, in Section
7.5.3.1, we focus on the response to temporary changes in wages, which is relevant
for temporary tax changes.21 We report heterogeneity by age, across the wealth
distribution, across demographic groups and over the business cycle. Then, in Sec-
tion 7.5.3.2, we report labour supply responses to changes in the entire life-cycle
wage profile, which we call life-cycle Marshallian and life-cycle Hicksian elastici-
ties. These are interesting for two reasons. First, for thinking about the implications
of permanent tax changes or differences in taxes across countries; and, second, for
comparing these life-cycle Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities with the static elas-
ticities from the MRS to assess the accuracy of the static approximation.
7.5.3.1 Response to temporary wage changes
Frisch responses are calculated by comparing labour supply at a given age between
the baseline economy and a counterfactual economy in which wages are anticipated
to be higher at that particular age. The wage difference generates differences in
participation rates, differences in hours worked for participants and, therefore, dif-
ferences in aggregate labour supply. In Table 7.8, we report the average response for
different age groups. The third column reports the ‘extensive response’, calculated
21We compute responses to both anticipated and unanticipated the temporary changes. The results
are almost identical because there is very little effect on the marginal utility of wealth, λ , of a
temporary change.
7.5. Labour supply elasticities 241
as the percentage point change in participation following a one percent increase in
the wage. The fourth to sixth columns report different percentiles of the distribu-
tion of the intensive margin elasticity at each age, computed by considering only
those individuals who participate both in the baseline economy and in the counter-
factual economy. Changes in participation also induce changes in the distribution
of hours worked that would be reflected in the aggregate response of labour supply.
Finally, therefore, the last two columns report the ‘aggregate’ elasticity: the change
in the total number of hours worked and the change in efficiency units of labour,
considering both intensive and extensive margins.
Table 7.8: Frisch responses by age
Age Participation Extensive Intensive Elasticity Aggregate Elasticity
Band Rate Response
(Percent) (Percent Pt) 25th 50th 75th Hours Eff units
25-29 61.61 0.82 0.69 0.85 1.09 1.93 1.44
30-34 70.07 0.63 0.66 0.82 1.11 1.51 1.12
35-39 70.00 0.63 0.64 0.82 1.14 1.49 1.08
40-44 72.05 0.56 0.64 0.85 1.21 1.37 1.01
45-49 69.53 0.59 0.65 0.88 1.25 1.42 1.04
50-55 65.37 0.59 0.67 0.91 1.30 1.49 1.06
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation in response to a 1%
increase in the wage. The aggregate elasticity reports the percentage change in hours correspond-
ing to a percentage change in the wage, accounting for changes at both the extensive and intensive
margins.
A first point to notice is the variation in the size of the extensive margin elas-
ticity over the life-cycle. As a consequence, the age composition of the population
may have important implications for the aggregate response of labour supply to
changes in wages. Early in life, the percentage point response is about 0.82, falling
to 0.63 between 30 and 35 and to a minimum of 0.56 for the 40-45 group. The me-
dian of the intensive margin elasticity is stable over the life-cycle, at around 0.85,22
22The comparable value calculated directly from step 2 of the estimation process is 0.86. The
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however the elasticity at the 75th percentile increases substantially with age.
The aggregate elasticity for hours is about 1.45 on average, but again is larger
at the start of the life-cycle. The relative importance of the extensive and inten-
sive margins to explaining the macro elasticity varies with age. Before age 30, the
intensive margin response contributes approximately 46% of the response in the
aggregate. However, by age 50-55, the contribution of the intensive response has
increased to 63%. The contribution of the intensive margin is somewhat larger than
Erosa et al. (2016), who find that the response through the intensive margin con-
tributes about 38% to the aggregate response. This difference is not surprising since
the Erosa et al. (2016) calculation is for men, where we see less variability in hours
worked but it highlights the difficulty of aggregating behaviour to create a single
labour supply elasticity. The aggregate elasticity for efficiency units is smaller than
that for hours, but also declines with age.
Household Wealth. In Table 7.9, we report household responses across the
wealth distribution. We calculate the percentiles of household’s wealth at each age
and classify households into quartiles. We find a clear pattern of a decreasing re-
sponse of the extensive margin with increasing wealth. This is the case at all ages.
There is also heterogeneity in the intensive margin elasticity by wealth, with the
wealthy being less responsive, but the differences are more moderate than with the
extensive margin response. The message from these results is that the distribution
of wealth is crucial to understanding the response of aggregate labour supply to
changes in wages.
Macroeconomic Conditions. Labour supply responses may change across
the business cycle. Differences in the economic environment will lead to differ-
ences in the estimated elasticity for the same underlying preference parameters, as
also discussed by Keane and Rogerson (2012). This issue is likely to be relevant
particularly for the extensive margin, which is driven by non-convexities in the dy-
namic problem, such as fixed costs of going to work. If these non-convexities are
important, it is likely that a certain sequence of aggregate shocks will tend to bunch
similarity of estimates from step 2 and step 3 of the estimation provides further validation of our
multi-step approach.
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Table 7.9: Frisch responses by household wealth
Wealth Participation Extensive Intensive Aggregate
Quartile Rate Response Elasticity Elasticity
(Percent) (Percent Pt) (Median)
Below p25 45.42 1.20 1.20 3.53
p25− p50 59.25 0.77 1.03 2.07
p50− p75 76.80 0.39 0.81 1.23
Above p75 90.10 0.16 0.66 0.81
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation
in response to a 1% increase in the wage. The aggregate elasticity reports the
percentage change in hours corresponding to a percentage change in the wage,
accounting for changes at both the extensive and intensive margins.
(or further disperse) households around the kinks that determine the extensive mar-
gin response. As a consequence, different distributions of the state variables will
trigger different responses in the aggregate. In particular, whether an economy is in
a recession or not may well affect how much individuals are willing to respond to
wage growth.
Table 7.10: Frisch responses across the business cycle
Business Extensive Intensive Aggregate Elasticity
Cycle Response Elasticity
(Percent) (Median) Hours Eff units
Baseline 0.63 0.86 1.53 1.12
Recession
First quarter 0.67 0.87 1.61 1.15
Fourth quarter 0.73 0.86 1.71 1.20
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation
in response to a 1% increase in the wage. The aggregate elasticity reports
the percentage change in hours corresponding to a percentage change in the
wage, accounting for changes at both the extensive and intensive margins.
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In Table 7.10, we report responses to temporary changes in wages that occur
at different points of the business cycle.23 We report the labour supply response in
the first and fourth quarters of the recession. The key finding is that responses are
higher in recessions than in the baseline, and further, responses increase with the
duration of the recession. From the results in Table 7.9, the decrease in wealth that
households suffer over a recession could be behind the increasing responsiveness of
the extensive margin to anticipated changes in wages. Effects may persist beyond
the end of the recession, especially if wages or wealth are permanently lower. Both
lower wages and lower wealth lead to higher elasticities: households who have been
hit by recessions earlier in their life are more responsive throughout the remainder
of their lives.24
Demographics. Finally, we explore the effect of children on the size of the
elasticities. Mothers of children aged 0 to 2 are more elastic at the extensive margin
(0.82) than mothers of older children (0.68) and childless women show the lowest
elasticity (0.57). In contrast, differences in intensive margin elasticities are less
pronounced, with mothers of young children being slightly less elastic.
7.5.3.2 Life-cycle responses to wage changes
In this section, we use our model to compute the response to a change in the entire
wage profile, so to measure the response to a permanent tax change. The life-cycle
Marshallian elasticity captures the response of labour supply to changes in wages
when savings are allowed to change, that is when the extra income that arises in
period t due to the increased wage, does not have to be spent in that period.
The life-cycle Hicksian elasticity arises after netting off the extra lifetime re-
sources from the lifetime budget constraint, in contrast with a static Hicksian re-
sponse, which would net off the extra resources within period. Life-cycle compen-
sation is calculated as the change in income needed to keep the original bundle of
23We define a recession as a situation in which all men and women receive an unexpected negative
earnings shock for four consecutive quarters. These wage changes are to the permanent wage and
will affect the marginal utility of wealth as well as changing intertemporal incentives. We consider
responses to temporary changes in wages at different points in such a recession.
24We show this by using our simulations to compare women hit by a recession at age 25 with
those not hit by recession. Differences persist throughout their lifetimes. The detail of these results
are not reported here.
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life-time consumption and hours worked exactly affordable. The change in income
from each period that needs to be compensated for is ∆w fh,t ∗
(
L− lh,t
)
. Summing
across all periods would give the extra resources from a wage increase that need
to be subtracted in a life-cycle context. This compensation can be implemented
either by imposing a person-specific lump-sum tax that is equal across periods, or
a person-specific lump-sum tax at a given point in time. The choice will matter
because uncertainty means the timing of income is important.25 The alternative to
this exact compensation is to do the compensation within a group, or indeed within
the whole population as discussed by Keane (2011), which would mean calculating
the extra income for all individuals as with the exact calculation, but then redis-
tributing through a common per period lump-sum payment. This approach does
not give exactly the life-cycle Hicksian response because some households will be
over-compensated and some under-compensated relative to their individual change
in lifetime resources. On the other hand, it may be the right way to calculate the
response to a funded tax change. If preferences are quasi-linear then there are no
income effects and so there is no effect on labour supply of any redistribution asso-
ciated with the lump sum compensation.
In Table 7.11, we report the life-cycle Marshallian and Hicksian responses.
The first panel shows responses when the Hicksian compensation is common across
all individuals. The second panel shows responses when compensation is common
within quartiles of the initial wage distribution for women. We compare these life-
cycle elasticities with the static elasticities estimated from the MRS. As we argued
in Section 7.1.1 and emphasized by Meghir and Phillips (2008), life-cycle labour
supply responses may be approximated by the static elasticities computed from the
MRS.
The median life-cycle Marshallian elasticity for the intensive margin is 0.43,
substantially above the 0.18 static Marshallian elasticity. The static elasticities are
calculated from the MRS using non-durable consumption, holding constant saving
and also, implicitly, durable spending. In a full life-cycle model, however, following
25In a model with substantial ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity, either from of compensation is
computationally costly to calculate.
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a wage increase, savings adjust and individuals reallocate resources across periods.
Furthermore, all life-cycle resources are spent, so that we have a broader consump-
tion measure in these calculations. In other words, the extra income from the wage
increase is not all spent on non-durables in the period it is earned. Spreading these
resources across periods and other goods reduces the amount of extra income and
hence the income effect in the period it is earned. This means the life-cycle Mar-
shallian elasticity is more like the static Hicksian elasticity. However, the life-cycle
Hicksian elasticity is close to the Hicksian elasticity we estimate with the MRS.
Looking at the responses by quartile in the bottom panel, there is substantial
heterogeneity in the size of the life-cycle Marhsallian intensive margin response de-
pending on initial conditions, particularly in the extensive margin response. On the
other hand, the life-cycle Hicksian elasticity when there is within quartile compen-
sation, does not vary much with the quartile of the initial conditions.26 The substi-
tution effect is very similar across groups, and it is the income effect which mat-
ters more for the heterogeneity in the Marshallian labour supply responses across
groups.
7.5.4 Elasticities with returns to experience
An important maintained assumption to this point has been the absence of any re-
turns to experience. Imai and Keane (2004) argue that assuming wages are exoge-
nous may introduce a downward bias in estimates of the willingness to substitute
intertemporally. Indeed, they present estimates of such a parameter as high as 3.8 in
a model that accounts for returns to labour market experience. We consider as a ro-
bustness exercise an alternative framework in which returns to experience accrue to
individuals who are participating, but in which returns to experience are not affected
by the number of hours worked conditional on participation. Appendix E.5 details
the estimation results allowing for returns to experience. Intensive elasticities are
similar to our baseline, but the extensive margin response differs: with returns to
experience, the current wage is only part of the return to work and so changes to the
26We experiment with more finely targetted compensation, in particular making the individual
transfer contingent on initial husband earnings and the maternity group, but this does not alter the
overall intensive margin response.
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Table 7.11: Life-cycle responses
Extensive Intensive Elasticity Aggregate Elasticity
Response
(Percent Pt) 25th 50th 75th Hours Eff Units
Whole Sample
Marshallian
Life-cycle Response 0.51 0.28 0.42 0.67 0.91 0.63
Static (MRS) 0.01 0.18 0.39
Hicksian
Life-cycle Response 0.65 0.42 0.63 0.96 1.26 0.84
Static (MRS) 0.44 0.54 0.69
By Quartile of Initial Wage
Life-cycle Marshallian
1st quartile 0.62 0.40 0.57 0.80 2.25 1.88
2nd quartile 0.70 0.34 0.48 0.78 1.44 1.21
3rd quartile 0.55 0.32 0.48 0.75 0.97 0.83
4th quartile 0.17 0.22 0.33 0.52 0.46 0.40
Life-cycle Hicksian
1st quartile 0.66 0.46 0.65 0.87 2.47 2.05
2nd quartile 0.81 0.45 0.62 0.94 1.71 1.43
3rd quartile 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.97 1.25 1.04
4th quartile 0.21 0.41 0.56 0.81 0.71 0.60
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation in response to
a 1% increase in the wage. The baseline participation rate is 67.8%. Within quartiles, the
baseline participation rates are 29,56,77 and 95% respectively. The aggregate elasticity reports
the percentage change in hours corresponding to a percentage change in the wage, accounting
for changes at both the extensive and intensive margins.
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current wage make little difference to participation. The extensive margin response
becomes very small.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that to understand labour supply behaviour and to calculate ag-
gregate labour supply elasticities, it is crucial to account for heterogeneity across
individuals. To make this point precisely and show its quantitative importance, we
estimate a life-cycle model of intratemporal and intertemporal choices over con-
sumption, saving and work and characterise the response of women’s labour supply
to different types of wage changes. In estimating such a model, we use a flexible
specification of preferences that allows us to test some of the assumptions com-
monly used both in the macro and labour literature on labour supply.
We find substantial heterogeneity in labour supply responses, and this hetero-
geneity is prevalent at both the intensive and extensive margins. The median static
Marshallian elasticity is 0.18, but has a 90-10 range of -0.14 to 0.79. The cor-
responding Hicksian elasticity is 0.54, with 90-10 range of 0.38 to 1.16; and the
corresponding Frisch wage elasticity is 0.87, with 90-10 range of 0.8 to 1.92. The
static Marshallian and Hicksian concepts assume there is no intertemporal reallo-
cation of resources in response to a wage change. We use the full life-cycle model
to show that these static concepts underestimate the full life-cycle responses, espe-
cially for the life-cycle Marshallian response. Finally, over the business cycle we
find that the aggregate hours elasticity increases in recessions and more so in longer
recessions.
In terms of heterogeneity in the intensive margin responses, the Marshallian,
Hicksian and Frisch elasticities are greatest for those working the least number of
hours, those with the lowest wages and those with the least wealth. For the exten-
sive margin, the response to anticipated wage growth is large for women under 30
and can explain 54% of their labour supply response. This sizable contribution of
the extensive margin declines with age. We find some evidence of non-separability
between consumption and leisure, but assuming there is separability does not sub-
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stantially change the distribution of estimates of the Frisch elasticity.
Our preference parameter estimates reject the restrictions required for balanced
growth, which are widely used in the macro literature. The curvature on consump-
tion in utility is less than log, and the curvature on hours worked is much greater
than the curvature on consumption. This implies individuals are less willing to
substitute hours of work over time than they are willing to substitute consumption.
Further, the heterogeneity we observe means it is not sensible to talk about a single
elasticity to measure how aggregate labour supply responds to wage changes. In-
stead, we aggregate explicitly from individual behaviour to the aggregate in order
to understand how economy wide hours of work change given the demographic and
age structure of the economy, the wealth distribution and the state of the business
cycle.
Our results on the importance of the extensive margin in explaining macro
elasticities can be compared to others in the literature, especially Erosa et al. (2016)
and Guner et al. (2012). Our estimates put a greater importance on intensive margin
changes in hours worked per week than those papers, but we do find that a substan-
tial fraction of the changes in total hours is due to changes in participation, ranging
from 54% to 37%. Erosa et al. (2016) find that the extensive margin is the dominant
labour supply response, explaining 62% of the aggregate response. Their model has
a similar life-cycle structure to ours, but is focused on men’s labour supply and the
conclusion on the importance of the extensive margin is for men where hours of
work are less variable. Guner et al. (2012) analyse the importance of the extensive
margin for the aggregate response of labour supply to changes in taxes in a model
with heterogeneous married and single households, and with an extensive margin
for women as well as an intensive margin for men and women. As with Erosa et
al. (2016), they find that the extensive margin for women is a key contributor to the
aggregate response to tax reform. The key difference from our framework is their
assumption that there is no uncertainty in wages and this assumption of certainty
tends to lead to greater labour supply responses, as shown in Low (2005).
One key point that emerges from our exercise is that aggregate responses of
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labour supply to changes in wages (both at the intensive and the extensive margin)
is not constant: it changes with the structure of the population as well as with the
state of the economy. This finding is similar to Keane and Rogerson (2012), who
argue that there is no contradiction between macro and micro elasticities of labour
supply and that they are simply measuring different concepts. Our conclusion is
however stronger: the macro elasticity is not a structural parameter, it is simply the
result of highly non-linear aggregation which depends on demographic structure as
well as the distribution of wealth and the particular point in the business cycle.
Chapter 8
General Conclusions
The chapters in this thesis all address questions relating to households’ consumption
and labour supply decisions over the life-cycle.
Chapters 2 and 3 addressed issues around how we measure expenditure and
price changes. Chapter 2 documented the declining share of expenditure surveys in
the US and UK relative to the national accounts and explored possible reasons for
this. Chapter 3 discussed how we measure inflation and in particular the appropri-
ate choice of formula for price changes at the elementary aggregate level of price
indices.
The next two chapters discussed consumption patterns at older ages. Chapter
4 discusses spending declines in two countries - the US and the UK - and the role
of medical expenses in accounting for these differences. Chapter 5 applied non-
parametric, ‘revealed preference’ tests of different variants of the life-cycle model
to retiring households in a Spanish consumption panel dataset.
The final two chapters looked at how consumers’ spending and labour supply
choices are affected by changes in their economic environment. Chapter 6 con-
sidered how households responses to house price changes are affected by their ini-
tial leverage. It showed how more leveraged households tend to disproportionately
increase their residential investment spending as house prices rise, and set out a
portfolio-rebalancing motive to explain this behaviour. Chapter 7 looked at how
womens’ labour supply responds to changes in wages along both intensive and ex-
tensive margins.
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A common theme across these chapters is the importance of accounting for
heterogeneity in consumer’s behaviours and responses to shocks. Chapter 4 high-
lighted how risks and precautionary savings motives change as individuals age.
Chapter 5 discussed the importance of allowing for heterogeneity in preferences
when conducting tests of the life-cycle model. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 both showed
how consumer responses to shocks depend non-linearly on their individual wealth
and indebtedness. Overall responses to shocks will depend heavily on how these
characteristics vary across households in the economy. Individual responses will
also not easily aggregate to give a single ‘macro’ response to changes in the eco-
nomic environment.
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 3
A.1 Proofs of chapter results
Proof. Proof of fact 1.
Using xk =
pi1
pi0
, the classical geometric-arithmetic inequality is
∏
(
xi
)1/N ≤∑ 1N xi
Using the change of variables
xi =
(
yi
)s
and substituting
∏
[(
yi
)s]1/N ≤∑ 1N (yi)s
then taking the sth root gives
∏
(
yi
)1/N ≤ (∑ 1N (yi)s
)1/s
For s ∈ (0,1) we can use Jensen’s inequality again to give
(
∑ 1N
(
yi
)s)1/s ≤∑ 1N yi
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since zs is concave with s ∈ (0,1)
∑ 1N
(
yi
)s ≤ (∑ 1N yi
)s
Now set s = 1/2. Then since Var (X) = E
(
X2
)− [E (X)]2
E (X) = ∑ 1N
(
yi
)1/2
[E (X)]2 =
(
∑ 1N
(
yi
)1/2)2
E
(
X2
)
= ∑ 1N y
i
Var (X) =∑ 1N y
i−
(
∑ 1N
(
yi
)1/2)2
Using the fact that ∏(yi)1/N ≤
(
∑ 1N
(
yi
)s)1/s(which we have already estab-
lished) with s = 1/2 gives
∏
(
yi
)1/N ≤ (∑ 1N (yi)1/2
)2
so
Var (X)≤∑ 1N y
i−∏
(
yi
)1/N
hence
PC (p0,p1)−PJ (p0,p1)≥Var
(
pi1
pi0
)
Proof. Proof of fact 2.
First notice that we can rewrite the Dutot as
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PD (p0,p1) =
E
[
pi1
]
E
[
pi0
] = E
[(
pi1
pi0
)
pi0
]
E
[
pi0
]
Then notice that the definition of the covariance between pi0 and
(
pi1
pi0
)
is
Cov
(
pi0,
(
pi1
pi0
))
= E
[
pi0
(
pi1
pi0
)]
−E [pi0] .E [( pi1pi0
)]
⇒Cov
(
pi0,
(
pi1
pi0
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/E
[
pi0
]
= E
[
pi0
(
pi1
pi0
)]
/E
[
pi0
]−E [( pi1
pi0
)]
This is just the difference between the Dutot and the Carli, so we have that
⇒ PD(p0,p1)−PC(p0,p1) =
Cov
(
pi0,
(
pi1
pi0
))
E
[
pi0
]
Proof. Proof of proposition 3.
Writing prices as in equation (3), we can think of the Dutot as the empirical
counterpart of
PD (p0,p1) =
E
(
pi1
)
E
(
pi0
)
and the Jevons as the counterpart of
PJ (p0,p1) =∏
(
E
(
pi1
)(
1+ ei1
)
E
(
pi0
)(
1+ ei0
))1/N = E (pi1)
E
(
pi0
)∏(1+ ei11+ ei0
)1/N
Rearranging gives
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PJ (p0,p1) = PD (p0,p1)∏
(
1+ ei1
1+ ei0
)1/N
The Jevons is equal to the Dutot multiplied by a function of the deviations in
each period. We can approximate the value of ∏
(
1+ei1
1+ei0
)1/N
by taking a second
order Maclaurin expansion.
Let
∏
(
1+ ei1
1+ ei0
)1/N
= f (e1,e0)
then our approximation is
f (e1,e0)≈ f (0,0)+
[
∂ f (e1,e0)
∂e1
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
∂ f (e1,e0)
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
+
1
2
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e′1 e
′
0
] ∂ 2 f (e1,e0)∂e1∂e′1 ∂ 2 f (e1,e0)∂e0e′1
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂e1∂e′0
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂e1∂e′1
 e1
e0

The derivatives of f (e1,e0) are the following
∂ f (e1,e0)
∂ei1
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
= 1/N,∀i
∂ f (e1,e0)
∂ei0
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
=−1/N,∀i
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂ei1∂e
j
0
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
=−(1/N)2,∀i, j
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂ei1∂e
j
1
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
=
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂ei0∂e
j
0
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
= (1/N)2,∀i 6= j
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
∂ (ei1)2
∣∣∣∣
e1,e0=0
=
∂ 2 f (e1,e0)
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e1,e0=0
=
1
N
(
1
N
−1),∀i
So our approximation evaluates to
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so we have that
PJ (p0,p1)≈ PD (p0,p1)
(
1+
1
2
[
Var
(
ei0
)−Var(ei1)]) (A.2)
Proof. Proof of proposition 1.
To find the solution to maxw−w′ lnw subject to ∑wi = 1, we first set up the
Lagrangian
L=−w′ lnw−λ (∑
i
wi−1) (A.3)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Taking first order conditions gives
wi
1
wi
+ lnwi−λ = 0,∀i (A.4)
=⇒ lnwi = λ −1,∀i (A.5)
=⇒ wi = exp(λ −1),∀i (A.6)
which implies that at the point of maximum entropy, budget shares are constant
across i. Combining this with constraint tells us that the entropy maximising budget
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shares will be 1/N.
Proof. Proof of proposition 2.
This proof consists of two stages. First we show that the solution to the max-
imum entropy problem (3.12) is wit = 1/N for all i, t. Then we show that constant
and equal budget shares are consistent with GARP, and so the additional constraint
in this problem is not binding.
The first stage is to solve
max
w0,w1
H (w0,w1) =−∑
t
wt′ lnwt subject to ∑
i
wit = 1 for t = 0,1
which is associated with the Lagrangian
−∑
t
wt′ lnwt−λ0(∑wi0−1)−λ1(∑wi1−1)
with λ0 and λ1 Lagrange multipliers. This has first order conditions
1+ lnwit−λt = 0,∀i, t
which as we demonstrate in the proof of proposition 1 implies that wit is con-
stant across i for both t. Combining this with the constraints implies that budget
shares will be 1/N (constant across both i and t).
To prove the second stage, we will show that a violation of GARP is impossible
with equal budget shares. A violation of GARP implies that there exist two periods
t and s, when the consumer chooses quantities qt and qs such that p′tqs ≤ xt and
p′sqt < xs or equivalently
∑ pit
[
wisxs
pis
]
≤ xt
⇒∑
(
pit
pis
)
wis ≤
xt
xs
and
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∑
(
pis
pit
)
wit <
xs
xt
Our working assumption is that budget shares are constant wit = w
i
s =
1
N for all
i,t. So these conditions imply that
1
N∑
(
pit
pis
)
≤ xt
xs
and
1
N∑
(
pis
pit
)
<
xs
xt
Now we know from Jensen’s inequality that
1
1
N ∑
(
pit
pis
) ≤ 1
N∑
(
pis
pit
)
since the reciprocal is a convex function. However, since for positive prices
and expenditures
1
1
N ∑
(
pit
pis
) ≥ xs
xt
then this implies that
xs
xt
<
xs
xt
which is a contradiction. It follows that equal budget shares must satisfy
GARP.
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Appendix for Chapter 4
B.1 Long term care costs
Table B.1: Distribution of out-of-pocket long term care costs, non-institutional population
HRS: United States percent Mean P25 P50 P75 P95 P99
All household population 60+ 100 53 0 0 0 0 526
Any stays in institutions (past 2 yrs) 5.3 991 0 0 246 3768 29075
Any paid-for stays in institutions (past 2 yrs) 1.7 3085 263 645 2010 12975 38189
ELSA: England
All household population 60+ 100 30 0 0 0 0 0
Any stays in institutions (past 2 yrs) 1.1 3236 0 0 1257 15699 37704
Any paid-for stays in institutions (past 2 yrs) 0.6 6619 628 1782 10055 28278 37704
Notes: Data from English Longitudinal Study of Ageing for England and the Health and Retirement Survey in the US for those
not in institutional residences at the time of interview. Values are annual averages over the previous two years in US$ (2010).
US spending is for 2012-2014. UK spending is for 2014-2016.
B.2 Within period demand system
In this appendix, we estimate an extension of the Almost Ideal specification of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) that includes an additional quadratic term in income
(Banks et al. (1997)). Our interest is in establishing the nature of within-period non-
separabilities between consumption and housing, health and employment in the two
countries through the effect of these variables on household budget shares. By in-
cluding total expenditure and prices, we control for differences in trends in relative
prices and wealth across different birth cohorts in the two countries, which may
otherwise confound our estimates.
We run the following consumer demand model in each of the two countries:
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wik = αik +
G
∑
k
+γk ln pkβk + ln
(
xi
ai(p)
)
+θk + ln
(
xi
(ai(p))
)2
(B.1)
where wik is the budget share of individual i for each of the G goods k, pk is
the price of good k and xi is total expenditure on the goods included in the demands
system by individual i. There are M demographic variables zmi for each individual
i including housing, employment, health and mortality are included in αik
αik = αk0+
M
∑
k
αmkzmi (B.2)
Expenditures are deflated using the price index
lnαi(p) = αO+
G
∑
k
αik ln pk +1/2
G
∑
l
G
∑
k
γlk ln pl ln pk (B.3)
This model differs slightly from the Almost Ideal specification ofDeaton and
Muellbauer (1980) in that it includes an additional quadratic term on income (al-
though it is still only an approximation to the fully integrable QUAIDS model
(Banks et al. (1997)). Our interest is in establishing the nature of within-period
non-separabilities between consumption and housing, health and employment in
the two countries through the effect of these variables on household budget shares.
By including total expenditure and prices, we control for differences in trends in
relative prices and wealth across different birth cohorts in the two countries which
may otherwise confound our estimates. The use of the household specific price in-
dex αi(p) means that income deflators can vary across groups according to their
differing consumption patterns.
Prices for each of our categories are computed from the individual compo-
nents and sub-indices of the UK Retail Price Index and the US CPI, which go back
to 1978 and 1988 respectively.1 Typically, sub-indices are not available for the par-
ticular category grouping we use (defined in Table 4.1). For instance, in the UK RPI
1The authors are grateful to Brendan Williams of BLS for constructing price indices that go back
to this date.
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Figure B.1: Real price of medical spending
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Notes: UK prices are a weighted geometric mean of the RPI categories that include medical spend-
ing. US prices are a weighted geometric mean of prices for medical care and hospital services. In
both calculations the weights are shares of total medical expenditure. Prices are made real with a
Stone price index for total non-durable spending.
medical costs are split between “personal services,” “chemists goods,” “personal ar-
ticles” and other categories. So in order to calculate price indices for these goods
we calculate a Stone price index for a given category k
pk = exp(
Gk
∑
j=1
w jk ln p j) (B.4)
where w jk is the cohort-year budget share of good j within some spending
category k for which there are Gk goods in category k for which we want a price
(e.g. “other non-durables”). We plot the estimated series for medical costs in Figure
B.1. This shows that real medical prices tended to increase faster in the US than they
did in the UK over the period we are considering. This implies that the growth in
medical consumption in the US may not have been as large relative to the UK as the
growth in medical expenditures.
Our demand system includes sex, number of children, number of adults, and
linear and quadratic time trends as controls in all models reported below. We also
include dummies for being over state pension age in the UK (60 for women, 65
for men) and for being over 65 in the US. These are included to control for the ef-
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fects of Medicare (to which US households become eligible at 65) and benefits such
as free-prescriptions, the Winter Fuel Payment, and transport subsidies which UK
households become eligible for at state pension age. We do not otherwise control
for age - our view is that age is usually included as a proxy for health and mor-
tality effects, and these are affects that we are directly interested in (and include
separately).
The health and mortality variables are cell averages for the population (by age,
year and sex) based on the data we described in Section 4.4 above. We instru-
ment the expenditure and expenditure squared variables using income and income
squared (dummying out changes in the income question in the CEX that occurred
from the 2nd quarter of 2001 - introducing a bracketing question for those who
failed to report their incomes - and income imputation which was introduced in
2004).
The coefficients on the taste shifters, αmk are shown in Table B.2. The par-
ticular specification of the demographic variables, z, includes: (1) housing tenure
with dummy variables for being a renter and housing owners with no mortgage
so that the reference group are owners with remaining mortgages; (2) marital sta-
tus represented a dummy variables for being single; (3) employment proxied by two
dummies - household head employed and both partners working; (4) the log of mor-
tality of the head (5) the health of head captured by the proportion of individuals in
their cohort who have the worst health status.
In both countries, the demand system results show that those who rent not sur-
prisingly spend a much smaller share of the budget on housing related expenditures.
In the US the share spent on housing related expenses is 10 percentage points lower
for renters than those who own. In the UK the equivalent number is 4 percent-
age points. The estimates in Table B.2 indicate renters consequently devote higher
shares to all other goods (except food at home in the US), with a particularly large
effect for other non-durable spending. Owning a home outright (compared to own-
ers who still have a mortgage to pay off) leads to small reduction in housing related
expenses in both countries (though the effect is not significant in the UK).
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Table B.2: Estimated demand system coefficients αmk
Food in Food out OthND Medical Housing Recrea Transport
UK (1978-2010)
Mean Budget Shares (percent):
24.36 4.97 25.10 1.88 23.82 7.29 12.58
Single -6.63 2.62 3.34 -0.26 -2.39 -0.08 3.40
(0.12) (0.07) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
Renter 0.85 0.38 3.26 0.01 -4.17 0.43 -0.77
(0.09) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Own-outright 0.14 -0.11 -0.75 0.16 -0.04 0.92 -0.31
(0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Head-empl. -0.03 0.61 -0.42 -0.05 -0.81 -0.40 1.11
(0.09) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Both work -0.67 0.23 0.71 -0.14 -0.47 0.43 -0.10
(0.09) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
ln(mortality) 0.85 -0.00 -1.81 0.36 0.78 0.17 -0.35
(0.06) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Worst health -0.53 -0.29 -0.16 0.28 -1.12 0.98 0.84
(0.46) (0.28) (0.63) (0.26) (0.55) (0.55) (0.48)
US (1988-2010)
Mean Budget Shares (percent):
22.00 6.50 17.82 12.61 19.99 4.26 16.81
Single -4.74 3.02 2.17 -3.57 -0.54 1.33 2.34
(0.24) (0.15) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24) (0.13) (0.22)
Renter -0.28 2.14 4.86 0.83 -10.32 1.45 1.34
(0.26) (0.17) (0.26) (0.37) (0.26) (0.14) (0.24)
Own-outright 0.08 0.53 -0.71 0.57 -0.33 0.09 -0.25
(0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12)
Head-empl. 0.96 0.46 -0.60 -1.68 0.10 -0.32 1.05
(0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.09) (0.16)
Both work -2.18 0.45 1.33 -0.09 -0.90 0.31 1.09
(0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.09) (0.17)
ln(mortality) -0.53 -0.45 -1.80 2.72 0.99 -0.12 -0.81
(0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.20) (0.14) (0.07) (0.12)
Worst health -0.19 -0.30 2.28 -0.30 -1.90 -0.89 1.32
(0.65) (0.39) (0.63) (0.94) (0.63) (0.33) (0.58)
Notes: UK N=99,425; US N= 50,796, standard errors in parentheses. We take only data from the first
interview in the CEX. Additional controls for log expenditure, log expenditure squared, number of children,
number of adults, dummy for whether head or spouse has compulsory education, a quadratic time trend,
being over state pension age and self-reported health missing. Expenditure is instrumented using income
(with additional dummies in US model for year greater than 2001 and year greater than 2004, when changes
to the survey income questions were introduced).
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Employment effects look as expected in both countries when the head is em-
ployed less is spent on recreation and more is spent on food out and on transport,
which is most likely associated with transport to work. Employment in the United
States is associated with more food consumption both in and out of the home, but in
the UK there is a substitution of food consumption to out of the home. When both
head and spouse are working, there is a reduction in spending on food at home in
the US.
Important differences emerge in the relationship between employment and
health costs, however. In the United States where people bear more of the responsi-
bility for paying their medical costs, the heads employment reduces out-of-pocket
medical expenses, a much larger effect than in the UK where the effect is essentially
zero. Although this could partly be explained by incomplete controls for health in
the model, the key difference is the association between medical insurance and be-
ing in a job in the United States (as reflected in Figure 4.7). In the US, the head
being employed reduces the proportion spent on medical spending by 1.7 percent-
age points but there is no similar effect in the UK. This could reflect employers
meeting some healthcare costs for their employees in the US (which in the UK
would be met by the state). Whether the spouse works or not, does not appear to
contribute to this effect.2
Due to the data limitations described above, our mortality and subjective health
measures capture variations in health status that occur on average at the cohort level
rather than individual level variation. A higher risk of mortality among the cohort
increases medical spending in both the US and UK with, perhaps unsurprisingly
in light of the differential financing of medical care in the two countries, a much
larger effect in the US. In the UK, reductions in subjective health controlling for
mortality have little effect on the composition of total household consumption (ex-
cept for a reduction in spending away from home). In contrast, a worsening of
2When we exclude health insurance spending from medical expenditures the estimated impact of
employment on the share of spending on medical in the US goes from -1.7 to -0.9. The value of this
coefficient may seem surprising given discounts for employer-sponsored insurance, However, those
leaving employment may still be covered by third parties as Figure 4.7 suggests (e.g. through retiree
benefit plans).
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the cohorts subjective health status in the United States leads to an apparent (but
statistically insignificant) reduction in medical expenses once the effects of mortal-
ity are controlled. This likely reflects some difference in health spending among
cohorts that we have not been able to control for (for instance, those caused by in-
stitutional changes in Medicare coverage or changes in the availability of expensive,
technology-intensive health services over time).
Comparing the positive impact of mortality probabilities on medical spending
with the zero or negative effects for self-reported health suggests that subjective
measures of health may not improve even when objective measures of health do.
One possible explanation for this is that people assess their health relative to others
in their cohort (so self-reported health status would tend to vary within but not
between cohorts), weakening its association with actual health conditions and so
medical expenditures.
In Table B.3 we show coefficients from demand system excluding medical
spending, additionally controlling for the quantity of medical consumption (defined
as the volume of medical spending or expenditure divided by price). This is a model
of conditional demands (using the language of Pollak (1969)), allowing us to test
for the presence of non-separabilties in medical consumption over and above those
associated with ill-health. In both countries, much medical consumption is publicly
provided and can only be obtained in rationed quantities. As a result, we instru-
ment medical consumption with its price. To make our results easier to interpret,
we also scale medical expenses by their standard deviation in both countries. We
use a test of the significance of the medical quantity term to test the hypothesis of
separability between medical and other demands. In both countries, we find evi-
dence of non-separability. In the US, higher medical quantities are associated with
significantly lower spending on other non-durables and recreation. Our results im-
ply a one standard deviation increase in medical quantities in the US is associated
with an increase in the US budget share on housing related goods by around 7 per-
centage points. The direction of effects for the UK are similar to those for the US,
except that higher medical consumption in the UK is associated with lower (rather
B.3. Coverage of household surveys 267
than higher) spending on housing and with higher (rather than lower) recreation
spending. However, the latter of these effects is not significant in the UK.
B.3 Coverage of household surveys
Comparisons of both the LCFS and the CEX to the aggregate National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) in the respective countries have highlighted the pos-
sibility of increasing measurement error over time in the two surveys. It is now
well-documented that coverage rates (the proportion of consumer expenditure in
the national accounts that is accounted for by the household surveys) have been de-
clining in both the US and UK (see for example Passero et al. (2015) and Attanasio
et al. (2006)). This potentially has consequences for our estimates of consumption
growth. In this appendix we compare trends in coverage rates for the two countries
to understand better what the implications of this might be.
Any comparison of national account and survey data must take into account the
fact that the two sources of information measure different spending concepts. For
example, the two sources cover different populations. Both the LCFS and the CEX
surveys exclude foreign residents and those in institutional residences whose spend-
ing is included in NIPA. In addition, some items of spending that may be thought of
as taxes are included as expenditures in surveys but are counted as transfers rather
than expenditures in the NIPA. Finally, there are items for which the definitions
of spending differ. For example, the NIPA impute rental costs to owner-occupiers
while not including the outgoings on for example mortgage interest payments. In
the US spending on healthcare made on behalf of households by employers and the
government (including the Medicare and Medicaid programs) are also counted as
household spending in the NIPA but are not counted in the CEX. Many of these mea-
surement differences might plausibly be thought to have been increasing over time,
perhaps differentially so in our two countries. In what follows, we calculate cover-
age rates after first making adjustments to both our survey data and to the NIPA to
make them more comparable. We start by removing spending by non-profit institu-
tions on households behalf from the personal consumption expenditures in both the
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Table B.3: Estimated conditional demand system coefficients αmk (no medical)
Food in Food out OthND Housing Recrea Transport
UK (1978-2010)
Mean Budget Shares (percent):
24.81 5.07 25.55 24.29 7.44 12.83
Single -8.50 6.71 1.21 -3.37 0.01 3.79
(0.41) (0.68) (0.51) (0.37) (0.23) (0.21)
Renter 1.45 -0.89 3.91 -3.89 0.36 -0.88
(0.22) (0.34) (0.28) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12)
Own-outright 1.09 -2.09 0.25 0.50 0.84 -0.51
(0.24) (0.38) (0.30) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13)
Head-empl. -0.08 0.74 -0.49 -0.89 -0.39 1.10
(0.19) (0.28) (0.25) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Both work -2.11 3.41 -0.88 -1.31 0.57 0.21
(0.32) (0.54) (0.41) (0.29) (0.18) (0.17)
ln(mortality) 2.30 -2.99 -0.08 1.51 0.01 -0.64
(0.30) (0.50) (0.37) (0.28) (0.17) (0.15)
Worst health -0.68 -0.23 -1.27 -0.64 1.46 1.36
(1.07) (1.55) (1.40) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
Medical quantity -24.66 59.62 -30.00 -14.94 1.66 5.98
(4.73) (8.44) (5.71) (5.09) (2.52) (2.16)
US (1988-2010)
Mean Budget Shares (percent):
25.28 7.38 20.31 23.07 4.80 19.15
Single -6.33 3.12 0.68 0.38 -0.41 2.50
(0.52) (0.31) (0.42) (0.47) (0.30) (0.38)
Renter 0.10 2.46 5.66 -11.75 1.67 1.91
(0.30) (0.19) (0.27) (0.31) (0.19) (0.27)
Own-outright 0.18 0.65 -0.51 -0.55 0.54 -0.30
(0.18) (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11) (0.15)
Head-empl. 0.60 0.41 -1.31 0.17 -0.67 0.76
(0.22) (0.14) (0.20) (0.23) (0.14) (0.19)
Both work -2.78 0.57 1.30 -0.35 -0.39 1.64
(0.29) (0.17) (0.24) (0.28) (0.17) (0.23)
ln(mortality) 0.13 -0.34 -0.62 0.42 1.03 -0.56
(0.34) (0.21) (0.27) (0.30) (0.21) (0.23)
Worst health -0.43 -0.23 2.23 -1.79 -1.61 1.84
(0.71) (0.43) (0.66) (0.77) (0.45) (0.66)
Medical quantity -2.18 1.10 -2.99 6.98 -5.28 2.03
(1.75) (1.08) (1.31) (1.47) (1.04) (1.08)
Notes: UK N=99,425; US N= 50,796, standard errors in parentheses. We take only data from the
first interview in the CEX. Additional controls for log expenditure, log expenditure squared, number
of children, number of adults, dummy for whether head or spouse has compulsory education, a
quadratic time trend, being over state pension age and self-reported health missing. Expenditure is
instrumented using income (with additional dummies in US model for year greater than 2001 and
year greater than 2004, when changes to the survey income questions were introduced). Medical
quantity is instrumented with its log price and scaled by its standard deviation in both countries.
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UK and the US. We then exclude spending on imputed rent to owner-occupiers in
the NIPA. In our surveys we remove the costs of mortgage interest, vehicle licensing
costs, property taxes and (in the UK) TV licenses. We also show the consequences
of removing health spending from both sources.
Figure B.2 plots the coverage rates for total expenditure, non-durables, non-
durables excluding medical expenditures and durables. The first thing to notice is
that there is still evidence of a steady decline in coverage in both countries. The top
left panel shows coverage rates for total spending (including medical) which decline
faster in the UK than the US. These fall from 80 percent to 71 percent in the UK
over the period 1985-2010 compared to a fall from 80 percent to 60 percent in the
US. A decline in coverage of this magnitude would reduce annual spending growth
as measured in surveys by around 0.5 percentage points in the UK compared to 1.2
percentage points in the US.
The coverage rates of non-durable spending, which is the definition of spend-
ing examined in this paper, decline at similar rates. However, when we remove
health spending in the bottom left panel, the picture is very different. Coverage rates
are now higher in the US (where they fall from 91 percent to 82 percent) than the
UK (where the fall is from 79 percent to 69 percent). The implied falls would now
suggest a slightly larger understatement of spending growth in the UK (by 0.54 per-
centage points compared to 0.46 percentage points in the US). The difference that
arises from excluding healthcare reflects the rapid growth of medical spending on
US households by government and employers. As mentioned above, these expendi-
tures are not included as household spending in the CEX survey but are included in
the US NIPA. Passero et al. (2015) estimate that spending by government on behalf
of households in the US increased by 271 percent from 1992 to 2010 and that this
accounts for one fourth of the growth in the gap between the coverage of the CEX
survey and NIPA consumption spending. An additional proportion is likely to be
explained by growth in the proportion of health costs paid by employers. In the UK
spending on the NHS is not attributed to households in the national accounts in the
same way, and employer coverage is much less widespread. As a result, excluding
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Figure B.2: Coverage rates, 1985-2010
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Notes: Coverage rate is the proportion of consumer expenditure in the national accounts that is
accounted for in the household surveys. Household survey data comes from the LCFS in the UK
and the CEX in the US. National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data comes from the UK
Office for National Statistics and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
health spending has a much smaller effect on coverage rates in the UK. Durable
spending in our household surveys has higher rates of coverage in both countries.
The CEX accounted for roughly 100 percent of the durable spending in the national
accounts by our measure in the US in 1985. This fell to just 63 percent in 2010. In
the UK the decline was from 83 percent to 77 percent over the same period.
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Table B.4: Changes in log non-durable expenditure
Including Medical Excluding Medical
Expenditure Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
US -0.009 -0.010 -0.028
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
UK -0.018 -0.023 -0.034
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Interest rate 0.199 0.318 0.313
(0.155) (0.160) (0.140)
Log Mortality -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆Head employed -0.068 -0.156 -0.117
(0.181) (0.180) (0.154)
∆Renter -0.029 -0.073 -0.163
(0.205) (0.201) (0.167)
∆Number of kids -0.043 -0.057 -0.042
(0.059) (0.059) (0.051)
∆Number of adults 0.248 0.237 0.233
(0.041) (0.039) (0.034)
∆Single -0.303 -0.275 -0.275
(0.080) (0.078) (0.068)
∆Worst health -0.781 -0.847 -0.585
(0.532) (0.530) (0.430)
∆Log Medical Price -0.510 -0.470
(0.112) (0.096)
pi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t 0.002
(0.002)
(US-UK)100 0.905 1.304 0.558
(0.551) (0.611) (0.658)
Hausman endogeneity 0.204 0.336 0.629
test (p-value)
N 616 616 616
Notes: Estimates presented are for weighted regressions with weights given by cell sizes in
each education-year-cohort cell. The dependent variable is log non-durable consumption
(col 1 with medical expenditure, cols 2 and 3 without). Additional controls for switch from
GHS to HSE surveys in the UK, change in proportion of households reporting own health in
US, and the change in proportion responding to subjective health questions. We instrument
employment, renter, health and mortality (and GHS, self-report dummies) with their first
and second lags. In column (4) we instrument the conditional risk term pi2s,k,t−1φs,k,t with
its lag value.
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
C.1 Proofs of chapter results
Proof of proposition 1.
Proof. To prove this proposition we need to show that firstly the test in (5.14) is
equivalent to GARP. Secondly, we need to show that data that satisfy the test in
(5.14) then this implies that they will be rationalised by the life-cycle model in the
sense given in definition 1.
Equivalence of (5.14) and GARP: Afriat’s theorem states that the following
two statements are equivalent (see Afriat (1967) or Varian (1982) for a proof):
(i) The data satisfy GARP: if qsRqt , then ptqt ≤ ptqs for all s, t
(ii) There exist ‘Afriat numbers’ Us,Ut ,λt > 0 such that Us ≤Ut +λt p′t(qs−qt)
for all s, t
Now if condition (ii) is satisfied for some data pt ,qt , then it will also be satisfied
for the data σt pt ,qt where σ1, ..,σT are any positive numbers. This is because if
U1...UT and {λ1..λT} satisfied (ii) in the old data, then U1...UT and {λˆ1..λˆT}, where
λˆt = λt/σt , will satisfy it in the new.
Conversely, if (ii) is satisfied for some σt pt ,qt , then it will also be satisfied for
pt ,qt . Hence, by Afriat’s theorem pt ,qt will satisfy GARP if σt pt ,qt satisfy (ii).
If we set σt = β t−1(1+ rt)(1+ rt−1) . . .(1+ r2) , then (ii) becomes the test of
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the life-cycle model in (5.14). Since this both implies and is implied by GARP, we
have that GARP⇐⇒(5.14).
Equivalence of the data satisfying (5.14) and the data being rationalised by
the life-cycle model (LCM): That LCM implies (5.14) is demonstrated in the text.
Thus, (5.14) is a necessary condition for LCM. It remains to be demonstrated that
(5.14) is sufficient for LCM. We can rearrange our test to get
λt
β t−1
ρ ′t (qs−qt)≥ u(qs)−u(qt)
Let’s call λtβ t−1ρ
′
t = Ξt . Across periods this gives us
Ξt(qs−qt)≥ u(qs)−u(qt)
Ξs(qu−qt)≥ u(qu)−u(qs)
...
Ξu(qz−qu)≥ u(qz)−u(qu)
Adding these up gives
Ξt(qs−qt)+Ξs(qu−qs)+ . . .+Ξu(qz−qu)≥ 0
This matches what Rockafellar (1997) and Browning (1989) call “cyclical
monotonicty”. Following Browning (1989) we can then apply Theorem 24.8 in
Rockafellar to demonstrate the existence of a concave utility function u(.) such that
u′(qt) = Ξt for all t. This satisfies the requirement in definition 1, completing the
proof.
Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 6
D.1 Mortgage imputation in Understanding Society
The BHPS contains data on mortgage values from 1993 (wave 3) onwards, while
Understanding Society dropped these variables in its second wave in 2010 except
for households who had newly moved. However, in all years of the BHPS and
Understanding Society the data contains a great deal of information on household
mortgages, including whether households are outright owners, the mortgage type,
the value of any additional loans, and the years left to pay on the mortgage. So as to
avoid throwing data out unnecessarily, we use this information to impute mortgages
for the remaining three waves of Understanding Society.
For those with interest only or ‘endowment’ mortgages, we assume no prin-
cipal repayments. In this case, we take the current value of the mortgage to be its
lagged value plus any additional loans the household may have taken out since its
previous interview. For those with standard repayment mortgages we assume the
loan is amortised with annual payments (which consist of both interest and princi-
pal) determined by
Ann. Payment = Mt−1× i/(1− (1+ i)−(`+1)) (D.1)
where Mt−1 is the value of the households mortgage in the previous year, i is
the interst rate and ` is the remaining life of the mortgage. This means that the
mortgage in any given period is given by
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Mt = Mt−1−Ann. Payment+ iMt−1+Mnewt (D.2)
where Mnewt is the amount of additional mortgage we observe the household
borrowing between periods t and t−1.
To assess the accuracy of our imputation procedure, we implemented it on
waves of the BHPS for which we observe the true value of households’ mortgages.
That is we took a set of households observed in the 3rd wave of the BHPS, and
imputed their mortgage values for all subsequent waves. We then plot the LTV
ratios implied by our imputation procedure against actual values calculated from the
survey for different percentiles of the LTV distribution (25th, 50th and 75th). The
results of this exercise are shown in Figure D.1. Our imputation procedure appears
to work extremely well - accurately predicting households’ LTV ratios even after
15 waves.
Figure D.1: Imputed and actual LTV values, BHPS
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Note: Data from British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society.
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D.2 LTI constraints and re-leveraging behaviour
To assess how re-leveraging responses vary according to households loan-to-income
and loan-to-value ratios, we run regressions of the following form
I[∆logMt > 0] = δ∆ logHValueit + εit (D.3)
separately for households with LTI ratios falling within different categories,
and separately in the BHPS and the PSID. As in Section 6.3, we instrument changes
in house values with changes in regional house prices. We use an indicator for
whether households increase their mortgage debt rather than the actual change in
mortgage debt to mitigate problems of endogeneity that come from splitting the
sample according to households’ debt values. We plot the coefficients on house
value changes for different LTI ratios in the left-hand panel of Figure D.2. The
right-hand panel shows the proportion of households who fall in each of the LTI
categories in the two countries.
The graph shows that in both countries, re-leveraging responses first rise and
the fall as households’ LTI ratios increase, suggesting that borrowing constraints
bind at high LTI ratios. US households appear more likely to re-leverage for a given
LTI value than their UK counterparts. UK households are more likely to have high
LTI ratios.
D.3 Two-sample IV
In this paper we make use of Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS).
Inoue and Solon (2010) show that this approach is more efficient than the TSIV
estimator of Angrist and Krueger (1992).
TS2SLS is best explained by first considering a standard two-stage least
squares (2SLS) approach.
Let M = [ X ωt−1 ωt−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) ] denote the n× (k + p) matrix of
right-hand side variables (p of which are endogenous). Suppose we face the prob-
lem of consistently estimating the 1× (k+ p) vector of coefficients δ in the model
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Figure D.2: Re-leveraging behaviour by LTI ratios
(a) Regressions coefficients by LTI category
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Notes: Data from British Household Panel Survey and Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The left-
hand panel shows regression coefficients from a regression of a indicator for increases in mortgage
debt over a two-year period on the change in log nominal house values (instrumented with the log
change in regional/state house prices).
c = Mδ + e
whereωt−1 and e are correlated. It is well known that the coefficients estimated
using a naive OLS regression of c on M will be biased. To solve this problem,
instrumental variable methods make use of an n× (k+ q) matrix of instruments Z
where the p endogenous variables in M are replaced with q ≥ p variables that are
assumed to be exogenous. This assumption implies that E[e|Z] = 0 and means that
δ can be consistently estimated using the 2SLS estimator
δˆ2SLS = (Mˆ′Mˆ)−1Mˆ′c (D.4)
where Mˆ = Z(Z′Z)−1Z′M, or the fitted values from the set of reduced form
regressions of the columns of M on Z
M = ZΠ+ v
Notice here that while this estimator requires knowledge of both the cross-
products Z′M and Z′c we do not require the cross product M′c. This insight was
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the basis for two sample IV proposed in Angrist and Krueger (1992).1 They show
that under certain conditions, it is possible to estimate δ even if no sample can be
found that contains data on M, c and Z simultaneously. All that is required is a
sample that includes both c and Z (but not necessarily the endogenous components
of M) and another which includes Z and M (but not necessarily c) . This allows us
to calculate a two sample 2SLS estimator (TS2SLS) that is analagous to (D.4)
δˆT S2SLS = (Mˆ1
′Mˆ1)−1Mˆ1
′
c1 (D.5)
where Mˆ1 = Z1(Z′2Z2)
−1Z′2M2 = Z1Πˆ2. Here c1 and M1 contain n1 obser-
vations from the first sample while M2 and Z2 contain n2 observations from the
second. Πˆ2 is the coefficient matrix formed from a regression of M2 on Z2.
This estimator can be implemented using a simple two step procedure:
1. Run a first stage regression in sample 2 and using the recovered coefficients
to impute M in sample 1.
2. In sample 1, regress c1 on the imputed values of M to recover δˆT S2SLS.
We adjust standard errors from our second stage regression to account for the
two-step nature of the procedure. Because we cluster observations from the same
household in our first stage regression, we use the robust standard error correction
for TS2SLS derived in Pacini and Windmeijer (2016).
D.4 Alternative estimation approaches
D.4.1 Alternative definitions of residential investment
First we investigate the extent to which our results depend on our chosen measure
of residential investment. The measure of residential investment that we use for our
main results includes certain white goods such as cookers, refrigerators and wash-
ing machines which are often capitalised into property values but which would not
1In their orginal article, Angrist and Krueger (1992) in fact proposed orginally an alternative
GMM estimator δˆIV = (Z′2M2/n2)
−1 (Z′1c1/n1). Asymptotically this gives identical results to the
TS2SLS estimator. However, Inoue and Solon (2010) show these two approaches will in general give
different answers in finite samples, and that the TS2SLS is more efficient. This gain in efficiency
arises because the latter estimator corrects for differences in the two samples in the distribution of Z
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necessarily be considered residential investment spending in for instance a national
accounting framework. Here we examine the extent to which our results are robust
to the removal of these items by restricting out definition to goods such as elec-
tric tools, floor coverings and the costs of installing or repairing heating and air
conditioning units (along with spending on household extensions).
We show results using these alternative measures in Table D.1. Column (1)
shows results using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of our narrower res-
idential investment measure. The effects of increases in prices for more leveraged
households are still large and statistically significant (and indeed very similar to
those obtained in our main results). In Column (2) we show results from a linear
probability model in which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the house-
hold is observed spending a positive amount on household extensions. This is prob-
ably the purest measure of residential investment in that it only includes structural
modifications to the home. Again we find that the investment spending of more
leveraged households is significantly more responsive to house price changes than
the spending of other home-owners. A 10% increase in local house prices is asso-
ciated with a 2 percentage point increase in the probability that a household with a
50% LTV ratio builds an extension in a given region, compared to a 1 percentage
point increase for outright owners.
Table D.1: Results with alternative definitions of residential investment
Narrow Res inv. Extensions>0
(1) (2)
ωit−1 -0.045 -0.010
(0.047) (0.010)
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) 0.725*** 0.100*
(0.278) (0.056)
R2 0.081 0.039
N 60,357 60,357
Notes: * p< 0.10 , ** p< 0.05 , *** p< 0.01. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. See table 6.5 for list of controls.
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D.4.2 Alternative instruments
In this section, we consider how our results are affected when we use two alternative
instruments in place of the price-to-income ratio at the time individuals moved into
their current residences.
Figure D.3: Credit Conditions Index vs price-income ratio
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Note: The construction of the Credit Conditions Index is described in
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006).
The first of these is the Credit Conditions Index (CCI) assembled in Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). This index contains 10 indicators of credit condi-
tions. Two are aggregate measures of unsecured and mortgage debts. The remaining
8 are fractions of mortgages for first time buyers that are above given loan-to-value
and loan-to-income ratios for different age groups and regions. The index is con-
structed controlling for various determinants of credit demand to ensure the index
reflects credit supply conditions.2 The series is plotted alongside our instrument in
Figure D.3. The CCI shows a discontinuous increase in 1981. Because this is not
2These controls are: nominal and real interest rates, a measure of interest rate expectations and
of inflation and interest rate volatility, mortgage and housing return, 36 risk indicators, house prices,
income, a proxy for expected income growth, the change in the unemployment rate, demography,
consumer confidence, portfolio wealth components, proxies for sample selection bias and institu-
tional features.
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matched by a similarly discontinuous increase in leverage for those moving in these
years in our sample, when we include households who moved before this date we
find the instrument to be weak and our results imprecise. The first two columns of
Table D.2 present results for log total spending and residential investment (condi-
tional on moving in 1981 or after). The results are very similar to what we obtain in
our main specification, with the implied elasticity much greater for residential than
other forms of spending.
The second alternative instrument we consider is the average regional price at
the point homeowners moved into their homes. This makes use of interregional
variation as well as intertemporal variation in house prices. We report results for
this approach in Table D.2. We find that they are again very similar to our main
results.
Table D.2: Results with alternative instruments
CCI Reg. house prices
Total Res. inv Total Res. inv
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ωit−1 -0.027 -0.135 0.034** 0.104*
(0.036) (0.144) (0.015) (0.058)
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) 0.097 0.847* 0.156* 0.829***
(0.112) (0.436) (0.081) (0.315)
Instruments:
CCI−T and CCI−T × ( prtprt−1 −1) x x
P−rT and P−rT × ( prtprt−1 −1) x x
R2 0.353 0.087 0.355 0.082
N 52,155 52,155 60,357 60,357
Notes: * p< 0.10 , ** p< 0.05 , *** p< 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
See table 6.5 for list of controls.
D.4.3 Alternative sample
A further concern might that our results for more leveraged households are driven
entirely by households who have just moved into their homes (and are thus more
likely to be at a credit constraint). Since price-to-income ratios have tended to
increase over time, our first stage regressions will tend to predict higher rates of
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leverage for more recent movers.
In our main results, we exclude households who moved into their homes in the
previous year only. In Table D.3 we consider how our results are affected when we
exclude households who moved into their homes within the previous five years. The
results from this exercise are remarkably similar to our main set of results.
D
.4.
A
lternative
estim
ation
approaches
283
Table D.3: Log spending responses
Total Non-durables Durables Res inv. Luxuries Total - Res
(IHS) (IHS) (IHS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ωit−1 -0.026** -0.016 -0.053 -0.063 -0.032 -0.023*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.049) (0.050) (0.026) (0.013)
ωit−1× ( prtprt−1 −1) -0.006 -0.001 -0.320 0.898** 0.128 -0.014
(0.120) (0.107) (0.444) (0.458) (0.233) (0.116)
R2 0.378 0.405 0.122 0.079 0.235 0.387
N 42,285 42,285 42,285 42,285 42,285 42,285
Notes: * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. See table 6.5
for list of controls.
Appendix E
Appendix for Chapter 7
Appendix to Section 7.1: Derivation of elasticities
Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities
For convenience we reproduce the consumer’s budget constraints and MRS condi-
tion:
yt =
(
Ah,t + ymh,t−F
(
ah,t
)
Ph,t
)
− Ah,t+1
1+ rt+1
(E.1)
ch,t +w
f
h,t lh,t = yh,t +w
f
h,tL (E.2)
w fh,t =
ulh,t
uch,t
= αh,t
l−θh,t
c−φh,t
(E.3)
Taking the derivative of the budget constraint and the MRS equation and stack-
ing them gives a matrix equation (omitting subscripts and superscripts for conve-
nience):
 1 wlc
φ −θ

 ∂ lnc∂ lnw
∂ ln l
∂ lnw
=
 w(L−l)c
1

This can be inverted to give the Marshallian elasticities in the main text (equa-
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tion 7.15):
εMc =
∂ lnc
∂ lnw
=
θw(L− l)+wl
θc+φwl
(E.4)
εMl =
∂ ln l
∂ lnw
=
φw(L− l)− c
θc+φwl
(E.5)
εMh =
∂ lnh
∂ lnw
=−
(
φw(L− l)− c
θc+φwl
)
l
L− l (E.6)
To calculate the Hicksian elasticities, we first calculate the income elastici-
ties by differentiating the MRS equation and the budget constraint with respect to
income:
εyc =
∂ lnc
∂ lny
=
θy
θc+φwl
(E.7)
εyl =
∂ ln l
∂ lny
=
φy
θc+φwl
(E.8)
The income elasticity and the marshallian elasticity are then used to calculate
the Hicksian elasticity using the Slutsky equation:
εHc = ε
M
c +
∂ lnc
∂ lny
wl
(c+wl)
εHl = ε
M
l −
∂ ln l
∂ lny
w(L− l)
(c+wl)
Frisch Elasticities
In this section we provide the formulae for the first and second derivatives that
are used to calculate the different elasticities. We define D = exp(piz+ ξP+ ζ )
(omitting subscripts for convenience). Then it is easy to show that:
uc (c, l) = DM−γc−φ (E.9)
ul (c, l) = DαM−γ l−θ (E.10)
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ucl (c, l) = (−γ)DM−γ−1αc−φ l−θ (E.11)
ull (c, l) = (−γ)ul (c, l)αM l
−θ −ul (c, l)θ l−1 (E.12)
ucc (c, l) = (−γ)uc (c, l)M c
−φ −uc (c, l)φc−1 (E.13)
Finally, note that:
ucl (c, l) = (−γ)uc (c, l) l−θ αM = (−γ)ul (c, l)c
−φ 1
M
(E.14)
These expressions can be used to calculate the Frisch elasticities in the main
body of the chapter. The formula for the wage Frisch for intensive margin choices
can be derived as follows:
 ucc ucl
ucl ull

 ∂c∂w
∂ l
∂w
=
 0
uc

 ∂c∂w
∂ l
∂w
=
 ucc ucl
ucl ull

−1 0
uc

 ∂c∂w
∂ l
∂w
= 1
uccull−u2cl
 ull −ucl
−ucl ucc

 0
uc

εFc =
w
c
∂c
∂w
=− ucucl
uccull−u2cl
w
c
(E.15)
εFl =
w
l
∂ l
∂w
=
ucucc
uccull−u2cl
w
l
(E.16)
εFh =
w
L− l
∂ (L− l)
∂ l
∂ l
∂w
=− ucucc
uccull−u2cl
w
L− l =−εl
l
L− l (E.17)
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The formula for the interest-rate Frisch can similarly be derived as follows:
 ucc ucl
ucl ull

 ∂c∂ (1+Rt+1)
∂ l
∂ (1+Rt+1)
=
 uc
ul

 ∂c∂ (1+Rt+1)
∂ l
∂ (1+Rt+1)
=
 ucc ucl
ucl ull

−1 uc
ul

 ∂c∂ (1+Rt+1)
∂ l
∂ (1+Rt+1)
= 1
uccull−u2cl
 ull −ucl
−ucl ucc

 uc
ul

εFRc =
(1+Rt+1)
c
∂c
∂ (1+Rt+1)
=
ucull−ulucl
(1+Rt+1)(uccull−u2cl)
1+Rt+1
c
=
ucull−ulucl
c(uccull−u2cl)
(E.18)
εFRl =
(1+Rt+1)
l
∂ l
∂ (1+Rt+1)
=
ulucc−ucucl
(1+Rt+1)(uccull−u2cl)
1+Rt+1
c
=
ulucc−ucucl
c(uccull−u2cl)
(E.19)
εFRh =
(1+Rt+1)
L− l
∂ (L− l)
∂ l
∂ l
∂ (1+Rt+1)
=− ulucc−ucucl
(1+Rt+1)(uccull−u2cl)
1+Rt+1
L− l =−ε
FR
l
l
L− l
(E.20)
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E.1 Appendix to Section 7.2: estimation strategy and
solution method
Fuller’s estimator
When estimating the parameters that determine the MRS or those that enter the
Euler equation, we use first order conditions to derive restrictions on the data to
identify structural parameters. Although these sets of conditions are different, as
one set is static in nature and one set is dynamic, they are of a similar nature, in that
they can be reduced to an expression of the type
E [h(X ;θ)Z] = 0 (E.21)
where h(·) is a function of data X and parameters, θ , and is linear in the vector
of parameters. The vectorZ contains observable variables that will be assumed to be
orthogonal to h. The nature of the instruments that deliver identification depends on
the nature of the residual h and, as we discuss below, is different when we estimate
the MRS conditions or the Euler equations. However, in both cases, we exploit a
condition such as (E.21).
In equation (E.21), one needs to normalise one of the parameters to 1. In the
context of the MRS equation (7.18), for example, we set the coefficient on lnwh,t to
1, but we could have set the coefficient on ln lh,t , or that on lnch,t to be 1. A well-
known issue with many estimators in this class is that in small samples they are not
necessarily robust to the normalisation used. A number of alternative estimators that
avoid this issue are available, ranging from LIML-type estimators, to the estimator
discussed in Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999), to the iterated GMM proposed
by Hansen et al. (1996). We use the estimator proposed by Fuller (1977) to estimate
both our MRS and Euler equations. This estimator is a modified version of LIML
with an adjustment that is designed to ensure that it has finite moments. Roughly
speaking, it can be thought of as a compromise between LIML and 2SLS (being
closer to LIML when the sample size is large relative to the number of instruments).
While this estimator is not completely normalisation free, it is much less sensitive
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to the choice of normalisation than estimators such as 2SLS and GMM.
An additional advantage of the Fuller estimator is that it is known to have better
bias properties than estimators such as 2SLS, when instruments are relatively weak.
In Section 7.2, we test the strength of our instruments comparing the values of the
Cragg-Donald test statistic to the relevant entries of the table supplied in Stock and
Yogo (2005).1 For the Fuller estimator that we employ, these critical values are
typically lower than those for 2SLS, and, unlike 2SLS, they are decreasing in the
number of instruments used.
Euler equation estimation with repeated cross-sections
We estimate the intertemporal parameters using the Euler equation. We need a long
time series because, even under rational expectations, expectations errors do not
necessarily average out to zero (or are uncorrelated with available information) in
the cross-section, but only in the time series: expectation errors may be correlated
with available information in the cross-section in the presence of aggregate shocks.
See the discussion in Hayashi (1987), Attanasio (1999), or Attanasio and Weber
(2010). We also need to assume that the lagged variables used as instruments are
uncorrelated with the innovations to the taste shifters ∆ζh,t+1. This is trivially true
if taste shifters are constant over time or if they are random walks. We maintain
one of these two assumptions, a hypothesis that we can in part test by checking
over-identifying restrictions.
We estimate equation (7.21) using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
Although the CEX covers many years, each household is only observed for a few
quarters and so we use a synthetic cohort approach (see Browning et al. (1985)):
we aggregate equation (7.21) over groups with constant membership and follow the
average behaviour of the variables of interest (or their non-linear transformation)
for such groups. A time series of quarterly cross sections can be used to construct
consistent estimates of these aggregates and, in this fashion, use a long time period
to estimate the parameters of the Euler equation and test its validity.
1The Cragg-Donald statistic is usually used to provide a test of underidentification. Stock and
Yogo (2005) propose using it as a test of instrument relevance as well.
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We define groups using married couples in ten year birth-cohorts. The assump-
tion of constant membership of these groups might be questioned at the beginning
and at the end of the life-cycle for a variety of reasons, including differential rates of
family formation, differential mortality and so on. To avoid these and other issues,
we limit our sample to households whose husband is aged between 25 and 65 and
where wives are aged between 25 and 60.2
Having identified groups, we aggregate equation (7.21) to be estimated across
group g households. For this approach to work, however, it is necessary that the
equation to be estimated is linear in parameters, which would be the case if Mh,t
were observable. However, Mh,t is a non-linear function of data and unobserved
parameters, so that, in principle it cannot be aggregated within groups to obtain
Mg,t . On the other hand, the parameters that determine Mh,t can be consistently esti-
mated using the MRS conditions as discussed in Section 7.2.1.3 These estimates can
be used to construct consistent estimates of Mh,t , which can be aggregated across
households to give Mg,t .
We can obtain consistent estimates of the grouped variables from the time se-
ries of cross-sections, giving the group average log-linear Euler equation:
η˜g,t+1 = κ+lnβ+ln(1+rt+1)−φ∆lncg,t+1+−γ∆ ln(M̂g,t+1)+ϕ∆Pg,t+1+pi∆zg,t+1
(E.22)
The residual term η˜g,t+1 now includes, in addition to the average of the ex-
pectation errors and of the changes in taste shifters, several other terms: (i) a linear
combination of the difference between the population and sample averages at time
t and t+1 for all the relevant variables (induced by the fact that we are considering
sample means rather than population means for group g); (ii) the difference between
the (consistently) estimated Mg,t and its actual value (induced by estimation error in
2If credit constraints are binding, the Euler equation will not be holding as an equality. The
youngest consumers are excluded because they are more likely to be affected by this issue. For older
consumers, in addition to changes in labour force participation and family composition, health status
also changes in complex ways that may be difficult to capture with the taste shifters that we have
been considering.
3Mh,t includes χh,t which is unobserved. However, since it is the residual from the MRS equation,
it can be included in the calculation of αh,t that is needed to calculate Mh,t .
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the parameters of the MRS); (iii) the difference between the innovation over time to
the average value of κg,t , which we have denoted with the constant κ.
All the variables on the right hand side of equation (E.22) are observable. We
can therefore use this equation to estimate the parameters of interest. However, the
instruments need to be uncorrelated with η˜g,t+1.4 The covariance structure of the
η˜g,t+1 is quite complex: the contemporaneous covariance of η˜gi,t+1 and η˜g j,t+1 is
not, in general, zero, as aggregate shocks have effects that correlate across differ-
ent groups. When computing the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, this
structure should be taken into account. Whilst it is in principle possible, given our
assumptions, to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of η˜g,t+1 from estimated
parameters, in practice it turns out to be cumbersome, as there is no guarantee that,
in small samples, these estimates are positive-definite. Given these difficulties, we
follow a different and, as far as we know, novel approach, based on bootstrapping
our sample, with a structure consistent with the basic assumptions of our model.
We describe the bootstrapping procedure in detail in the next subsection.
Bootstrap procedure
We bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals for both our MRS and Euler
equations.
The two step Heckman-selection procedure for estimating the MRS coeffi-
cients can be bootstrapped in the standard way. Bootstrapping results for our Euler
equation requires a slightly more complicated procedure however. This is because
we aggregate our data into cohort groups and then implement an IV procedure.
Taking Zt as a vector of exogenous variables, and Xt and Yt as endogenous variables
(with Yt as our dependent variable) we can reformulate our approach as estimating
the equations
4As noted by Deaton (1985) and discussed extensively in the context of the CEX by Attanasio
and Weber (1995), the use of sample rather than population averages for all the ‘group’ variables
induces an MA(1) in the residuals, because of the sampling variation in the rotating panel structure.
We need to assume that the instruments are not correlated with the (average) estimation error of the
Mh,t or with the innovations to the higher moments of the expectation errors (κg,t − κ). This last
assumption is discussed in Attanasio and Low (2004).
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Xt = ΠZt + vt
Yt = Xtβ +ut
where vt is a vector of errors in our first stage. These can be thought of as
economic shocks which may have a complicated structure. For instance they may
be correlated across time for a given cohort, or may have an aggregate component
which is correlated across cohorts for a given time period. Errors may also be
correlated across the equations for different exogenous variables Zt . We will wish
to preserve these correlations when we implement our bootstrap procedure. In order
to do this, we attempt to construct the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals v.
Rather than filling in all possible cross-correlations in this matrix, we calculate the
following moments for each cohort c, and equation i
var(vi,c)
cov(vi,ct ,v
i,c
t−1)
cov(vi,ct ,v
j,c
t )
cov(vi,ct ,v
i,k
t )
Setting all other correlations to zero. Thus we impose for instance that there
is zero correlation between vi,ct and v
i,k
t−1. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that
this matrix will be positive definite. In our procedure we therefore apply weights to
the non-zero elements of our ‘off-diagonal’ matrices - which give the covariances
across different cohorts for the same equation - and to our 1st autocovariances for
residuals for the same cohort and same equation. The weights we apply to these are
the maximum that ensure the resulting matrix is positive definite: in our case they
are both set at 0.23.
Once we have this matrix we can Cholesky decompose it to obtain a vector of
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orthogonalised residuals
Ω= vv′ = εCC′ε ′
We then draw from the orthogonalised residuals, premultiply them by C and
then add them to ΠZt to reconstruct the endogenous variables (including Y ). We
then reestimate our second stage equation to obtain a new set of estimates for β .
The values of Zt in our case will depend on the results we obtain from our
MRS equation, so in each iteration of our bootstrap we resample with replacement
from from our disaggregated data, re-run the MRS equation, reaggregate to obtain
the cohort averages which make up Zt and then make a draw from our residuals.
Solution method
Households have a finite horizon and so the model is solved numerically by back-
ward recursion from the terminal period. At each age we solve the value function
and optimal policy rule, given the current state variables and the solution to the
value function in the next period. This approach is standard. The complication in
our model arises from the combination of a discrete choice (to participate or not)
and a continuous choice (over saving). This combination means that the value func-
tion will not necessarily be concave. We briefly describe in this appendix how we
deal with this potential non-concavity. An alternative would be to follow the method
in Iskhakov et al. (2017).
In addition to age, there are four state variables in this problem: the asset stock,
the permanent component of earnings of the husband, vmh,t , the permanent compo-
nent of wife’s wage, v fh,t ,and the experience level of the wife. We discretise both
earning and wage variables and the experience level, leaving the asset stock as the
only continuous state variable. Since both permanent components of earnings are
non-stationary, we are able to approximate this by a stationary, discrete process only
because of the finite horizon of the process. We select the nodes to match the paths
of the mean shock and the unconditional variance over the life-cycle. In particular,
the unconditional variance of the permanent component must increase linearly with
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age, with the slope given by the conditional variance of the permanent shock. Our
estimates of the wage variance are for annual shocks, but the model period is one
quarter. We reconcile this difference by imposing that each quarter an individual re-
ceives a productivity shock with probability 0.25, and this implies that productivity
shocks occur on average once a year.
Value functions are increasing in assets At but they are not necessarily concave,
even if we condition on labour market status in t. The non-concavity arises because
of changes in labour market status in future periods: the slope of the value function
is given by the marginal utility of consumption, but this is not monotonic in the
asset stock because consumption can decline as assets increase and expected labour
market status in future periods changes. By contrast, in Danforth (1979) employ-
ment is an absorbing state and so the conditional value function will be concave.
Under certainty, the number of kinks in the conditional value function is given by
the number of periods of life remaining. If there is enough uncertainty, then changes
in work status in the future will be smoothed out leaving the expected value func-
tion concave: whether or not an individual will work in t +1 at a given At depends
on the realisation of shocks in t +1. Using uncertainty to avoid non-concavities is
analogous to the use of lotteries elsewhere in the literature.
The choice of participation status in t is determined by the maximum of the
conditional value functions in t. In our solution, we impose and check restrictions
on this participation choice. In particular, we use the restriction that the participation
decision switches only once as assets increase, conditional on permanent earnings
and experience. When this restriction holds, it allows us to interpolate behaviour
across the asset grid without losing our ability to determine participation status.
We therefore define a reservation asset stock to separate the value function and
the choice of consumption made when participating from the value function and
choice of consumption made when not participating. There are some regions of the
state space where individuals are numerically indifferent between working and not
working. Since we solve the model by value function iteration, it does not matter
which conditional value function we use in these regions
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In solving the maximisation problem at a given point in the state space, we
use a simple golden search method. Note that in addition to the optimal total ex-
penditure, the optimal amount of leisure is computed in each period by solving the
MRS condition. We solve the model and do the calibration assuming this process is
appropriate and assuming there is a unique reservation asset stock for each point in
the state space, and then check ex-post.
There are no non-concavities due to borrowing constraints in our model be-
cause the only borrowing constraint is generated by the no-bankruptcy condition
which is in effect enforced by having infinite marginal utility of consumption at
zero consumption.
Finally, we include here the value functions of the household problem. In each
period, if the woman chooses to participate, the value function is given by
V 1h,t
(
Ah,t ,vh,t
)
=
max
ch,t ,lh,t
u(ch,t , lh,t ,Ph,t = 1)+ βEt
max
 V 0h,t+1
(
Ah,t+1,vh,t+1
)
V 1h,t+1
(
Ah,t+1,vh,t+1
)

  (E.23)
Note that the state variable vh,t is a vector containing the woman and the man’s
productivity type. If she chooses not to participate, the value function is given by,
V 0h,t
(
Ah,t ,vh,t
)
=
max
ch,t
u(ch,t ,Ph,t = 0)+ βEt
max
 V 0h,t+1
(
Ah,t+1,vh,t+1
)
V 1h,t+1
(
Ah,t+1,vh,t+1
)

  (E.24)
The decision of whether or not to participate in period t is determined by com-
paring V 0h,t
(
Ah,t ,vh,t
)
and V 1h,t
(
Ah,t ,vh,t
)
. The participation choice, the hours choice
and the consumption choice in t determines the endogenous state variable (assets)
at the start of the next period.
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E.2 Appendix to Section 7.3: data sources and de-
scriptive statistics
As discussed in the the main chapter, most of the data are from the CEX.
One important exception are the data on the real interest rate. We define this
variable as the 3 month T-Bill rate (on a quarterly basis) minus the rate of
growth in the CPI. The source for the T-Bill rate is from the St Louis Fed
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS).
In for Table E.1 presents descriptive statistics at the individual level using data
from three particular years (1980, 1995 and 2012). Married women have seen large
changes in their wages, hours and patterns of employment over our sample period.
Employment rates increased from 60% in 1980 to 69.8% in 1995 before falling back
to 61.9% in 2012.
Table E.1 also shows wage levels over the three years. Average real wages
increased over this period, though with marked differences across different edu-
cation groups. The wages of those with less than high school education actually
fell slightly from $12.16 in 1980 to $11.33 in 2012. By contrast, married women
with a college degree or higher saw a 20% increase in their wages between 1980
and 2012 (from $19.30 to $23.20). This increase in the education premium has
been attributed to skill-biased technological change which outstripped the supply of
educated workers (Goldin and Katz, 2007).
Changes in hours worked across education groups appear to mirror these pat-
terns. While all education groups worked very similar hours in 1980, by 2012 those
with a college degree were working on average five hours more per week than those
with less than high school education, although the fraction with a college degree
has markedly increased over the period.
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Table E.1: Descriptive statistics for married women, 1980, 1995 and 2012
1980 1995 2012
Demographics No. of children 1.25 1.15 1.17
Education % Less than high school 19.4 12.3 9.7
% High school 44.1 36.8 25.3
% Some college 18.1 25.3 28.5
% Degree or higher 18.4 25.5 36.5
Hours (workers) All 35.2 37.5 38.4
Less than high school 34.9 37.4 34.2
High school 35.2 36.2 38.6
Some college 35.0 36.7 37.1
Degree or higher 35.5 39.7 39.5
Hourly net wages ($ 2016) All 15.58 16.63 18.95
Less than high school 12.16 11.23 11.33
High school 14.22 13.41 14.62
Some college 16.62 16.41 17.28
Degree or higher 19.30 22.26 23.20
% Employed All workers 60.0 69.8 61.9
% Workers part-time 28.4 23.7 20.6
Sample sizes All 2,199 2,064 2,026
Workers 1,318 1,441 1,254
Note: Part-time is defined as working less than 35 hours per week.
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Alternative methods of estimating the MRS
In this appendix we discuss results from alternative MRS specifications. For com-
parison with later results, we present a more complete set of parameter estimates
from our baseline MRS specification in Table E.3. First, we present results for the
selection probit we run prior to estimating our MRS equation. Husband’s earnings
are strongly negatively correlated with participation.
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Table E.2: Selection probit results
Log earnings of husband -0.164*** (0.007)
Husband employed -1.929*** (0.064)
No. of Elderly HH members 0.023 (0.026)
Log family size -0.110*** (0.022)
Wife: White -0.015 (0.014)
Age -0.056 (0.042)
Age2 0.001 (0.001)
Age3 /1000 0.003 (0.018)
Age4 /10000 -0.003* (0.001)
Has kids -0.034 (0.018)
No. of kids aged 0-2 -0.515*** (0.014)
No. of kids aged 3-15 -0.167*** (0.008)
No. of kids aged 16-17 0.071*** (0.017)
North East -0.004 (0.015)
Mid-West 0.119*** (0.014)
South 0.035** (0.013)
Notes: N= 78,674. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls for season
and year dummies and cohort-education interactions.
Estimation method and normalisation
We start by considering the issue of how the MRS is normalised. Recall that our
MRS relationship is
lnw fh,t = ψ0+ψzh,t−θ ln lh,t +φ lnch,t +υh,t (E.25)
As Keane (2011) notes, this is not a labour supply equation but an equilibrium
condition in which wages, leisure and consumption are all endogenous. All three
variables are potentially correlated with the error term υh,t and so there is no natural
choice of the dependent variable.
Despite this, we find that, when conventional methods are used, results can
be highly sensitive to whether wages, leisure or consumption are placed on the left
hand side of the MRS equation. Table E.4 shows results from estimating φ and θ
using GMM under the three different possible normalisations. We include results
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Table E.3: Baseline MRS estimates
Parameter Estimate (Standard Error) [95% C.I]
θ 1.75** (1.230) [0.34,5.12]
φ 0.76*** (0.103) [0.55,0.95]
Ψ
Age 0.05** (0.02) [0.01,0.09]
Age2 -0.0005 (0.0007) [-0.002,0.001]
Age3/1000 -0.01 (0.01) [-0.03,0.01]
Age4/10000 0.002** 0.0007 [0.0002,0.003]
North East 0.01 (0.03) [-0.02,0.08]
Mid West -0.05** (0.01) [-0.07,-0.02]
South -0.11*** (0.02) [-0.18,-0.09]
White -0.04 (0.03) [-0.09,0.04]
No. elderly HH members 0.02 (0.02) [-0.02,0.05]
ln( f amsize) -0.32*** (0.037) [-0.38,-0.23]
Has kids 0.07*** (0.021) [0.04, 0.12]
No. of kids 0-2 0.15*** (0.030) [0.10, 0.22]
No. of kids 3-15 0.06*** (0.017) [0.04, 0.10]
No. of kids 16-17 -0.02* (0.011) [-0.05,0.00]
Constant (Ψ0) 4.70 (4.94) [-1.19,18.52]
Heckman selection terms
e1 0.07 (0.167) [-0.18, 0.48]
e2 0.05 (0.172) [-0.21, 0.51]
e3 0.01 (0.052) [-0.08, 0.13]
Notes: N = 50,895. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional controls for season and year
dummies and cohort-education interactions. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 1000
replications allowing for clustering at the individual level.
form our baseline specification in the first column. The implied parameter estimates
and elasticities vary a great deal across these different approaches. When wages are
selected as the left-hand side variable, elasticites are relatively large. When leisure
is the dependent variable, they are much smaller. Very similar considerations apply
to the estimation of our Euler equation.
Differences of this kind can emerge in IV estimation in 2SLS and GMM esti-
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Table E.4: MRS estimates using GMM
Fuller GMM
Dependent variable: Wages Wages Leisure Consumption
Parameters
θ 1.75∗∗
[0.34,5.12]
0.46∗
[−0.04,0.61]
13.8
[−120.13,186.11]
0.13
[−0.54,0.58]
φ 0.76∗∗∗
[0.55,0.95]
0.61∗∗∗
[0.48,0.66]
0.17
[−3.44,2.78]
1.38∗∗∗
[1.24,1.74]
Wage elasticities at median
Marshallian 0.18
[0.05,0.38]
0.55
[0.50,1.16]
0.09
[0.00,0.12]
−0.17
[−0.41,−0.08]
Hicksian 0.54
[0.27,1.29]
1.19
[1.10,2.25]
0.11
[−0.01,0.14]
0.77
[0.59,1.10]
Notes: N = 50,895. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls as in Table 7.3. Elasticities
are calculated as averages within a 5 percent band of the 50th percentile of the Marshallian
distribution. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Confidence intervals are boot-
strapped with 1000 replications.
mation when the instruments chosen are relatively weak. Indeed, Hahn and Haus-
man (2003) propose using the differences in parameters implied by 2SLS estimates
run under different normalisations as a test of instruments’ strength.
Various papers have discussed possible remedies for cases when strong instru-
ments are not available (Hahn and Hausman, 2003; Hausman et al., 2012). One
possible solution is the use estimators such as Limited Information Maximum Like-
lihood (LIML) rather than 2SLS, which is known to have poor bias properties in
such circumstances (Staiger and Stock, 1997b; Nelson and Startz, 1990). Using the
notation from Davidson and MacKinnon (2004), for the case where
y = Zβ1+Yβ2+u = Xβ +u
Y = ΠW + v
where Z is a matrix of exogenous variables, Y a matrix of endogenous vari-
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ables, and W = [Z,W1] (with W1 being a matrix of instruments). Matrices X and W
are n×k and n× l respectively (with l ≥ k). In general, so-called k-class estimators
such as OLS, 2SLS, and LIML can be written in the form
βˆLIML = (X ′(I− kMW )X)−1X ′(I− kMW )y (E.26)
where MW = I−W (W ′W )W ′. In the case of OLS k = 0, and in the case of
2SLS k = 1. In the case of LIML we use
k = kLIML =
(y−Yβ2)′MZ(y−Yβ2)
(y−Yβ2)′MW (y−Yβ2) (E.27)
While LIML is often found to have better bias properties than 2SLS, it has
long been recognised that conventional normalisations of LIML do not have finite
moments (Mariano and Sawa, 1972; Sawa, 1972), and simulation exercises have
shown that this can add considerable volatility to empirical estimates (Hahn et al.,
2004). As a result Hahn et al. (2004) recommend the use of either jack-knifed 2SLS
or the modification of LIML proposed by Fuller (1977). For this latter estimator,
we replace k in equation (E.26) with
kFuller = kLIML− λ
(n− k) (E.28)
where λ here is a parameter chosen by the researcher, to obtain a value for
βˆFuller. We choose a value of one for this as suggested by Davidson and MacK-
innon (2004) as it yields estimates that are approximately unbiased. The resulting
estimator is guaranteed to have bounded moments in finite samples Fuller (1977).
Since the adjustment to LIML is smaller when (n− k) is large, the Fuller estimator
will be closer to LIML when sample sizes are large relative to the number of instru-
ments. In our case, the Fuller estimator can be thought of as a compromise between
2SLS and LIML, as it adjusts the value of k we use downwards slightly towards
one.
As well as its superior bias properties, the Fuller estimator has the advantage
that is much less sensitive than GMM or 2SLS to the choice of the dependent vari-
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able, as Table E.5 shows. Both the elasticity and parameter estimates obtained using
alternative normalisations of the Fuller estimator are very similar to our baseline re-
sults.
Table E.5: MRS estimates with different dependent variables
Dependent variable
Wages Leisure Consumption
Parameters
θ 1.75∗∗
[0.34,5.12]
1.84∗
[−0.43,5.38]
1.75∗
[−0.00,4.60]
φ 0.76∗∗∗
[0.55,0.95]
0.76∗∗∗
[0.53,0.95]
0.77∗∗∗
[0.58,0.95]
Wage elasticities
at median
Marshallian 0.18
[0.05,0.38]
0.17
[0.06,0.37]
0.18
[0.07,0.42]
Hicksian 0.54
[0.24,1.07]
0.53
[0.23,0.95]
0.54
[0.27,1.29]
Notes: N = 50,895. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Controls as in Table
7.3. Elasticities are calculated as averages within a 5 percent band of the
50th percentile of the Marshallian distribution. 95% confidence intervals in
square brackets. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 1000 replica-
tions.
Alternative instruments
In Table E.6 we show results using alternative choices of instruments. We show
results using GMM (with wages as the dependent variable) and the Fuller estimator
described above, in both cases using a full set of cohort-education-year interactions
as used in Blundell et al. (1998). This approach is similar to the approach we adopt
for our main results but interacts cohort-eduction dummies full set of year effects
rather than a polynomial in time trends. The estimates we obtain from fully adopting
the Blundell et al. (1998) approach are very similar to our main results, though
E.3. Appendix to Section 7.4 303
somewhat less precise.
The sensitivity of our results to the choice of instruments is on the whole quite
small when we compare it to the differences that can arise from the choice of es-
timation method. Just as we find for our main set of results, the hours elasticities
estimated using the GMM estimator with wages as the dependent variable are sub-
stantially larger than those using the Fuller estimator when using the alternative
instrument set.
Table E.6: MRS estimates using alternative instruments
Fuller GMM
Parameters
θ 1.93
[−9.09,11.58]
0.08
[−0.20,0.19]
φ 0.76∗∗∗
[0.42,1.03]
0.52∗∗∗
[0.41,0.52]
Wage elasticities
at median
Marshallian 0.17
[−0.84,1.13]
1.08
[1.04,2.29]
Hicksian 0.51
[−1.91,2.65]
1.97
[1.82,3.85]
Notes: N = 50,895. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. We use a full set
of cohort-education-year dummies as instruments, following Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998). Controls as in Table 7.3. Elasticities are cal-
culated as averages within a 5 percent band of the 50th percentile of the
Marshallian distribution. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.
Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
Alternative samples
Table E.7 shows how our MRS results are affected by alternative sample selection
choices. Column (1) presents results when we exclude those individuals who report
working exactly 40 hours a week. The justification of this experiment is that these
individuals may be affected by some kind of friction that does not allow them to
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adjust their hours worked as desired. Such frictions would mean that the MRS con-
dition that we exploit to recover φ and θ need not hold. Excluding these observa-
tions, we obtain greater estimates of our Marshallian and Hicksian hours elasticities
(at 0.45 and 0.72 respectively). These values are however somewhat imprecisely
estimated and the confidence bands that surround them include our baseline esti-
mates.
In Column (2) we show results when we exclude individuals working less than
20 hours per week (with an appropriate adjustment to our selection correction).
We consider results from this specification because there may be certain frictions
that prevent individuals working fewer hours than this, which would again lead to
potential violations of the MRS condition. Excluding these observations delivers
somewhat lower elasticity estimates, but again the estimates are imprecise.
Finally, in column (3) we consider only those ten-year birth cohorts with the
most similar labour-supply behaviour over the life-cycle. In particular we exclude
those born before 1925 as they tend to work fewer hours at older ages than other
cohorts, and those born after 1975, as less-educated individuals born after this date
tend to have lower employment rates than other earlier cohorts at the same ages.
Using this sample, we obtain a Marshallian elasticity of 0.27 and a Hicksian 0.53.
While the Marshallian elasticity estimated from this sample is slightly higher than
our baseline estimates, the Hicksian elasticity is essentially unchanged.
Alternative definitions of hours
In column (4) of Table E.7 we consider how elasticity estimates are affected when
we use an alternative measure of hours of leisure. The measure we use here is
leisure =
5200−hours per week × weeks worked per year
52
(E.29)
This measure accounts for the observed variation in weeks worked per year in
addition to variation in hours worked per week across workers.
The elasticities resulting from this exercise are in general lower but on the
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Table E.7: MRS estimates using alternative samples/hours measures
Exc. 40 hours Exc. <20 hours Born 1925-1965 Ann. hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters
θ 1.52
[−3.16,5.69]
2.81
[−2.48,9.81]
2.08∗∗∗
[0.68,4.66]
2.30∗
[−1.30,7.00]
φ 0.42∗
[−0.05,0.92]
0.76∗∗∗
[0.33,1.03]
0.56∗∗∗
[0.42,0.82]
0.78∗∗∗
[0.53,1.01]
Wage elasticities
at median
Marshallian 0.45
[−0.45,1.41]
0.13
[0.02,0.30]
0.27
[0.09,0.62]
0.13
[−0.09,0.41]
Hicksian 0.72
[−1.29,2.57]
0.39
[−0.14,1.43]
0.53
[0.27,1.09]
0.42
[−0.25,1.24]
N 26,060 47,743 39,057 50,895
Notes: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Specification (1) excludes individuals who work exactly
40 hours. Specification (2) excludes those working less than 20 hours (part-time workers). Specifi-
cation (3) only includes individuals from cohorts with the most similar labour supply choices over
the life-cycle. Elasticities are calculated as averages within a 5 percent band of the 50th percentile
of the Marshallian distribution. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. Confidence intervals
are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
whole similar to than those in our baseline specification, with a Marshallian elas-
ticity of 0.13 and a Hicksian elasticity of 0.42. The value of θ is larger than in
our main results (at 2.30), and much less precisely estimated. The value of φ is
essentially unchanged.
External parameters for the calibration
Table E.8 reports the complete set of estimated and external parameters used in the
calibration. The first panel reports the estimated parameters from Tables 7.3 and
7.4 above. The second panel reports parameters which come from external sources.
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Table E.8: External parameters
Estimated Parameters (from first-order conditions)
Curvature on leisure θ 1.75
Curvature on consumption φ 0.76
Curvature on utility γ 2.07
Exogenous Parameters
Interest Rate (annual) r 0.015
Regression Log Wage on Age and Age2 (Men) ιm1 , ι
m
2 0.0684, -0.00065
Husband and Wife Wage Correlation ρ 0.25
Std Dev. of Permanent Shock (Men) σξm 0.077
Std Dev. of Initial Wage (Men) σξm0 0.54
Length of Life (in years) T 50
Length of Working Life (in years) R 40
E.4 Appendix to Section 7.5: Results for CES and ad-
ditive separability
In this Appendix we discuss results for alternative specifications of our utility func-
tion. In particular we consider results from a standard CES utility function (where
we impose that θ=φ ), and one where we impose additive separability between con-
sumption and leisure (i.e γ = 0).
Table E.9 presents parameter estimates when we impose the restrictions im-
plied by CES utility. Under this functional form for utility, we get a slightly larger
value of φ and a much lower value of θ than we obtain from our preference speci-
fication (at 0.83 compared to 0.76 and 1.75 that we obtain for φ and θ respectively
in Table 7.3). We also obtain a slightly larger value of γ however (at 3.04 compared
to 2.07 for our less restrictive utility function).
Taken together, the CES parameter estimates imply that utility is less concave
in leisure, and hence that labour supply elasticities are greater. We show the elastic-
ities implied by these estimates in Table E.10. While Marshallian hours elasticities
for the CES specification are only greater at the upper end of the distribution, the
estimated Hicksian and Frisch hour elasticities are roughly 50% larger. The CES es-
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Table E.9: Parameter values
CES
φ 0.83
[0.66,0.97]
θ 0.83
[0.66,0.97]
γ 3.04
[0.64,4.27]
timates also imply a more substantial degree of non-separability between consump-
tion and leisure. The Frisch elasticity of consumption with respect to predictable
wage increases has a median of around 0.4 compared to 0.05 from our main esti-
mates. This reflects both a greater sensitivity of the marginal utility of consumption
to changes in leisure and the fact that leisure responses to given wage changes will
in general be greater under these preferences. Finally we note that, the interest rate
Frisch elasticity at the median is much lower than in our baseline specification.
Table E.10 also shows Frisch elasticities for our preference specification in the
case where we impose additive separability for preferences over consumption and
leisure (that is we impose that γ = 0). This necessarily sets the Frisch consumption
responses to wage changes to zero. It turns out that Frisch hours elasticities are
very similar to those estimated when we allow for non-separability in our main
specification. This reflects the fact that when, as we find, the parameters θ and φ
are small and α large, then the numerator and denominator in formulae for Frisch
elasticities given in equations (E.15) and (E.16) will be dominated by the term Mt .
Consequently, the impact of small changes in γ will be limited.
When additive separability is imposed, the Frisch elasticity is identical - a di-
rect result of setting ucl = 0 in expressions (E.18) and (E.19). The estimated Frisch
elasticity of consumption with respect to the interest rate (now simply given by
−1/φ ) also falls relative to our baseline results, from a median value of -1.19 in
our baseline results to -1.31.
E.5. Returns to experience 308
Table E.10: Elasticities at percentiles of Marshallian distribution: CES
γ = 0 CES
Wage Interest rate Wage Interest rate
Frisch Frisch Marshallian Hicksian Frisch Frisch
Hours worked Hours worked
10th 0.84
[0.23,3.17]
0.84
[0.23,3.17]
−0.24
[−0.30,−0.11]
0.48
[0.41,0.60]
1.08
[0.97,1.47]
0.83
[0.63,1.32]
25th 0.83
[0.23,3.15]
0.83
[0.23,3.15]
−0.04
[−0.13,0.12]
0.60
[0.51,0.76]
1.16
[1.06,1.56]
0.85
[0.65,1.35]
50th 0.90
[0.25,3.40]
0.90
[0.25,3.40]
0.21
[0.10,0.42]
0.77
[0.67,0.98]
1.33
[1.23,1.75]
0.93
[0.71,1.47]
75th 1.04
[0.29,3.93]
1.04
[0.29,3.93]
0.54
[0.39,0.82]
1.04
[0.89,1.32]
1.66
[1.53,2.17]
1.13
[0.86,1.78]
90th 1.98
[0.55,7.50]
1.98
[0.55,7.50]
1.11
[0.88,1.55]
1.62
[1.39,2.06]
2.71
[2.51,3.57]
1.89
[1.44,2.99]
Consumption Consumption
25th 0.00
[−,−]
−1.31
[−1.81,−1.05]
0.91
[0.82,1.08]
0.63
[0.54,0.80]
0.32
[0.12,0.53]
−0.59
[−0.93,−0.45]
50th 0.00
[−,−]
−1.31
[−1.81,−1.05]
1.07
[0.97,1.27]
0.72
[0.62,0.91]
0.37
[0.15,0.62]
−0.58
−0.91,−0.44]
75th 0.00
[−,−]
−1.31
[−1.81,−1.05]
1.23
[1.12,1.44]
0.80
[0.68,1.01]
0.42
[0.17,0.69s]
−0.57
[−0.90,−0.43]
Notes: Elasticities are calculated as averages within 5 percent bands of the 10th, 25th, 50th and
75th and 90th percentiles of the Marshallian distribution. 95% confidence intervals in square
brackets. Confidence intervals are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.
E.5 Returns to experience
We recalibrate parameter values: the fixed cost of working, F¯ , child care price, p,
the offered wage gender gap andψ0. In addition to these parameters, we also need to
calibrate the parameter that characterises human capital accumulation function and
its depreciation rate.5 As in the baseline, we identify these parameters by targeting
participation rate of women, the participation rate of mothers, the average hours
worked, the observed wage gender gap, the observed wage growth at early ages,
5Note this is only one parameter in contrast to the two parameters ι f1 and ι
f
2 for the exogenous
wage growth that were used in the baseline economy.
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and the observed depreciation of wages during non-participation (we take this figure
from Attanasio et al. (2008)). We report the calibrated parameters in Table E.11 and
compare them to the baseline. In the context of returns to experience, where there
is a strong incentive to work to reap future returns, a much larger childcare cost is
required in order to reduce participation and match participation statistics.
Analogously to Figure 7.2, Figure E.1 shows life-cycle profiles in the simula-
tions and in the data; and Table E.12 reports additional statistics on the distribution
of hours and of wages. There are some differences between the model with returns
to experience and the baseline. First, there is a decline in the participation profiles at
ages beyond 35. These patterns are not observed either in the data or in the baseline
model. Second, very few women change their participation decisions. For example,
the fraction of women who worked in all previous periods at the age of 52 is 57%,
which compares to 40% in the economy without returns to experience. Third, the
childcare cost that is needed here to keep women out of the labour market during
childbearing is substantially higher because of the incentive to accumulate labour
market experience. In particular the monetary fix childcare cost is up to 76% of
median earnings of a women aged 25 to 55.
E.5.1 Response to temporary wage changes
In Table E.13, we report the labour supply responses in the economy with returns
to experience. The key finding is that, in contrast to the economy without returns
to experience, the extensive margin response is close to zero and, as a result, the
aggregate elasticity is about half of the one in the baseline economy (reproduced in
the final column). In the return to experience economy, there is a strong incentive
to participate to obtain the return to experience. The larger childcare cost of partici-
pating that is estimated in this economy alongside the strong incentive to participate
implies that changes in the current wage makes little difference to the incentive to
participate. As expected, the size of the intensive margin response is similar to the
one in the economy without returns to experience. Our results here are in line with
Imai and Keane (2004) who argue that the response of labour supply to transitory
changes in wages may be mitigated when there are returns to experience. Our re-
E.5. Returns to experience 310
Table E.11: Baseline economy: calibrated parameters and targets
Parameter Name Values
Ret to Exp Baseline
Constant term weight of leisure ψ0 4.13 4.20
Childcare Cost p 5820 967
Fixed Cost of Working F¯ 315 468
Offered Wage Gender Gap at age 22 y f0/y
m
0 0.78 0.74
Std Dev. of Permanent Shock (Women) σξ f 0.063 0.063
Std Dev. of Initial Wage (Women) σξ f ,0 0.50 0.50
Exogenous growth in offered wage ι f1 - 0.052
Exogenous growth in offered wage ι f2 - -0.0006
Women’s Human Capital Tech ν 0.003 -
Discount Factor (annualized) β 0.99 0.99
Depreciation rate δ 0.017 -
Targets Data Ret to Exp Baseline
Weekly hours worked 37.2 37.5 37.2
Participation Rate 0.684 0.690 0.679
Participation Rate of Mothers 0.538 0.544 0.546
Observed Wage Gender Gap 0.720 0.716 0.727
Observed Var. Wage Growth (Women) 0.004 0.005 0.004
Observed Initial Var. of Wages (Women) 0.14 0.15 0.15
Wage Growth (if younger than 40) 0.012 0.013 0.010
Wage Growth (if older than 40) 0.001 0.013 0.004
Median wealth to income ratio 1.84 1.82 1.80
Observed Depreciation Rate -0.050 -0.040 0.02
Note: Statistics for women born in the 1950s and aged 25 to 55. Wage growth and depreciation
rate are annual.
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Table E.12: Returns to experience: statistics on hetereogeneity
Data Model
Participation Rate Mothers with Children Aged 3-17 0.682 0.672
Participation Rate Childless Women 0.755 0.724
Average Hours Worked 10th Percentile 20 21
Average Hours Worked 25th Percentile 35 31
Average Hours Worked 50th Percentile 40 40
Average Hours Worked 75th Percentile 40 46
Average Hours Worked 90th Percentile 48 50
Wage 10th Percentile 8.16 7.43
Wage 50th Percentile 15.05 15.58
Wage 90th Percentile 29.23 31.71
Note: Women without dependent children are women who have never had children and
those whose children are over 17.
Figure E.1: Life-cycle profiles: baseline model (solid line) versus data (dashed line)
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sults show that the response of the participation margin to a transitory anticipated
change in the wage (for given preferences on the intensive margin) may be very
different depending on the assumption that is made about the nature of the wage
growth over the life-cycle (exogenous or endogenous). The extra wage that is pro-
vided by an anticipated increase in the wage in a particular period is a small fraction
of the total return to participate in that period (in particular at early ages) and then
it has a small impact on the participation decision.
Table E.13: Returns to experience: Frisch changes
Extensive Intensive Elasticity Agg Hours Baseline
Response 25th 50th 75th Elasticity
25-29 0.02 0.65 0.81 1.15 0.91 1.85
30-34 0.04 0.63 0.79 1.17 0.91 1.48
35-39 0.03 0.63 0.78 1.17 0.90 1.45
40-44 0.03 0.61 0.79 1.19 0.89 1.35
45-49 0.04 0.60 0.77 1.19 0.88 1.39
50-55 0.07 0.58 0.75 1.09 0.86 1.45
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation in re-
sponse to a 1% increase in the wage. The aggregate hours elasticity reports the percent-
age change in hours corresponding to a percentage change in the wage, accounting for
changes at both the extensive and intensive margins.
It may well be that the small response of the extensive margin labour supply
that we find is related to the simple model of return to experience we have con-
sidered. Whether returns to experience operate in a more subtle manner through
intensive margins and the number of hours is a question we leave for future re-
search. If that is the case, we would need to change substantially the estimation
methods we used in the chapter.
One possibility, of course, is that returns to tenure are important for some oc-
cupations and/or skill levels and not for others. In such a case, it would be necessary
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to introduce an additional dimension of heterogeneity that would make the aggre-
gation issues we have repeatedly stressed even more salient.6
Life-Cycle responses to changes in wage profiles
Finally, in Table E.14 we report the extensive, intensive margin and the macro re-
sponses to an increase in the entire wage profile of 10% for both husband and wife.
In this case the response both at the extensive and the intensive margin is very sim-
ilar in the economy with and without returns to experience.
Table E.14: Labour supply changes, Marshallian
Extensive Intensive Elasticity Agg Hours
Response 25th 50th 75th Elasticity
Ret to experience 0.53 0.25 0.40 0.77 0.99
Baseline 0.51 0.28 0.42 0.67 0.91
Notes: The extensive response is the percentage point change in participation in
response to a 1% increase in the wage. The aggregate hours elasticity reports the
percentage change in hours corresponding to a percentage change in the wage,
accounting for changes at both the extensive and intensive margins.
6Alternatively it could be that returns to experience depend on hours worked. Blundell et al.
(2016b) show that these returns are close to zero for part-time work.
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E.6 Appendix to Section 7.4: selection correction
In this Appendix we consider an extension of the full model that we calibrate in Sec-
tion 7.4.3. We allow for taste shocks χ and ζ in the utility function. We solve and
simulate this economy and explore the ability of our empirical strategy in Section
7.2 to recover the preference parameter values that are assumed in the simulations
(φ = 0.76 and θ = 1.75). We discretise both χ and ζ .
Table E.15: MRS estimates with simulated data
OLS IV IV+Selection Correction
φ 0.52*** 0.61*** 0.76***
(0.000130) (0.00229) (0.0666)
θ 1.97*** 2.20*** 1.71*
(0.000561) (0.00528) (0.902)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.∗p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05,∗∗∗p< 0.01
In the first column of Table E.15 we report the OLS estimates of the MRS
equation using simulated data. We estimate φ = 0.52 and θ = 1.97. These are
clearly biased with respect to the assumed parameter values. As discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2, there are two reasons for the bias. First, regressors are endogenous since
consumption and leisure are correlated with the error term in the MRS equation,
and, second, there is non-random self-selection of women into the labour market.
In order to address the first issue we solve and simulate the economy for several
cohorts of women that differ in the average wage they face. We use the variation
in wages across cohorts to instrument consumption and leisure in the MRS equa-
tion and we provide the estimates in the second column of Table E.15. Estimated
parameter values are still biased with respect to the assumed parameter values. In
order to address the consequences of non-random selection we estimate a probit
of the participation decision in which we include as exclusion restrictions a cohort
dummy and the log of husband earnings (the same as what we used in the data). We
then include the selection correction terms as regressors of the MRS equation and
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report the results in the third column of the Table. In this case estimated parameter
values are very close to the assumed parameter values.
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